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ABSTRACT 
 
For many years, Kenya gave the impression of a relatively stable nation-state 
within the turbulent sub-Saharan Africa and a suitable hub from which the international 
community extends its missions to parts of Africa such as the Great Lakes Region 
(Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, DR Congo, Kenya and Tanzania) and the Horn of Africa 
(Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia Djibouti and Uganda). However, the highly disputed 
presidential elections in 2007 and the upheaval that followed prompted concern about 
Kenya’s stability in the wake of global insecurity. While the healing process is underway, 
challenges of intergroup accommodation persist, as Kenya counts about forty-two distinct 
ethno-linguistic groups. Also, the International Criminal Court (ICC) recently brought 
criminal proceedings against four of the six alleged masterminds of the 2007/08 conflicts, 
adding to the challenges of intergroup cohesion ahead of the next general elections.  
This dissertation examines the politics of intergroup accommodation in Kenya’s 
vernacular radios and how they influenced intergroup relations in the events leading to 
the 2007/08 conflicts. Considering conflict as a communicative process, it builds on 
Azar’s (1990) theory of Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC) by integrating media framing 
not only to unpack the discourses that surrounded the framing of the 2007/08 conflicts, 
but also to uncover attitudinal shifts that characterized intergroup relations prior to, 
during, and after this particular conflict. The study mainly borrows from qualitative 
methods to collect data from three distinct ethno-linguistic regions in Kenya: Nyeri 
(Kikuyu majority), Kisumu (Luo Majority) and Eldoret (Kalenjin majority).  
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The central argument of this dissertation is that the framing of conflicts by 
vernacular radios can either be differentiated or concerted, and this depends on the stage 
at which a given conflict manifests itself. While in differentiated framing, media 
narratives are negotiated in terms of negative competition likely to reinforce divisive or 
rebellious attitudes, concerted framing underpins the framing process whereby media 
discourses are articulated in a manner that underlines shared ideals that cut across 
intergroup allegiances, and thus may strengthen collaborative attitudes. I argue that the 
shifts in vernacular radio narratives occur when new elements are added to the already 
existing conflict frames and the kinds of “new meaning” they generate with regard to 
conflict processes.  
I also argue that the shifts from differentiated framing to concerted framing (and 
vice-versa) also hinge on the degree to which the proposed frames resonate with the 
appeals and expectations of the target population. Overall, the study argues that the 
language of broadcast and cultural proximity drive the framing of intergroup relations in 
Kenya’s vernacular radios, particularly in situations of conflict or competition. The 
strength of this dissertation lies in the analytical viewpoints that it proposes to locate the 
shifting perspectives in conflict situations, especially in multiethnic states where the 
politics of intergroup accommodation are fragile and situational.  
 
Keywords: Kenya, social conflicts, peace-building, ethnicity, media framing, vernacular 
radio. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Depuis des années, le Kenya avait donné l’impression d’être un pays relativement 
stable dans la région d’Afrique sub-saharienne, régulièrement secouée par les conflits, et 
un « centre » autour duquel la communauté internationale coordonne ses missions vers 
certains pays d’Afrique comme ceux faisant partie de la Région des Grandes Lacs 
(Burundi, Rwanda, Ouganda, République démocratique du Congo, Kenya et Tanzanie) et 
ceux de la Corne de l’Afrique (Kenya, Somalie, Éthiopie, Djibouti et Ouganda). 
Toutefois, les élections présidentielles très contestées en 2007 et les conflits qui se sont 
enchaînés ont entrainé de nombreuses préoccupations en ce qui concerne la stabilité du 
Kenya à l’ère de l’insécurité globale. Alors que le rétablissement de la paix continue, la 
coexistence entre groupes est toujours délicate car le Kenya compte au moins quarante-
deux ethnies qui sont toutes distinctes les unes par rapport aux autres. Par ailleurs, 
l’ouverture d’une enquête judiciaire, par la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI), contre 
quatre des six personnes présumées être les principaux auteurs des violences 
postélectorales de 2007/08, s’ajoute aux problèmes liés à la coexistence pacifique entre 
les différents groupes avant les prochaines élections.  
Cette thèse examine les politiques relatives à l’accommodation des différents 
groupes à travers les radios vernaculaires et comment ces politiques ont influencé les 
relations entre les groupes lors des conflits de 2007/08 au Kenya. Partant du constat 
qu’un conflit est un processus communicatif, elle intègre le concept d’encadrement 
médiatique à la théorie de Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) définie par Azar (1990) pour 
tracer non seulement les changements dans les discours d’encadrement de ces conflits, 
mais aussi pour illustrer les mutations des attitudes à l’égard des relations entre groupes 
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survenues avant, durant et après ces conflits. Cette étude emploie principalement les 
méthodes qualitatives pour rassembler les données issues des trois régions au Kenya qui 
sont ethniquement et linguistiquement divergentes: Nyeri (la majorité Kikuyu), Kisumu 
(la majorité Luo) et Eldoret (la majorité Kalenjin).  
L’argument central de cette thèse est que l’encadrement des relations entre 
groupes, notamment lors des conflits, est soit différencié soit concerté dépendamment du 
stade auquel le conflit se manifeste. Alors que dans l’encadrement différencié, les 
discours médiatiques sont articulés de façon à ce que ceux-ci soient susceptibles 
d’entrainer une polarisation entre groupes, l’encadrement concerté décrit les discours 
médiatiques négociés de manière à ce que ceux-ci reflètent les valeurs partagées au 
travers des différents groupes, et donc sont susceptibles d’engendrer une coopération 
entre groupes. J’argumente que les changements dans le discours des radios vernaculaires 
prennent effet lorsque de nouveaux éléments sont ajoutés aux discours caractérisant un 
conflit déjà existant, et les « nouveaux significations » que ces éléments apportent à la 
compréhension du conflit en question.  
J’argumente également que le changement du l’encadrement différentiée à 
l’encadrement concerté (et vice-versa) dépende du degré de résonance de ces discours 
avec la population cible. De façon générale, cette étude suggère que le langage de 
diffusion et la proximité culturelle induisent l’encadrement entre groupes à travers les 
radios vernaculaires au Kenya. La force de cette thèse se trouve donc dans les 
perspectives analytiques qu’elle propose pour localiser les discours changeants lors des 
conflits, plus particulièrement dans les états multiethniques où les politiques 
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d’accommodation entre les différents groupes demeurent toujours fragiles et 
conditionnelles. 
 
Mots clés: Kenya, conflits sociaux, construction de la paix, ethnicité, encadrement 
médiatique, radios vernaculaires 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to 
him in his language, that goes to his heart” (Nelson Mandela). 
 
Multiethnic societies continue to face new waves of socially protracted conflicts, 
most of which are intrastate in nature. While the pre-Cold War conflicts were often 
among and between superpowers (Wolff, 2004; Azam, 2001; Byman, 2002; Callahan, 
1998; Fisher, 2001), the literature generally supports that contemporary social conflicts 
are mainly intrastate (Burton, 1997; Kleiboer, 1994; Lederach, 1997; Steadman, 1991; 
Ignatieff, 1997), and that their manifestations are often latent and protracted (Callahan, 
1998; Sandole, 1999; Azar, 1990; Tir, 2005; Shinar, 2003; Miall et al., 2001). These 
conflicts continue to drain these societies of their resources, a trend that has prompted a 
host of scholarship to provide interpretations of such disputes – whether descriptively or 
analytically.  
Some studies emphasize the ambiguity around democratic liberties and 
perceptions of citizenship and nationalism as the main sources of such conflicts 
(Anderson, 2005; Ignatieff, 1993, Ignatieff, 1997; Guibernau and Hutchinson, 2001; 
Bayer, 2010). In this regard, intrastate conflicts are marked by the shifting perceptions 
surrounding one’s self-determination. Others foresee ethnicity and cultural differences as 
the sore point of intrastate conflicts (Fisher, 2001; Roeder, 2003; Blanton et al., 2001; 
Huntington, 1997; Jenkins, 1997). In this view, intrastate conflicts are perceived as 
“being motivated by ethnic sentiments, as being grounded in deeply-seated hatreds, and 
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as being virtually inescapable” (Fenton: 2004:1). In other words, cultural allegiances are 
emphasized as the most pervasive analytical element explaining the competing claims 
often inherent in such conflict manifestations.  
In the “newly” formed nation-states, historical contingencies and colonial legacy 
that saw the division of various groups along territorial allegiances are often regarded as 
the epicentre of intrastate conflicts (Tir, 2005; Zartman, 1989; Wimmer, 1997; Ulrich and 
Wolff, 2004; Stedman, 1991; Mitchell, 1993; Brown, 2004; Mamdani, 1996; Milne, 
1981; Posner, 2007; Okigbo, 2004; Githongo, 2006). In this view, intrastate conflicts are 
essentially treated as a matter of historical grievances nurtured during colonial occupation 
and perpetrated by various local leaders who succeeded these structures.  
Apart from differing analytical paths, the literature on intrastate conflicts is also 
characterized by multiple epistemological approaches. Some have adopted holistic 
analyses to map out the contours or conditions likely to generate such conflicts (Azar, 
1990; Shinar, 2003; Byman, 2002), while others offer presumptive models that, from 
their view points, explain the transformation of conflict situations into peaceful processes 
– or vice versa (Burton, 1997; Lederach, 1997; Galtung, 1997; Fisher, 2007; Sandole, 
1999; Sandole, 1997).  
What is particularly interesting to observe, however, is that despite the rich 
analytical frameworks advanced by many of these studies, the centrality of media 
narratives, as an essential aspect of socially protracted intrastate conflicts, is often 
downplayed or neglected. Instead, cultural allegiances (mainly ethnicity) revitalized by 
political stigmatization remain the most pervasive analytical window embraced by the 
majority of these studies. There is, however, a growing base of literature that is trying to 
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move away from this “collective” approach (Wolff, 2004; Shinar, 2003; Tir, 2005; 
Fenton, 2004).  
For instance, Wolff (2004) warns that it may not be that obvious to determine 
whether a conflict is ethnic-based or not. He thus argues for a three-level ethnic conflict. 
The first one describes ethnic conflicts that are violent, whose causes and consequences 
are obviously ethnic (i.e. the crises in Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Cyprus, Middle East or the 
Basque Country). The second set describes conflicts whose manifestations are far less 
violent despite the presence of distinct ethnic identities (i.e. the complex intergroup 
patterns that emerged in post-Apartheid South Africa and religious allegiances 
characterizing India and Pakistan). Lastly, Wolff supposes that there are conflicts 
emerging within and among same groups mainly because of incompatible interest 
structures (i.e. South Tyrol and Catalonia). 
Fenton (2004) also infers that “the difficulty in understanding ethnic conflict lies 
in treating it as primarily ethnic in its cause and nature”. He goes on to suggest that “to 
analyze ethnic conflict effectively requires meeting two further difficulties: to trace out 
the possibilities of global comparative analysis and to address the problem of “culture” 
(p.179-180). Fenton’s assumptions raise two main concerns with regard to the credence 
of ethnicity as a presumptive explanation of conflicts in multiethnic states.  
On the one hand, it suggests that one’s ethnic allegiance hinges on a symbolically 
constructed sense of belonging, and as many studies have indicated (Jenkins, 2004; 
Cohen, 1994; Osaghae, 1999), this sense of belonging does shift according to one’s level 
of ethnic consciousness. On the other hand, ethnicity per se cannot explain the lines of 
tensions between various groups. This is because it is a mode of classification (Hall, 
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1997). The central problem with this classification arises when the contours relative to 
such categorization are politicized to generate distrust or hatred.  
Given this brief overview, how can one make sense of the 2007/08 conflicts in 
Kenya? Why did various groups, once co-habitating peacefully, turn against each other? 
Why did the crisis shift from electoral discourse to embrace ethnicity? Can one really 
situate the source of this particular conflict with the discrepancies noted during the 2007 
presidential vote tallying, and the subsequent announcement of the official results giving 
Kibaki a second term? Or, were the 2007 elections perceived as an open window to 
address deep-seated socio-political issues that had been long overdue?  
 
Problem Statement  
 
Although Kenya has experienced shaky elections in 1992 and 1997, it has, for a 
very long time, given the impression of a conflict-free zone and had become one of the 
beacons of hope in the sub-Saharan Africa as far as regional stability is concerned. 
However, the general election held on December 27th, 2007, the ninth election since 
Kenya’s independence in 1963, changed this perception. Previously, the country had 
known only two presidents: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi 
(1978-2002). In 2002, Mwai Kibaki emerged victorious under the National Rainbow 
Coalition (NARC) to become the third president, a political breakthrough for Kenya after 
Moi’s 24-year rule.  
During the 2007 elections, Kibaki sought re-election under the Party of National 
Unity (PNU) while his major opponent, Raila Odinga, became the flag-bearer of the 
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Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The highly contested results announced on 
December 30, 2007 that gave Kibaki a second term, engulfed Kenya in violent conflicts 
not witnessed since independence (Somerville, 2009; Jamal and Deane, 2008; Rutten and 
Owuor, 2009). Most of the violence was blamed on the youth, especially the Mungiki 
uprising and on political elites in various regions (Waki Report, 2008, Rasmussen, 2010).  
The 2007 electoral crisis may have started as a mere distrust of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) when Kibaki decided to appoint 19 out of 22 members of 
the ECK without consulting the opposition (Brown, 2009; Lynch, 2008). The credibility 
of the ECK was therefore questioned. During the 2007 presidential vote tallying, both 
local and international observers declared the electoral process flawed.  Equally, the 
election observers were kicked out of the count room before the last changes were made 
on the result’s lead, which came out at the very last minute. It is this growing mistrust 
and the alleged discrepancies in vote counting that was reduced to tensions along the two 
party loyalties, those affiliated to ODM and those allied to PNU.  
It did not take long before the tensions transformed into spontaneous violence in 
various parts of the country, a trend which appeared to force different groups to cling to 
their supposed “ethnic territories” while chasing “enemies” out of these regions, some of 
which were now reclaimed as stolen “ancestral lands.” In the process, one party affiliates 
(ODM) claimed to recapture its “stolen victory” while their opponents (PNU) declared 
their calls as power-hungry and opportunistic based on ethnic chauvinism. In the midst of 
this chaos, the government decided to impose a temporary ban on all live-media to, 
supposedly, enforce public order and safety. 
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Given the magnitude of the violence, which claimed over a thousand lives and 
internally displaced hundreds of thousands, and the inability of the African Union (AU) 
to mediate the dialogue between the “big two” (Kibaki and Odinga), the international 
community saw the need to intervene through the former United Nation’s (UN) Secretary 
General, Dr. Kofi Annan, to end the mass killings and to ascertain the way forward, 
through a power-sharing structure, for the country was now perceived as incapable of 
resolving its internal matters (Lynch, 2008; Anderson and Lochery, 2008; Brown, 2011). 
The intervention also came amid donor threats, mostly the United States and the 
European Union, to withdraw or reduce their foreign aid to Kenya (Brown, 2009).  
The ramifications of this particular conflict and the intervention strategies that 
followed were welcomed with mixed feelings. Some nationalists (mostly the local 
leaders) perceived it as a continued dominance of the “West” tampering with Kenya’s 
sovereignty (once engulfed in colonial creed), others (such as the civil society, donor 
agencies and humanitarian organizations) applauded the intervention as a relief given the 
cessation of violent conflict and the relative reestablishment of social order. The 
aftermath of the conflicts provided a ground for major reforms such as the adoption of a 
new Constitution in August 2010. 
This study identifies four broad concerns, complementary to one another, that are 
relative to the events of the 2007/08 conflicts. First, struggles for political supremacy 
between groups tend to create the perception that control over “state machinery” implies 
the ability to satisfy a specific group’s needs or interests. Hence, various communities 
appear to believe that state resources channelled to them are directly linked to whether or 
not the members from their community are in control of these resources. Second, forging 
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a national identity without various groups proclaiming their rights to ethnic self-
determination is daunting. This may explain why the state’s actions are sometime 
interpreted as protective of a particular group, as witnessed in the events of 2007/08 
conflicts when some groups claimed that the state used the police force to contain 
dissenters from specific ethno-linguistic regions (Lynch, 2008; Lonsdale, 2008). Also, the 
bid by the Kenyan government to defer International Criminal Court (ICC) proceedings 
against the alleged masterminds of the 2007/08 conflicts was interpreted by some as the 
state’s desire to protect its “in-group” members1.  
Third, issues around Kenya’s sovereignty and its ability to handle internal affairs 
have become challenging. For the first time in Kenya’s post-independence history, the 
UN mediation team was forced to intervene as the country was on the verge of 
transforming into civil war. Lastly, it appears that communicating intergroup claims 
and/or values, especially in vernacular radios, is problematic. All these concerns point to 
the porosity of intergroup relations, especially in situations of conflict or competition.  
 
Purpose of the Study  
 
This dissertation examines the politics of intergroup accommodation in Kenya’s 
vernacular radios during the 2007/08 conflicts. It poses the following questions: Why 
(searching for motives) and how (relative to conditions) did the 2007/08 conflicts shift 
from electoral discourse to embrace ethnicity? How do Kenya’s vernacular radios 
accommodate and/or negotiate intergroup claims in situations of competition and/or 
                                                
1See Ndegwa, Alex, 2011. “Kenya's ICC deferral bid in UN stalls.” The Standard, March 17. 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000031411&cid=4&  
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conflict? What makes different groups choose to act according to the prompts of ethnic 
allegiances?2 
The main objective of this research is not to develop a presumptive model for 
conflict resolution in multiethnic societies, but rather to propose analytical perspectives 
that could shed light on the key issues inherent in socially protracted conflicts in many 
multiethnic states3. Specifically, it seeks to examine the politics of intergroup 
accommodation in Kenya’s vernacular radios during the 2007/08 conflicts. Other 
objectives aim at a) mapping out the patterns of vernacular radio listenership in the three 
locations of research; b) determining the dominant vernacular radio stations in the three 
locations of study; and c) finding out why vernacular radio listenership is important in the 
lives of those interviewed.  
The study is grounded in a cross-theoretical approach building on Azar’s (1990) 
theory of protracted social conflicts (PSC) to explore the contours of the 2007/08 
conflicts from the perspective of vernacular radio audiences in three distinct ethno-
linguistic regions in Kenya: Nyeri (Kikuyu majority), Kisumu (Luo majority) and Eldoret 
(Kalenjin majority). This provides the basis to unpack the dominant discourses used by 
these radios to negotiate intergroup relations during this conflict. In terms of data 
collection, this study hinges primarily on qualitative methods: documentary research, in-
depth interviews and observation. Quantitative data is also presented to contextualize the 
underlying assumptions discussed. Articulating methodology, understood from the 
perspective of Cultural Studies, is also used to tease the links between the data gathered 
during fieldwork and documentary research.  
                                                
2This question was adapted from Fenton, S. (2004). ‘Beyond Ethnicity: The Global Comparative Analysis 
of Ethnic Conflict’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology 45(3–4): 179–194. 
3 See the discussion in chapter six 
	   9	  
 
Rationale  
 
In the past decade alone Kenya, like many countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, 
has witnessed a significant shift in its media landscape, especially the rapid growth of 
vernacular radios in the late 1990s. While this increase may be applauded as one of the 
many efforts that the country has made to reinforce democratic liberties, accommodating 
values cutting across intergroup allegiances has been daunting given the presence of at 
least 42 different languages and dialects. This is generally due to the fact that most of 
these radios target specific ethno-linguistic groups and also broadcast in the languages 
spoken and understood by members of these groups.  
The winds of change also brought with them new ways of broadcasting with the 
growing influence of major advertisers on the media content. This is relatively new in 
Kenya where the upsurge in privately owned commercial FM radios pose new regulatory 
concerns. These are some of the changes that continue to inform the patterns of socially 
protracted conflicts, yet mainstream theories to conflict transformation (and/or peace-
building) either ignore or downplay the salience of media framing. Often, the emphasis is 
put on ethnicity, colonial legacy and political processes, without necessarily explaining 
the mechanisms that transform these processes into overt or covert conflicts.  
The strength of this dissertation not only lies in the fact that it acknowledges and 
reaffirms the centrality of media framing (vernacular radios) as an equally important 
aspect in understanding socially protracted conflicts, but also demonstrates how such 
narratives are likely to determine the directions and patterns of intergroup cohesiveness in 
	   10	  
situations of conflict or fierce competition. In other words, this study illustrates how 
vernacular radio narratives are likely to inform attitudinal changes of the groups they 
serve with respect to intergroup relations. Various studies have demonstrated that people 
make sense of situations (including their own identity) partly based on how they are 
framed by the media (Entman, 2010; D’Agnelo, 2011). Equally, “conflict labels” such as 
ethnic, racial, political, and cultural also emerge from media’s categorization of different 
phenomena (Hall, 1997).  
Past research looking at socially protracted conflicts in Kenya has been marked by 
an emphasis on ethnicity and how it influences intergroup cohesion in political processes 
(Makinen and Kuira, 2008; Kalyango, 2008, Jamal and Deane, 2008; Maina, 1995; 
Kagwanja, 2003; Ndegwa, 1997; Osamba, 2001; Lynch, 2008; Rutten and Owuor, 2009). 
While it is true that ethnic sensitization is central to intergroup polarization, putting more 
emphasis on ethnicity as the central attribute of intergroup conflicts often overshadow the 
efforts towards a constructive understanding of protracted social conflicts. Probably one 
of the key attempts to deviate from this “collective” approach is the study conducted by 
Somerville (2009) that critiques the manner in which ethnicity was overly emphasized by 
the British newspapers during the 2007/08 social unrest in Kenya.  
This dissertation is therefore a modest attempt to move away from this “dominant 
approach” to provide a more elaborate explanation of the 2007/08 conflicts. Ethnicity is 
thus envisioned as an episodic process that is part of the larger cultural structure affecting 
intergroup relationships, more so, in situations of competition and/or conflict. In this 
regard, media frames also become important, as they are likely to determine the 
perceptions that people hold about the conflict itself. The central argument of this study is 
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that vernacular radio frames can either be differentiated or concerted depending on the 
level at which the conflict manifests itself. In what I call differentiated framing, the 
narratives relative to conflict situations are negotiated in terms of negative competition 
likely to generate intergroup polarization. Conversely, in concerted framing, conflict 
narratives are articulated in a manner that reinforces positive conflict transformation and 
by extension, peace-building initiatives.  
Equally, the findings support the argument that ethnicity per se does not generate 
conflicts. This is because it is part of the larger cultural structure explaining intergroup 
relations. However, when such cultural structures (or cultural allegiances), within which 
ethnicity is potent, are negatively politicized in situations of fierce competition, they can 
easily generate intergroup polarization, and conflict along cultural affectivity, such as 
ethnicity. Other findings point out the significance of vernacular radios as a form of 
cultural heritage and a vehicle by which various communities sustain their ethnic identity 
that is weakened by the trends of globalization. 
 
Organization of Chapters 
 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter one provides the 
background of the study. I begin by looking at the social, political and economic 
conditions informing intergroup relations in Kenya. This is followed by a brief overview 
of the Kenyan people, with more emphasis on the groups that were targeted in this study. 
I then look at the patterns of the past and present conflicts before contextualizing the 
2007/08 conflicts and the kinds of responses that it drew from the state, the civil society 
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and the international community. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to the media 
industry in Kenya. Here, I provide an overview of the underlying conditions within which 
the media (vernacular radios) operate.  
Chapter two is mainly concerned with conceptual clarifications. Here, I explain 
some of the core concepts used in this study and the meaning I attach to them.  
Chapter three reviews the literature on media and conflict transformation. It is in 
this chapter that I also layout my theoretical framework that integrates media framing, as 
a possible fifth cluster, to Azar’s (1990) four-cluster theory of protracted social conflicts 
(PSC).  
Chapter four presents the methodology of the study and highlights the 
epistemological orientation that guided the methods of data collection. Essentially, 
qualitative methods are emphasized: documentary research, in-depth interviews and 
observation, with special focus on purposive non-probability sampling methods. 
Articulating methodology is also used to tease out the links between various data. 
Chapter five presents the findings of the study. These include the demographic 
information of participants, patterns of vernacular radio listenership, factors linked to 
vernacular radio listening, and the narratives relative to the framing of intergroup claims 
prior, during and after the 2007/08 violent conflicts.  
Chapter six discusses the findings in relation to the research questions initially 
formulated. It examines the links between the fieldwork findings (interviews and 
observation) and data gathered through documentary research. The discussion is mainly 
analytical, and proposes some of the angles within which protracted social conflicts can 
be understood in Kenya. 
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The conclusion illuminates major arguments and contribution of this dissertation 
while drawing general conclusions on how the revised theory of Protracted Social 
Conflicts is relevant to the wide-ranging scope of this study. The conclusion also 
proposes some directions for future research in line with the emerging discourses on the 
prosecution, by the International Criminal Court (ICC), of four of the six alleged 
architects of the 2007/08 conflicts. 
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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I take a historical 
perspective to shed light on some of the processes and conditions that continue to inform 
intergroup relations while providing, at the same time, the foundation for protracted 
social conflicts in Kenya. A brief overview of the Kenyan people, with emphasis on the 
study’s target groups (Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin), is also provided in this section.  
In the second section, I provide a general overview of socially protracted conflicts 
in Kenya. Here, I focus on the patterns characterizing the past and present conflicts, 
before contextualizing the 2007/08 conflicts and the kinds of responses that it drew from 
the state, the civil society and the international community.  
The third section focuses on the media industry in Kenya. Here, I provide an 
overview of the underlying conditions within which the media (vernacular radios in this 
case) operate. These factors provide the foundation for the underlying discussions 
developed in this dissertation.  
 
 
	   15	  
Figure 1. Kenya’s administrative boundaries and concentration of ethnic groups4 
 
 
 
 1.1. Social, Political and Economic Conditions 
 
Kenya gained its independence on December 12th, 1963 from the British. The 
country is located in the Eastern part of Africa and lies astride the equator. It covers a 
total area of 582,650 square kilometres, including 13,400 square kilometres covered by 
water. Kenya borders Tanzania to the south, Uganda to the west, Somalia to the east, 
Ethiopia to the north, and Sudan to the north-west. As Figure 1 illustrates, the country is 
                                                
4 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7167363.stm , accessed May 10, 2012. 
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divided into seven provinces and one area: Rift Valley, Central, Eastern, Coast, North, 
Western, North Eastern, and Nairobi area. The provinces are further divided into districts 
and counties5.  
The major urban settings include Nairobi (country’s capital), Mombasa, Kisumu, 
Nakuru, and Eldoret. These cities are geographically dispersed within the country and 
have varying populations depending on workforce demands, business opportunities, 
educational facilities, etc. English and Swahili remain the official languages despite the 
rich multiethnic nature of Kenya. Both English and Swahili are used as instructional 
languages (although the emphasis is often put on English), making them the only means 
through which ethnic groups can understand one another. These factors influence the 
social, political and economic conditions relative to intergroup relations. 
 
1.1.1. Social Conditions  
 
Kenya is a multiethnic nation-state with at least 42 ethno-linguistic groups, often 
regrouped within confined administrative boundaries (see Figure 1). The social co-
existence and well-being of these communities therefore hinge on proper access to 
important resources such as education, land, health, power, etc. The challenge, however, 
is the increasing demographic pressure leading to fierce competition for the already 
scarce resources.  
According to the 2009 population census6, Kenya has about 38.6 million 
inhabitants, with an estimated growth of 2.8% annually. Out of this number, the Kikuyu 
                                                
5 Since the adoption of the new Constitution in 2010 
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group represents 22% of the total population (estimated at 6.62 million). The other three 
major groups include the Luhya (5.35 million), Kalenjin (4.96 million) and Luo totalling 
4.04 million. Other groups with significant population include the Kamba (3.89 million), 
Kenyan Somali (2.38 million), Kisii (2.21 million), Mijikenda (1.96 million), Meru (1.65 
million), Turkana (0.99 million), Maasai (0.84 million), Teso (0.33 million) and Embu 
(0.32 million). The population is quite young, with about 70% under the age of 30.  
According to the same census, Rift Valley alone has an estimated 10.1 million 
inhabitants, shyly followed by the Eastern province with 5.6 million. Nyanza province is 
estimated at 5.4 million, while Central and Western provinces comprise 4.4 million and 
4.3 million respectively. The total population of the Coastal Province is estimated at 3.3 
million and Nairobi province accounts for 3.1 million people. North-Eastern province is 
sparsely populated with 2.3 million people.  
The literacy rate, on the other hand, is quite high compared to many African 
countries. According to the statistics by UNICEF, the adult literacy rate in Kenya 
between 2005 and 2010 is estimated at 87% (aged 15 and older). The literacy rate of male 
youth (15-24) is estimated at 92% compared to 94% of the female youth of the same age 
bracket. Life expectancy at birth improved from 51 (in 2005) to 57 (in 2010) 7. Although 
there have been improvements, the same report appears to link the unaging Kenyan 
population to the increasing infiltration of HIV-AIDS (that accounts for 6.3% of the 
mortalities in 2009 – age 15-49), poor health facilities and economic stresses induced by 
weather and poor governance of local resources.  
                                                                                                                                            
6 See Daily Nation and the Standard newspapers, August 31 2010. In Kenya, population census is often 
taken every ten years.  
7 See http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/kenya_statistics.html (accessed May 13, 2012). 
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Globally, the country boasts diverse wildlife reserves that support its tourism 
sector. In terms of sports, Kenya has produced long-distance marathoners who have 
dominated the Olympic championships. Kenyans are also well represented in rugby and 
cricket, with the Kenya National Cricket team reaching semi-finals in the 2003 World 
Cup series. Many Kenyans also socialize around soccer games, especially when their 
favorite national teams Gor Mahia, FC Leopards, and Harambee Stars, confront other 
local or international teams.  
 
1.1.2. Political Conditions 
 
Politically, Kenya is a Republic, which appears to be torn between parliamentary 
and presidential systems (Gacheru, 2005; Ogot and Okoth, 2000). The president is 
usually elected for a term of five years. The Constitution sets various conditions for 
presidential contenders to be declared a winner. For instance, the candidates need to win 
the majority of the votes, with at least 25% of votes in five of the eight provinces. The 
president not only acts as the Head of State and of Government, but also as the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, therefore centralizing key powers to the 
incumbent president (Cottrell and Ghai, 2007; Muigai, 1995). Although the Coalition 
Government (established after 2007/08 political stalemate) devolved some of the 
executive powers to the “newly” created premier’s position, the serving president retains 
control of the key dockets within the state’s machinery.  
Historically, trade unions, religious organizations and Mau Mau movements were 
at the source of political struggles that saw Kenya ascend to independence in 1963 from 
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the British (Ogot, 1981; Mboya, 1963/1970; Nyinguro, 2005; Wood, 1962; Ross, 1975). 
As Mboya (1963) notes, these political manifestations were essentially a “triangular 
struggle.” That is, it comprised the extreme Europeans who fought to maintain their 
political hegemony within the region; the radical Africans who spread “the doctrine of 
Africa for the Africans”; and moderate voices vis-à-vis the occupation.  
The pre-independence politics were marked by a sense of solidarity of the 
“African voice” to fight a “common enemy,” the occupiers. The challenge was how to 
structure a workable African government that would account for an ethnically and 
racially diverse country. As Gacheru (2005) writes, “the Africans found themselves 
competing with Europeans and Asians who were much better equipped economically, 
politically, and educationally for the new society […], [also] the facilities to assist 
Africans to advance and catch up with Europeans and Asians in the economic life were 
insufficient” (p.12). 
Despite these concerns, the political situation in Kenya had been marked by 
relative stability within the turbulent sub-Saharan Africa, having known only three 
presidents between 1963 and 2012. Those were, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), Daniel T. 
Arap Moi (1978-2002) and Mwai Kibaki (2002-2012) who was re-elected following the 
controversial 2007 general elections. The next general elections are scheduled for March 
2013 when a new fourth president will be elected, as the current Constitution disqualifies 
the incumbent president from seeking a third term in office.  
Although the contentious 2007 general elections remain one of the highly 
contested presidential elections since independence, Moi’s 24-year regime suppressed 
oppositional politics and subsequently contained political dissent from transforming into 
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violence, although the general elections in 1992 and 1997 were somewhat violent. 
Between 1982 and 1992, Moi transformed Kenya into an authoritarian one de jure party 
state. This followed a foiled coup in 1982.  
The growing political uncertainty, especially with the ICC confirming charges 
against four of the six alleged masterminds of the 2007/08 conflicts, continues to affect 
the economic growth of the country. Poor governance and graft within the civil service 
also add to the stagnant economic growth.  
 
1.1.3. Economic Conditions  
 
Agriculture remains the most common economic activity practiced by many 
people in Kenya. Kenya produces various cash crops such as coffee and tea, which are 
consumed both locally and internationally. According to historians such as Gacheru 
(2005) and Ogot (1981), the introduction of cash crops in Kenya can be traced to the 
Anglo-German Agreement in 1886 that placed Kenya under British rule. This convention 
introduced capitalist production and shelter farming thus replacing household production, 
previously widespread amongst the African communities. Since then, agriculture has 
remained the bedrock of Kenya’s economy with 80% of the population engaged in 
agricultural activities (Amisi, 1998; Lonsdale, 2008). 
In the past three decades alone, overexploitation of natural resources has reduced 
forested lands to only 2%, of which an estimated 50 square kilometers are lost annually8. 
The most endangered forests are, among others, Mau Forest and Karura Forest, which the 
                                                
8 See http://www.information.go.ke/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1, accessed May 10, 2012. 
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late Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize laureate and environmentalist Dr. Wangari Maathai, 
fought to save from looming real-estate development.  
The diverse and rich wildlife, including landscape, also places Kenya among the 
countries enjoying substantial gains from the tourist industry. For instance, Kenya is 
“home for the famous Africa “Big Five”: Lion, Elephant, Rhino, Leopard and Buffalo, as 
well as “an incredible range of wild habitats, each one with its own unique range of 
species.9” This makes wildlife and tourism a significant contributor to Kenya’s economic 
development. However, increasing wildlife poaching for economic purposes continues to 
threaten Kenya’s vibrant tourism sector. For instance rhinos, elephants and leopards have 
been particularly endangered.  
Regarding the exploitation of natural resources, Kenya has insignificant deposits 
of gold, garnets, soda rubies, ash, salt, fluorspar, and limestone, which do not form pillars 
of its economy. In March 2012, however, oil deposits were discovered in Turkana County 
and the Northern Rift Valley regions, which may add to Kenya’s probable economic 
activities.10 Although mineral mining also drives the country’s economic developments, it 
constitutes a very minor portion of exports, and thus is not an important source of capital. 
Kenya’s economy has often been affected by fluctuating weather conditions, 
especially in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country, which are prone to long-
term droughts. Kenya’s stagnant economic growth has always been associated with poor 
leadership. Indeed, it recorded its worst economic growth in the 1990s due to poor 
leadership accompanied by weak economic reforms. In 1997 for instance, Kenya failed to 
                                                
9 See the Kenya Ministry of Tourism’s portal, http://www.tourism.go.ke/ministry.nsf/pages/kenyas_wildlife 
accessed May 12, 2012. 
10 See the Daily Nation and Standard Newspapers, March 26 2012.  
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meet governance standards imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
led to its funding suspension for a period of three years. 
Following Kibaki’s first term in office (2002-2007), ambitious economic reforms 
were established that led to a 5% economic growth. In 2007, the government disclosed 
Vision 2030, an ambitious economic program intended to reposition Kenya’s economy 
among the fastest growing economies. However, the distressing economic situation partly 
caused by the aftermath of the 2007/08 conflicts and demographic pressures continue to 
challenge these ambitious economic objectives.  
 
1.2. Kenyan People and the Study’s Target Groups 
 
Kenya has at least 42 distinct ethno-linguistic groups. According to historians 
(Gacheru, 2005; Ogot, 1981; Ng’ang’a, 2008), these groups fall under three major family 
groups, the Bantu, Nilotes and Cushitic, the first of which are further sub-divided into 
Western Bantus; Central Bantus and Eastern Bantu. The Western Bantus include the 
Luyia, Gusii, Suba and Kuria: the Central Bantus are mainly the Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba 
and Meru.  
The Nilotic group is believed to have immigrated into Kenya from areas around 
the Nile River in Sudan, hence Nilotic (Ng’ang’a, 2008). The Nilotes are sub-divided into 
three sub-groups: the Western Nilotic (comprising the Luo); Eastern Nilotic (the Teso, 
Turkana, Maasai, Njemps and Samburu) and the Southern Nilotic (the Oromo-Kalenjin 
groups – Pokot, Marakwet, Elgeyo, Tugen, Kipsigis and Terik).  
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The Cushitic group is also divided into two major sub-groups: the Western 
Cushitic (the Shangala, Burji, Oromo, Somali, El Molo and Rendile) and the Southern 
Cushitic (the Dahalo). According to Ogot (1981), continued immigration and interaction 
between the groups has led to a blurred demarcation of intergroup boundaries. Ogot 
writes, 
The Western Kenya societies have evolved as a result of a long and a complex 
process of interaction between the Cushitic, the Kalenjin, the Bantu Luyia, Gussi 
and Kuria, and the Nilotic Luo, stretching back to the period before 1000 A. D. 
[…] In the Rift Valley, we find that the Southern Cushitic who expanded into the 
area from Southern Ethiopia were assimilated by the Kalenjin and Central Bantu-
speakers. [...] When we move to Central Kenya, we find that the pre-colonial 
history is dominated by the stories of the Kikuyu, Meru and Kamba. […] In the 
coastal region, the histories of the Mijikenda and the Swahili predominate. The 
former comprise the Rabai, Duruma, Kauma, Chonyi, Jibana, Kambe, Digo, Ribe 
and Gariama (Ogot, 1981: 4-5). 
 
The underlying issues evoked in this assumption are twofold. On the one hand, it 
suggests that intergroup relations in Kenya continue to experience a shake-up, with 
various groups losing or gaining a new sense of “their” belongingness. On the other hand, 
it highlights the centrality of the administrative boundaries with respect to territorial 
affiliations (see Figure 1). Resettlement schemes are thus a source of vicious ethno-
territorial stress.  
In this study, only three groups were targeted: the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin. 
Historically, these groups have had a very turbulent relationship even before Kenya’s 
independence in 1963. Many scholars link this thorny relationship to power and political 
struggles (Ogot, 1981; Langley, 1979; Gacheru, 2005; Ross; 1975; Odhiambo and 
Wanyande, 1989; Middleton and Kershaw, 1965; Mboya, 1963; Wood, 1962). 
Furthermore, the 2007/08 conflicts were particularly violent in the regions where these 
communities form the majority group. 
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1.2.1. The Kikuyu 
 
The Kikuyu form the largest group in Kenya, representing about 22% of the total 
population according to the 2009 census. They also represent the largest group among the 
Bantu-speaking groups in the country. The Kikuyu speak Gikuyu, and live, almost 
exclusively, in Central province although a number of them resettled in parts of the Rift 
Valley province during the colonial occupation that saw the eviction of some groups to 
create room for Settlers in the so-called “White Highlands” (Ogot, 1981; Middleton and 
Kershaw, 1965) and around Nairobi.  
In terms of origin and identity, Middleton and Kershaw (1965:15) believe that the 
Kikuyu share a belief that they descended from “Gikuyu and his wife Mumbi (the 
creator) who lived at Mukuruwe wa Gathanga, near the present Fort Hall. Mumbi gave 
birth to nine daughters, from whom have descended the nine Kikuyu clans.” Some 
historians situate the genesis of the Kikuyu modern developments with the arrival of the 
missionaries, notably Missionary Krapf who, supposedly, introduced the community to 
education in the earlier years of colonial occupation (Ogot, 1981; Middleton and 
Kershaw, 1965). Not only did this early exposure prepare the Kikuyu for political and 
economic readjustments across time, it facilitated their education compared to that of 
other communities (Ross; 1975; Odhiambo and Wanyande, 1989). 
For instance, while some of them were evicted from their “highlands” to provide 
room for the European farming settlers, many Kikuyu managed to get jobs at the farms in 
the southern “white reserves”, maintaining contact with Western culture and thinking. 
This may be why a number of Kikuyu led various political campaigns, such as the 
Kikuyu Central Association created in the 1920 (Gacheru, 2005) and Mau Mau 
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movements (Nyinguro, 2005) whose efforts were directed towards Kenya’s political 
independence from the British occupation11.  
Since independence, the Kikuyu have been one of the few groups 
disproportionately represented in the government. Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of 
Kenya and Mwai Kibaki, the third president, are both from the Kikuyu community. 
Questions continue to be raised as to why other groups cannot take over Kenya’s 
leadership, especially the “overall office.”  This is one of the concerns raised by other 
groups such as the Luo, one of the major groups in Kenya. 
 
1.2.2. The Luo 
 
The Luo descended from the Nilotic family group, and are believed to have 
migrated to Kenya from northern Uganda, south-western Ethiopia and southern Sudan 
(Ogot, 1981). They inhabit western Kenya, mainly Nyanza province around Lake 
Victoria. Most of the Luo are fishermen, small-scale farmers or skilled labours in Africa. 
The Luo speak dholuo, and are the fourth largest ethnic group in Kenya after the Kikuyu, 
the Luhya and the Kalenjins respectively according to the 2009 population census. 
Just like the Kikuyu, the Luo have been very present in Kenya’s politics since the 
colonial occupation. In fact, Kenya’s first vice president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, the 
father to the current Prime Minister, Raila Odinga, was a Luo. Since the colonial period, 
the Luo have often been associated with opposition politics (Gacheru, 2005; Muigai, 
1995; Odhiambo, 2002). For instance, following disagreements between the late Jomo 
                                                
11 Mau Mau was a pro-autonomy movement led by some Kenyan nationalists, mostly the Kikuyu, which 
took place in the 1950s to press for Kenya’s political independence from the British rule.  
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Kenyatta (the first president) and his late vice president (Oginga Odinga), the latter 
created the first opposition party in the “independent” Kenya. Also, the foiled coup in 
1982 (during Moi’s regime) was linked to dissents from the Kikuyu and Luo groups.  
The 2007/08 conflicts erupted following Raila Odinga’s claims of “stolen victory” 
and fraudulent electoral process that placed him second after Kibaki (Jamal and Deane, 
2008; Kalyango, 2008; Lynch, 2008). The strong oppositional politics that appear to be 
led by the Luo group, especially the Odinga’s dynasty, continue to raise questions in 
terms of intergroup relations in Kenya, especially in the realms of power. For instance, 
the 24-year rule by Daniel Moi’s (a Kalenjin) government (1978-2002) consolidated the 
belief that the Kalenjin group had their share in government, and that it is time for other 
communities to take over the leadership (Lynch, 2008). 
 
1.2.3. The Kalenjin 
 
The Kalenjin make up about 13% of Kenya’s total population, and is the third 
largest ethnic group according to the population census taken in 2009. The group 
comprises a number of communities living in the present Rift Valley province, mainly the 
Nandi, Pokot, Terik, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Kipsigis and Saboat (Lynch, 2008). They 
are believed to have descended from the “Highland” Nilotic family group that entered 
Kenya through the highlands of Ethiopia (Langley, 1979). Kalenjin groups are also found 
in eastern Uganda, Sudan and Tanzania (Ogot, 1981). 
For many years, the Kalenjin have earned the country’s pride at international 
athletics. They are hailed as the “kings and queens of marathon.” Many of the Kalenjin 
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are pastoralists. As such, they still regard land and cattle as forms of wealth (Langley, 
1979).  The Kalenjin speak several languages that are closely related.  
The Kalenjin became very present in Kenya’s politics in the course of Moi’s 24-
year regime (1978-2002).  Since Moi’s retirement in 2002, the Kalenjin are still very 
active in politics, especially in 2007 that saw William Ruto, a junior Kalenjin who 
managed to rally the majority of the Kalenjin community behind Odinga’s Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) against Moi’s appeals that sought for Kibaki’s re-election 
in 2007.  These beliefs and/or “established truths” have some resonance with the ways in 
which inter-group relations are perceived in various communities. The next section looks 
at some of the past and present conflict patterns in Kenya.   
 
1.3. Understanding Socially Protracted Conflicts in Kenya 
 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of past and present conflicts in Kenya 
before looking at the 2007/08 conflicts, which form the foundation of this dissertation. I 
will also embody the historical perspective to highlight the patterns of these conflicts as 
well as the underlying discourses that have been used to characterize such disputes. 
 
1.3.1. Patterns of Past and Present Conflicts 
 
The patterns of past conflicts in Kenya point out multiple causal factors. These 
can be grouped under three broad categories: land-related conflicts, cross-border conflicts 
and ethno-political conflicts.  
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1.3.1.1. Land-related Conflicts 
 
Land-related conflicts are common among pastoralist groups, who scramble for 
the scarce grazing fields. As noted earlier, the well-being of many Kenyans is rooted in 
agricultural activities. Access to land is therefore equated with the access to basic needs. 
The problem, however, is that the northern and north-eastern parts of the country, often 
inhabited by pastoralist communities, are prone to long periods of drought forcing many 
communities to migrate in search of “greener pastures” (Leo, 1984; Lonsdale, 2008).  
With the scarcity of lands, increased deforestation, and uncertain weather 
conditions, these movements have become one source of intergroup conflicts in Kenya. 
This is because many Kenyans identify themselves with the territory to which they 
“symbolically” belong. In this view, land tenure has more to offer than just its economic 
value. Indeed, the competing claims on land, negotiated in terms of identity and welfare, 
have made it a highly sensitive issue, often politicized to generate intergroup tensions 
(Amisi, 1998; Oyugi, 2000; Rutten and Owuor, 2009). 
Specifically, on land-induced conflicts, historians such as Ogot (1981), Gacheru 
(2005) and others have noted that the problems of land tenure have roots in the 1904 
convention by the British occupation that saw the alienation of Maasai communities from 
their fertile lands. As a result, the Maasai community were stripped of their lands and 
relocated to dry lands in parts of Rift Valley (Amisi, 1998; Leo, 1984).  
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As other land schemes were developed under colonial occupation, groups such as 
the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Kamba communities were gradually dispossessed of their lands 
to allow more room for “White Settlement” on the fertile “Highlands” (Ogot, 1981; 
Gacheru, 2005; Amisi, 1998; Oyugi, 2000). Given the forceful relocation of these groups 
in territories they did not necessarily identify with, mutual coexistence between the 
“relocated” and the “host” groups have remained a thorny issue after independence.  
Kenyatta’s (first president) land policies were regarded as benefiting his Kikuyu 
community at the expense of other groups that were also affected by colonial land 
policies. This included the sale of expatriate farms that were previously owned by the 
White Settlers, the “Million-Acre Scheme”. Similarly, Moi’s (second president) 
government did little to address land-related concerns raised during Kenyatta’s regime. 
This partly explains why the stability of the Rift Valley province, where many of the 
resettlement schemes took place, is particularly volatile.  
 
1.3.1.2. Cross-border Conflicts 
 
Cross-border conflicts have evolved to become of one of Kenya’s major stability 
threats. In this category, we can include disputes between the Kenyan government and 
other neighbouring states as well as the conflicts that are sparked by terrorist activities. 
Indeed, the growing insecurity along Kenyan borders, especially the Kenya-Somalia 
frontier, continues to question Kenya’s security. Recent attacks on Kenyan soil by 
militant groups believed to be linked to Somalia’s Al-Shabaab forced the Kenyan 
government to take military action against their uprising.  
	   30	  
In essence, intermittent conflicts (and Al-Shaabab’s insurgency) along Kenya-
Somalia borders, also known as the Horn of Africa, is often traced to the creation of the 
New Republic of Somalia in 1960s after the integration of British Somaliland and Italian 
Somaliland (Mandani 1996; Oyugi, 2000), a factor that may have “Balkanized” the 
Somalis into separate entities, mainly in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. With a 
dysfunctional government in place, Somalia has become a quasi-lawless state that has not 
only served to create insecurity off the Somali Coast, but also within the East African 
Community (EAC) by engaging in activities such as weapon smuggling.12  
Attacks on the Kenya’s Turkana community by the alleged Ethiopia’s Merille 
group are generating tensions along the Kenya-Ethiopia border. Disputes between the 
Kenyan and Ugandan governments over Migingo Island, on Lake Victoria, are also 
turning into a diplomatic deadlock between the two nations. Moreover, the growing 
concerns about terrorist activities from neighbouring Sudan, regarded as a sponsor of 
terrorism and the uprising of Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), add to the 
dilemmas of peace in East Africa. 
Although the concerns about Kenya becoming a victim of terrorist activities seem 
to have risen since the 2007/08 conflicts, the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, served as indicators of the worrying security within 
the EAC. The origins of these attacks were traced by the Clinton administration to 
Afghanistan and Sudan, Kenya’s neighbour to the north that has been in civil war until 
the 2005 peace deal that saw the creation of South Sudan in 2011. Despite these changes, 
                                                
12 See Shiundu, A. (2011). “Smuggled Grenades Kenya’s New Security Threat.” Daily Nation, March 20 
2011. 
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the Kenya-Sudan border is still worrisome, as Sudan is still considered one of the states 
sponsoring terrorism13.  
 
                                                
13 US Department of State. 2011. “States Sponsors of Terrorism.” Accessed October 28, 2011 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm  
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1.3.1.3. Ethno-political Conflicts 
 
Ethno-political conflicts are characterized by the shifting perceptions of identity 
and sense of belongingness, often reinforced during political processes such as general 
elections. This may explain why electoral processes are regarded as a competition 
between ethnic groups, rather than issue-based competition. Apart from struggles for 
freedom that characterized the pre-independence era, ethno-political unrests are often 
situated with the establishment of the Majimbo Constitution following the elections in 
1963.  
The provisions in the 1963 Majimbo Constitution were meant to protect minority 
groups that formed the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) (mainly the Kalenjin, 
led by Daniel Moi; the Luhya, led by Masinde Muliro; and the Coastal people, led by 
Ronald Ngala) against dominance by the then major ethnic groups (the Kikuyu and Luo) 
14. The major groups formed the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the key 
political party that led Kenyans to independence. At independence, Jomo Kenyatta (a 
Kikuyu) became the president and Oginga Odinga (a Luo) became the vice president.  
In 1966, Odinga quit the government following disagreement with Kenyatta and 
formed an opposition party (Kenya People’s Union – KPU) attracting other politicians. 
Further cracks developed within the government and in 1969, a key political figure, Tom 
Mboya (a Luo), was murdered, plunging the country into a civil turmoil. Five years later, 
another prominent politician, J.M. Kariuki (a Kikuyu) was also murdered. These deaths 
were linked to key members of Kenyatta’s government.  
                                                
14 For detailed information, see the report published on April 2008 by the European Union’s Election 
Observation Mission (EOM) in Kenya. Accessed May 11, 2012. www.eueomkenya.org. 
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The death of Kenyatta in 1978 and ascension to power by Daniel Moi (a Kalenjin) 
changed the political dynamics, although mysterious deaths of key outstanding politicians 
continued. That is, Moi shifted power from the Kikuyu that formed major part of the 
Kenyatta’s government to his Kalenjin community. The Kalenjin now held major 
ministerial positions such as national security, finance, and local government. Moi’s 
regime particularly became authoritarian after a foiled coup in 1982, and by extension, 
transformed Kenya into a de jure one-party state until 1992, when multiparty elections 
were held again.  
Equally, the killings of prominent politicians and witnesses continued. For 
instance, Dr. Robert Ouko (a Luo) who held the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1990s 
was murdered, adding to intergroup tensions that remained latent, although there were 
instances when they turned violent (i.e. during the 1992 and 1997 general elections that 
gave Moi more terms in office). Most of the violence was witnessed in the Rift Valley 
province (where Moi’s Kalenjin community remains the majority group) and the 
bordering territories. The majority of these conflicts (or “ethnic clashes” as was 
commonly referred to) were mainly due to the restoration of multiparty politics and the 
determination of the Moi’s regime to remain in power despite the new challenges that 
multiparty politics brought to bear.  
In Moi’s view, multiparty politics was not suitable for Kenya given its multiethnic 
nature. Moi even warned on numerous occasions that Kenya was heading towards 
protracted ethnic conflicts with multiparty politics. Since then, ethno-political conflicts 
have become widespread, particularly in general elections with the exception of the 2002 
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general elections where Moi was constitutionally barred from seeking another term due to 
the limits of two terms in office. 
This brief overview of past and present conflicts indicates that Kenya had enjoyed 
relative stability in an environment characterized by latent intergroup tensions. This 
stability was reinforced by authoritarian structures that discouraged political dissent, and 
by extension, social unrest. A different scenario, however, characterized the 2007/08 
conflicts. The next section looks at some of the specifics of the 2007/08 conflicts. 
 
1.4. The 2007/08 Conflicts 
 
The complex patterns of the 2007/08 conflicts are a mix of conflict contours 
outlined above, though induced by a political process – the 2007 general elections. In 
order to understand the undercurrents of this particular conflict, it is important to journey 
back to the 2002 general elections, the most peaceful election Kenya has seen since 
independence.  
 
1.4.1. Context of the 2007/08 Conflicts 
 
The Kenyan general election held December 27th, 2007 was the ninth election 
since Kenya’s independence in 1963. Previously, the country had known only two 
presidents: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002). In the general 
elections held in 2002, Moi was forced to retire following Constitutional amendments 
that barred him from seeking further terms. Before this historic election, Raila Odinga (a 
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Luo) defected from the then-ruling party KANU (led by Moi) to support Kibaki’s 
coalition party, NARC. It is believed that his defection came as a result of Moi choosing 
Uhuru Kenyatta (son of the first president) as a favourite successor in the 2002 elections, 
a move strongly opposed by the then-opposition (Lynch, 2008). 
In the 2002 elections, Mwai Kibaki (a Kikuyu) emerged victorious, with a 
whopping 61.7% of the total votes, to become the third president of the Republic of 
Kenya under the NARC party. This was a political breakthrough for Kenya after Moi’s 
24-year rule, most of which was characterized by the politics of intimidation, 
dictatorship, and economic distress. NARC was essentially embraced on grounds of 
major political reforms that were to create the position of Prime Minister to streamline 
the excessive executive powers initially held by the incumbent president.   
Once Kibaki became the president, he disregarded the changes he had promised; 
yet these were the changes that saw him elected as president. The alleged betrayal 
developed major cracks within the coalition government, with his ally now turned foe, 
Raila Odinga, quitting the government and spearheaded the “no campaign”, which voted 
down the 2005 constitutional referendum with about 58% votes.  In the process, Odinga 
and his allies created an opposition party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), 
ahead of the 2007 general elections. During the 2007 elections, Kibaki sought re-election 
under the Party of National Unity (PNU) while his major opponent, Raila Odinga, 
became the flag-bearer of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).  
The highly contested results in January 2008 gave Kibaki a second term, 
engulfing Kenya in violent conflicts not witnessed since independence (Somerville 2009; 
Jamal and Deane 2008). The conflicts claimed over a thousand lives and displaced 
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hundreds of thousands, forcing the international community to intervene through former 
UN’s Secretary General Kofi Annan to end mass killings and ascertain the way forward 
(through a power-sharing deal) for a country that was now perceived incapable of solving 
its internal matters (Lynch 2008; Anderson and Lochery 2008).  
 
1.4.2. Responses to the Conflict 
 
The 2007/08 conflicts were characterized by a mixed response from the state, the 
civil society and the international community. The state’s response was characterized by 
a heavy deployment of the police force in areas it believed “posed national security 
threat.” The alleged ODM strongholds where Kibaki’s reelection was not recognized (at 
least during the conflicts) seemed to be the main targets. This included parts of Nyanza 
(e.g. Kisumu and Migori) and Rift Valley provinces (e.g. Eldoret, Nakuru, and 
Naivasha).  
Equally, the state imposed a temporary ban to all “live-media.” The interpretation 
of this action was twofold. On the one hand, the state’s spokesperson, then Dr. Mutua, 
said the initiative was meant to stop the diffusion of “images of fear” and to reinstate 
“public order”. On the other hand, the local media groups alleged that the ban was a 
move by the government to mask the killings perpetrated by the police force, especially 
after the government supposedly authorized the police force to “shoot to kill.” This 
curfew was inconsequential; in fact, the state’s orders were now aligned with those of a 
particular group leading the spillover of attacks and counter-attacks in various parts of the 
country.  
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The civil society’s response to the conflicts was to step up the pressure for the 
“big two” (Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga) to put their differences aside and call for the 
cessation of conflict as the country was gradually transforming into conflict-ridden 
refugee camps. Leaders from church organizations, human rights groups, community 
elders, student unions and media groups spearheaded the appeals by the civil society. At 
the centre of civilian response, was the involvement of humanitarian organizations such 
as the Red Cross, ACTIONAID, USAID, National Council of Churches of Kenya 
(NCCK), Care International, and Oxfam. The deteriorating health and sanitation of the 
displaced populations were at the centre of their concern. 
The significance of these appeals is that they created a sense of awareness inside 
and outside the Kenyan frontiers, most of which condemned the killings and 
displacement of persons (IDPs). Given the circulation of these images to the outside 
world, the situation in Kenya came as a surprise to many countries that had, for a very 
long time, held a very positive image of a country with relative stability within the 
turbulent sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, Kenya had been one of the hubs through which the 
international community extends its missions to parts of Africa, especially within the 
conflict zones of the Great Lakes Region.  
The international community’s response to the conflict was also varied. First, the 
heads of state from various countries did not recognize the re-election of Kibaki. This is 
because many independent electoral observers (local and international) declared the 2007 
electoral process as fraudulent. As a result, the Kenyan government was called upon to 
accept the “will of the people” and to either recount the votes or conduct fresh elections. 
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In order to contain the crisis, the international community sent the former United 
Nation’s Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to help find a common ground for the “big 
two.” Annan’s initiative led to a power-sharing deal that saw the creation of a coalition 
government run by both Kibaki (as President) and Odinga (as Prime Minister). The 
challenge, however, is that Kenya had never had such structures where both the President 
and Prime Minister shared executive powers.  
Equally, key donors such as the United States and the European Union threatened 
to withdraw or limit funding until the government took substantial measures to oversee 
political reforms, particularly the thorny Constitutional amendments. Parallel to the 
“Western” supposed sanctions, the Chinese government, which is growingly becoming a 
key donor to the African countries, vowed to continue its funding on the grounds that it 
does not meddle in the affairs of a sovereign state.  
This brief background to the 2007/08 conflicts poses a key question: how did 
Kenyans make sense of this particular dispute (and its consequences) with respect to the 
multiethnic nature characterizing its people? One way of tackling the question is by 
looking at the accommodation of intergroup differences in the media. This is because 
people partly make sense of events in relation to the information they receive through the 
media. As several studies have demonstrated, news frames disseminate persuasive angles 
of news interpretation as well as the reasons as to why these frames are important 
(Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009; Matthes 2012; D’Angelo 2011).  
In the next section, I provide an overview of the media industry in Kenya. This 
sets the foundation for the underlying issues discussed in this dissertation, that is, the 
accommodation of intergroup relations by various vernacular radios. The rationale is that 
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media narratives are increasingly becoming key elements of polarization or de-
polarization of intergroup relations in Kenya. The negotiation of these relations by 
vernacular radios, therefore, cannot be examined in isolation from the broad processes 
influencing the media environment in Kenya. 
 
1.5. The Media Industry in Kenya: An Overview 
 
The media sector is one of the fastest growing economies in Kenya, especially 
since the late 1990s that saw the explosion of FM commercial radios and vernacular 
radios. In this section, I briefly look at the key media groups in Kenya before and after 
the 1990s. I then provide an overview of media concentration before looking at some of 
the regulatory organs that oversee media operations in Kenya.  
 
1.5.1. Key Media Groups 
 
Although the history of the press in Africa is often situated with the coming of 
European missionaries, immigrants and colonialists (Ochilo, 1993), only a few broadcast 
and presses existed in Kenya before independence in 1963. The key dailies in this regard 
were the Daily Nation and The Standard newspapers, both privately-owned (Ochilo, 
1993; Obonyo, 2003; Faringer, 1991). The Standard newspaper first published in 
November 1902 and formerly known as the East African Standard, is the oldest press in 
Kenya (Onyebadi, 2008; Obonyo, 2003; Wanyande, 1995). The Standard Group Limited, 
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a Kenyan news corporation that now runs radio and television networks, owns the 
Standard newspaper. 
Arguably, the Daily Nation newspaper is the leading newspaper in Kenya 
(Onyebadi, 2008; Wanyande, 1995). It was established in 1960 by British newspapermen 
Michael Curtis and Charles Hayes, but sold a few years later to the Aga Khan, then a 
student at Harvard. The newspaper is currently owned by Nation Media Group, which 
controls most of the media market in Kenya and in the East African region (Onyebadi, 
2008; Obonyo, 2003).  
In terms of broadcast media, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), founded in 
1928, as an English radio station, was the only broadcast established under the then-
British occupation (Faringer, 1991). Before independence, KBC only targeted white 
audiences who followed news from their countries of origin. Given the nationwide 
outreach of KBC and its subsidiaries, it still has significant influence over the public in 
general, especially in the rural areas despite the proliferation of private FM radio stations 
in the late 1990s. 
Before independence, most of the existing media operated in the English 
language. The press that aired African views was often sanctioned because it criticized 
colonial occupation (Ochilo, 1993; Mboya, 1963; Gacheru, 2005; Muigai, 1995; Abuoga 
and Mutere, 1988; Cottrell and Ghai, 2007). As Ochilo, (1993) notes, “after the second 
world war in particular, many aspiring political leaders used the indigenous press to build 
and cement political organizations. These were essentially agitational which made them 
crucial in the realization of independence goals” (p. 24).  
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Following Kenya’s independence in 1963, the media operation was characterized 
by a pattern similar to what the one witnessed before independence. That is, 
“governments had full control of the electronic media run under the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting headed by a Minister appointed by the President” (Ochilo, 
1993). Most of the legislative framework and national policies established during colonial 
occupation were adopted by their “African” (Kenyan) successors. Unlike in the colonial 
period, however, most programs targeted the African population and were produced in 
the Swahili language (Abuoga and Mutere, 1988).  
It was during Moi’s government (1978-2002) that the media industry stalled. The 
then-ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), which also led Kenya to 
independence, assumed greater influence in setting national policies. Under Moi’s 
leadership, KANU considered itself, at one time, superior to parliament (Obonyo, 2003). 
This followed Moi’s orders in 1982 (following an attempted coup) that transformed 
Kenya from a de facto one-party state to a de jure one-party state until 1992 when 
multiparty politics were restored due to mounting pressure from the local organizations as 
well as the international community (Ochilo, 1993; Wanyande, 1995; Muigai, 1995; 
Cottrell and Ghai, 2007).  
In this period, the environment became very restrictive for both the media and 
grass-roots politics. The state-owned KBC, and its subsidiaries, not only became the 
government’s mouth-piece (Obonyo, 2003; Muigai, 1995), but also remained the primary 
broadcast media in Kenya. This is because many private broadcasters were subjected to 
restrictive airwaves (Ochilo, 1993; Wanyande, 1995; Ochieng, 1992). Most of the KBC 
programs were (even to date) offered in English and Swahili as well as in major ethnic 
	   42	  
languages. This made KBC the prime source of information available to many citizens 
until the late 1990s. In 1983, KANU also created a daily newspaper, Kenya Times, a daily 
whose editorial was also influenced by the state (Odhiambo, 2002; Cottrell and Ghai, 
2007; Ochieng, 1992).  
Although the privately owned media groups, The Standard and Nation Media, 
were somewhat autonomous, their editorial independence remained questionable. For 
instance, during Jomo Kenyatta’s government (1963-1978), it is believed that his son-in-
law, Udi Gechaga, became Standard Group’s chairman. When Moi took over leadership 
in 1978 following Kenyatta’s death, one of his close allies, Mark Too, also took over 
Standard Group’s chairmanship. This “hidden” relationship between the state and media 
groups continued to influence editorial independence of the supposedly independent 
media outlets (Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003; Ochieng, 1992).  
However, the media landscape has changed considerably since the late 1990s, 
following the restoration of multiparty politics in 1992. This wave of change saw the 
explosion of private broadcasts, mainly FM radio stations such as Capital FM, the first 
privately owned radio founded in 1996. Most of these broadcasts have a strong 
commercial focus.  
 
1.5.2. The Media Environment Since the Late 1990s 
 
The restoration of multiparty democracy in 1992 represents the turning point of 
the media industry in Kenya. This period saw the proliferation of FM radio stations 
ranging from vernacular to general-public stations broadcasting in Swahili and English. 
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Independent newspapers and private TV stations also saw their numbers increase, going 
hand-in-hand with ‘new’ political dynamics. Equally, the major media groups embraced 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to expand their reach both locally 
and internationally. Meanwhile, the state kept loosing its monopoly control over media 
outlets (Odhiambo, 2002; Ochieng, 1992). 
During this period, the privately owned Nation Media and the Standard Group 
not only expanded their sectors to incorporate radio and TV stations, but also ventured 
into online media, thereby diversifying the spectrum of their readers worldwide. A former 
opposition leader, the late Kenneth Matiba, also founded People Daily in 1992, another 
influential independent newspaper during this period. Probably the most noticeable 
change in this period was the growth of vernacular radios, often traced to the 
establishment of the first Kikuyu language radio, Kameme FM (Makinen and Kuria, 
2008; Wanyande, 1995; Odero and Kamweru, 2000; Kalyango, 2008).  
Launched in 1999, Kameme FM was established to reach out to Kenya’s largest 
ethnic group. Since then, there has been a steady growth of vernacular radios in Kenya. 
Given their increasing popularity, their programs have been expanded to target both the 
rural and urban dwellers.  Others have linked the growth of vernacular radios to platforms 
through which “indigenous cultures”, threatened by the homogenizing Culture Industry, 
are sustained (Gathigi, 2009; Lynch, 2008). It is worth noting that vernacular 
broadcasting existed before (as subsidiary outlets) through the state-owned Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) that rebroadcast in vernacular languages spoken by 
Kenya’s major ethnic groups such as Kalenjin, Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Kamba. KBC 
only allocated few hours a week for these rebroadcasts.  
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Although these radios often serve specific ethno-linguistic groups, their 
ownership is not confined to territorial or group identity. The best example is Royal 
Media Services, a private media company established in 1999 by an affluent 
businessman, Samuel Macharia, who now owns a TV station (Citizen TV) and several 
FM radio stations such Radio Citizen and Hot 96 FM (broadcasting in English and 
Swahili), and a number of radios broadcasting in vernacular languages: Inooro FM 
(Kikuyu), Wimwaro FM (Embu), Mulembe FM (Luhya), Muuga FM (Meru), Musyi FM 
(Kamba), Bahari FM (Mijikenda), Chamgei FM (Kalenjin), Egesa FM (Kisii), and 
Ramogi FM (Luo).  
The media in the late 1990s became very critical of the government and exposed 
major financial scams within the civil service (Moggi and Tessier, 2001; Dixon, 1997). 
This has often put government on the defensive, sometime trying to control media 
content. As Ngugi (2008) notes, in 2006 “unknown” men dressed in police uniforms 
stormed the Standard Group’s offices, vandalized newspaper print equipment, burned 
newspaper copies that were to be circulated the following day, and made away with 
newsroom computers. Ngugi also asserts that the Kenya Television Network (KTN), 
owned by the same media group, was also switched off the same night. It is believed that 
attacks came amid the allegations that Standard Group was about to publish an issue that 
criticized the president.  
 The increasing commercial focus of many of the broadcasts continues to question 
media content per se. This is because of the major advertising companies that continue to 
“take control” of media contents in Kenya. On this note, Obonyo (2009) claims 
“advertisers have spread an elaborate network to monitor content. They spread their 
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money only in media houses that do their bidding and carry content that they agree with. 
Stories are killed because the big spenders do not like them although they are 
newsworthy.15” 
 
1.5.3. Media Concentration  
 
In terms of media market concentration, Nation Media Group (NMG) and The 
Standard Group (SG) control at least 70% of the print media market, with NMG having 
the largest share estimated at 55% (Onyebadi, 2008). This is because NMG owns various 
media outlets. Among others, the group owns The East African (regional), The Monitor 
(Uganda’s daily), Mwananchi, The Citizen (Tanzania’s dailies), Let’s Cook, Business 
Daily, The Weekly Advertiser, Daily Metro, Taifa Leo (in Swahili).  
NMG also owns Nation TV, Nation FM and Easy FM, among others. Given its 
wide network and solid financial base, the group relies mostly on commercials and 
private programming for funding. Although the company’s shares are publicly traded at 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange, the annual report published in 2006 by Nation Media Group 
indicates that the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development (AKFED) remains the key 
shareholder of NMG, with an estimated 45% of the total shared interests16. The report 
shows most of the NMG stakeholders as corporate entities, especially the local banks and 
insurance companies. In 2006, the company’s turnover was estimated at about 6.3 billion 
Kenyan Shillings, roughly US $97.2 million (Onyebadi, 2008).  
                                                
15 See http://ebookbrowse.com/levi-obonyo-press-freedom-pdf-d74789212, accessed May 10, 2012. 
16Nation Media Annual Report (2006) accessed February 23, 2008. 
http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/downloads/NMG-Annual-Report-2006.pdf   
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The Standard Group (SG), considered as NMG’s main competitor covers only 
about 25% of the media market. The rest of the print market (13%) is covered by other 
media groups. The Standard Group owns the Kenya Television Network (KTN), the first 
private television to acquire a broadcast license in 1989. According to Onyebadi (2008), 
the Standard Group turnover in 2006 was about 2.96 billion Kenyan Shillings, roughly 
US $45.7 million. The company’s shares are also traded at the Nairobi Stock Exchange. 
About 69.2% of these shares are owned by the group itself, under S.N.G Holdings 
Limited (Onyebadi, 2008).  
In terms of electronic broadcast, Royal Media Services seem to have the largest 
electronic media outlets. Royal Media owns about 62 FM frequencies, but only 42 are in 
use17. This vibrant growth has positioned Royal Media as one of the key media players in 
Kenya. 
 
1.5.4. Media Regulations   
 
Three main regulatory bodies oversee media operations in Kenya: the Ministry of 
Information and Communication, the Communication Commission of Kenya and the 
Media Council of Kenya. Guided by the legal frameworks amended in the 2010 
Constitution, the regulatory bodies also provide provisions within which commercial FM 
and vernacular radios operate. There are also numerous Acts that guide media 
functioning in Kenya (see Mbeke, 2008 for detailed information). 
In the 2010 Constitution, the clauses relative to freedom of speech and media 
operation are found in articles 33 through 35. Article 33:1 grants every person the right to 
                                                
17 See http://infoasaid.org/guide/kenya/media-groups, accessed May 10, 2012. 
	   47	  
freedom of expression. This is extended to seeking or receiving information from diverse 
sources. However, this freedom would be revoked if the said freedom perpetuates 
“propaganda for war; incitement to violence; hate speech; or advocacy of hatred that 
constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others or incitement to cause harm; or is 
based on any ground of discrimination, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, 
health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, dress, language or birth” (33:2). 
Article 34 is concerned with the autonomy of the media industry, whether print, 
broadcast or new media, although this is also limited when it comes to propaganda or 
messages of incitement. The article also mandates the Parliament to oversee the 
establishment of regulatory bodies without government or political influence. Article 35 
encourages citizens to access the information held by the state (or other person) so long 
as it is in line with the protection or exercise of fundamental freedom. Before the changes 
brought by the 2010 Constitution, freedom of speech as well as media freedom were 
circumvented in section 79, Protection of Freedom of Expression, of the old Constitution, 
which held that, 
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his 
freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions without 
interference, freedom to receive ideas and information without interference, 
freedom to communicate ideas without interference (whether the communication 
be to the public generally or to any person or class of persons) and freedom from 
interference with his correspondence (The Constitution of Kenya, 2001). 
 
However, the said freedom was likely to be revoked if (79a) it threatens the  
Interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality or public health” 
and (79b) for the “purpose of protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of 
other persons or private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings, 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining the 
authority and independence of the courts or regulating the technical 
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administration or the technical operation of telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless 
broadcasting or television (Constitution of Kenya, 2001).  
 
Essentially, the previous Constitutions provided room for abuse of the media by 
those in the higher ranks of the government or private sector. This is because the access 
to information, whether from government bodies or private sectors was indirectly 
protected by the Constitution. Scandals orchestrated by senior Civil Servants were also 
masked under this provision.  
This is because journalists could not easily expose such matters to the public due 
to issues of “privacy.” The 2010 Constitution not only grants every person the right to 
freedom of expression, but also allows citizens to seek and receive information from 
diverse sources. This does not mean that media operations will be less affected with new 
Constitution in place. Indeed, the adoption and the applicability of the new Constitution 
is still a long process to be determined by the lawmakers.  
 As for the Ministry of Information and Communication, it assumes the “macro” 
management of major regulatory bodies such as the CCK and MCK. Before the 
establishment of CCK and MCK, the Ministry was responsible for drafting media 
policies that were often passed by the Parliament with little or no consultation with media 
professionals. For instance, the government created a Task Force of Press in 1993 aimed 
at providing a legal framework for both print and broadcast media (Moggi and Tessier, 
2001; Mbeke, 2008), an initiative that failed due to the pressure from both the local and 
international media activists. In effect, media professionals, including stakeholders and 
media training schools, endorsed the Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ) in 1998 to 
oversee the policies within which the media could operate. 
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A year later, the Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK) was created 
following the Kenya Communication Act in 1999, to ensure that customer and operator 
standards are met before acquiring broadcast license for telecommunication or postal 
services. In general, the functions of CCK include licensing, regulation of tariffs for 
monopoly areas, establishment of interconnection principles, approval of communication 
equipment, management of radio frequency spectrum and implementation of universal 
service obligations for telecom and postal services18. Although the Commission identifies 
itself as ‘independent,’ most of its activities tend to be closely controlled by the 
government through the Ministry of Information and Communication (Mbeke, 2008).  
On the other hand, MCK was established in 2002 (but started operating in 2004) 
as a self-regulatory body aimed at promoting “press freedom and responsible 
journalism.19” In essence, MCK functions as an arbiter between the media, the public and 
the government. It ensures that the code of conduct and practice of responsible journalism 
is met by media professionals. It is therefore the body with the mandate to administer 
complaints by and against the media. Despite this directive, this has not always been the 
case.  
It is believed that the government still influences its Board of Directors (Mbeke, 
2008). The raid at the Standard Group in 2006 and the temporary ban of all live media 
during 2007/08 conflicts indicate that the government still “disciplines” the media 
without consulting with MCK. The government also threatened to disband MCK 
                                                
18 See www.cck.go.ke (accessed March 5 2010) 
19 See www.mediacouncil.or.ke (accessed March 5 2010) 
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following “their move to establish a taskforce to audit how media houses covered last 
year’s general elections and the subsequent violence20.” 
There are other bodies that guide media regulations in Kenya. They are, among 
others, the Media Owners Association (MOA), the Kenya Correspondents Association 
(KCA), the Editors Guild, and the Kenya Union of Journalists (KUJ). Most of these 
organizations provide policy provisions that target media functioning in Kenya. 
 
Chapter Summary  
 
Section one of this chapter provided an overview of the social, political and 
economic conditions that continue to influence intergroup relations in Kenya. It also gave 
a short description of the Kenyan people, with more emphasis on the study’s target 
groups: the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo.  
The second section explored the patterns of the past and present conflicts in 
Kenya before looking at the 2007/08 conflicts and the kinds of responses that it drew 
from the state, the civil society and the international community. It highlights the fact that 
the 2007/08 conflicts were a complex process characterized by local, national and 
international actors.  
The last section reviewed the media industry in Kenya, providing the foundation 
to understand the underlying conditions within which the media operates in Kenya.  
The next chapter focuses on the core concepts used in this study.  
                                                
20 See Daily Nation, February 21, 2008 
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 CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS  
 
This chapter clarifies the use of some of the concepts in this study. The goal is to 
offer comprehensive displays of how some commonly used terms, yet essentially 
ambiguous, are defined to illuminate the meanings I associate with them all through the 
dissertation. This includes: ethnicity (and ethnic group), conflict (including ethnic 
conflict), self-determination (ethnic and national), peace-building, vernacular radios, and 
media framing. 
 
2.1. Ethnicity  
 
The concept of ethnicity is increasingly becoming central in media and conflict 
resolution literature. While the definition of ethnicity itself remains ambiguous as it is 
appropriated in different fields of study (Fenton, 2004; Murphy, 2001; MacRae, 1983; 
Jenkins, 1997; Wolff, 2004), it is inevitable to talk about conflicts, especially in 
multiethnic settings, without revisiting the notion of ethnicity. In post-communist 
societies such as the former Yugoslavia, the notion of ethnicity is often used to 
characterize the widespread social conflicts that took place following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Guibernau & Rex, 1997).  
In this regard, ethnicity can be situated within the wave of immigration that saw 
the movement of people from post-colonial societies to the so-called “monopoly” states. 
This movement, according to Guibernau and Rex (1997), consolidated different aspects 
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of ethnicity, all of which raised concerns about the process of assimilation and 
accommodation of intergroup values. Looking closely at the authors’ assumption, one 
can argue that notions such as in-groups and out-groups correlate with ethnic 
categorization to underscore group differentiation and/or symbolically constructed 
particularities.  
As such, ethnicity is defined here as “a form of false consciousness which would 
be replaced in due course by a consciousness of shared and opposed interests” 
(Guibernau and Rex, 1997: 2) and “a decision people make to depict themselves or others 
symbolically as the bearers of certain cultural identity” (Cohen, 1994: 119). Equally, the 
study not only acknowledges the fact that the perimeters of ethnicity and/or an ethnic 
identity are mutational, it also recognizes that ethnicity may prevail in situations of 
conflict and mutual collaboration. In other words, ethnicity can also be described as the 
mobilization of ethnic identity and difference to gain advantage in situations of 
competition, conflict or mutual collaboration (Osaghae, 1999). 
If ethnicity underscores both conscious (I see myself) and unconscious (I am seen 
as) state of one’s mind in an event of shared and opposed interests, it remains plausible 
that ethnicity revolves around subjective and objective perceptions of intergroup 
relations. While subjective perception of one’s relationship with the “cultural other” may 
create a sense of belongingness relative to blood-ties, objective perception may evaluate 
the relationship from a macro point of view, emphasizing socio-cultural norms such as 
creed, customs, culture, and history. According to Guibernau and Rex (1997: 4), “identity 
is both a psychological and a sociological term. […] On the one hand, it helps the 
individual to produce order in his or her own individual life. On the other hand, it helps to 
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place the individual within a group or involves identification within a collectivity.” In this 
regard, ethnic identity is not a sine qua non of shared past, but a symbolically constructed 
sense of belongingness. 
Scholars such as Dibie (2003) have gone further to assert that, in ethnically 
heterogeneous societies such as sub-Saharan Africa, the problems of ethnicity are 
inevitable. The central argument in this kind of assumption is that the politics of ethnicity 
have either been denied or restricted in those nations for fear of ethnic radicalization. In 
essence, Dibie (2003) infers that, in ethnically heterogeneous nations, “neither the 
disappearance nor a significant amelioration of ethnic conflict is possible [because] […] 
the stability of these societies [is] threatened not by communalism, but by the failure of 
national institutions to explicitly recognize and accommodate existing ethnic divisions 
and interests” (p. 31).  
The study therefore uses the notion of ethnicity to mirror the complex relationship 
between ethnicity and/or ethnic identity that characterize the media landscape in Kenya, 
particularly vernacular radios that serve specific identity groups. Indeed, previous studies 
have also pointed out the centrality of ethnicity in Kenya’s political arena (Muigai, 1995; 
Mandani, 1996; Himbara, 1994; Anderson, 2005), especially following independence in 
1963 from the British. According to Mukhongo (2010), identity politics have served to 
deepen inter-ethnic distrust as dominant ethnic groups continue to form coalitions of 
allies with other major groups for security and political gains.  
 
2.2. Ethnic group 
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In this study, ethnic group is envisioned as “a group of people bound together by a 
belief of common kinship and group distinctiveness, often reinforced by religion, 
language, and history” (Byman, 2002: 5). It also describes “human groups that entertain a 
subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of 
customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration” (Weber, 1992, 
cited by Guibernau and Rex, 1997:2).   
These definitions not only highlight the porosity of ethnic group boundaries, they 
also exemplify the subjective and collective perceptions that characterize one’s sense of 
belongingness. This elasticity in peoples’ perception of themselves is what Jenkins 
(2004) calls “selfhood” (how you see yourself) and “personhood” (how others see you). 
In other words, group allegiances may change depending on his/her levels of ethnic 
consciousness (Osaghae, 1995), adding to the ambiguity surrounding ethnicity as claimed 
by the people themselves, and that attributed to them by others (Guibernau and Rex, 
1997).  
As such, individuals in ethnically heterogeneous states may rally behind a given 
ethnic group not because they share cultural values but rather because of imagined “unity 
of descent” and security. It is within this lens that the term ethnic group is used in this 
study. Kenya is one of the many ethnically heterogeneous African states where the 
politics of cultural hybridism have not been fully successful. The creation of 
administrative boundaries during the colonial period translated into the “balkanization” of 
the Kenyan people into imagined ethnic groups and “territorial ancestry.”  
This explains why various provinces and counties have been reduced to ethnic 
territories: Central for Kikuyus, Nyanza for Luos, Rift Valley for Kalenjins, and Western 
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for Luhyas, etc. However, within the supposed “ethnic territories,” are many other 
distinct ethno-linguistic groups with different values. The Kalenjin may claim Rift Valley 
for their people yet there are other groups such as the Kikuyu that call this territory their 
home. Nyanza may be labelled a Luo territory, yet other communities such as the Gussi 
and Kuria also call Nyanza home.  
The ambiguity surrounding ethnic groups and territorial ancestry continues to 
threaten intergroup cohesion in Kenya. As explained in Chapter 2, the vicious cycle of 
conflicts in Kenya, especially in the Rift Valley, stems from this ambiguity. Linking 
territory to a particular group has harnessed a thorny relationship between different ethnic 
communities, especially in times of conflict when the perceptions of “in-group” and “out-
groups” seem to collide. In this regard, an ethnic group may also describe a form of self-
defined community that may be differentiated from other groups through their collective 
historical memories, proper names, ancestry, differentiating elements of culture, and 
association with specific homeland (Wolff, 2004). 
 
2.3. Conflict  
 
Conflict is another blanket term used in almost every situation to explain 
occurrences where two or more people have opposing views. These views may be 
influenced by behavioural, historical, cultural, and social aspects defining one’s 
interpretation of the situation. For the majority of psychologists and communication 
scholars, conflicts can be understood not only by looking at interpersonal relationships in 
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everyday life situations, but also by examining the challenges involved in maintaining 
these kinds of connections (Milne, 1981; McRae, 1983; Hachsten, 1993; Hoddie, 2006).  
Sociologists such as the renowned French scholar Bourdieu (1977) anchor the 
understanding of conflicts on socio-cultural struggles that take place between social 
actors over time. Conflicts are seen as end results of social processes that determine 
human existence. Conflict, in this regard, is not only inevitable but also a normal 
occurrence or condition characterizing the progress of a given society. Conflict is also 
common in environmental discourse highlighting the dilemmas surrounding 
environmentally induced crises. On the one hand, we have eco-centric perspectives, 
which emphasize the scarcity of natural resources and the degradation of environment as 
causes of conflicts (Mathew et al., 2002). On the other hand, economic perspectives 
refuting environmental regulations maintain that low production may lead to the scarcity 
of basic needs such as housing or food, all of which may endanger human existence itself 
(Gowdy, 2004). The competing attitudes with regard to environmental resources are, in 
this case, envisioned as factors of conflict.  
In security studies, conflicts are seen mainly in terms of national and international 
systems, which may have placed stronger and weaker states on the same level of 
competition, a factor believed to bolster strategies of exploitation and opportunism (Azar, 
1990, Fisher, 2007; Blanton, et al., 2001; Jenkins, 1997; Lederach, 1997; Rothschild, 
1997; Baker, 2001; Galtung, 2002). In this perspective, conflicts explain the discordance 
within and between nation-states, commonly referred to as intra-state and inter-state 
conflicts.  
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These assumptions underscore the ambiguity inherent in defining conflict itself. 
Some consider conflicts as normal, if not essential, processes for socio-political change 
(Burdieu, 1997; Hachsten, 1993; Hoddie, 2006; Coser, 1956). In this perspective, 
conflicts provide a terrain for various social groups to gauge their courses of action and 
the repercussions that the actions generate. Others seem to focus mainly on the negative 
implications of conflicts while contending that conflicts generate social disorder 
(Lederach, 1997; Rothschild, 1997; Baker, 2001; Galtung, 2002).  
This study describes conflict as “a situation in which two or more actors, who 
interact with each other, pursue incompatible goals, are aware of this incompatibility, and 
claim to be justified in the pursuit of their particular course of action” (Wolff, 2004: 8). In 
this regard, conflict has both positive and negative connotations. It may characterize both 
the short-term and long-term polarizations emanating in a given social space, thus 
creating diverse sentiments in an individual. These sentiments can take several forms 
such as dissatisfaction, misrepresentation, lack of recognition, inequality, opportunism, 
reprisal, collaboration, compromise, and survival.  
Indeed, Wasmuth (1992) goes further to describe four dimensions within which 
conflict behaviours may be understood: a) conflict as a social fact that should not 
mistaken with its form, b) the analysis of conflicts cannot be limited by narrow 
evaluation, c) the complexity of conflict stretches beyond contextual characteristics, and 
d) “cause and effect should not be compounded or interchanged by defining conflicts21”. 
In essence, the author argues that there needs to be a holistic approach to conflict 
                                                
21See Axt, Milososki and Oliver Shwarz (2006). Conflict – a review of literature, accessed June 2, 2011 
http://www.europeanization.de/downloads/conflict_review_fin.pdf  
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situations before providing such occurrences with labels such as political, ethnic or 
religious for this may narrow the understanding of the conflict per se.  
The notion of conflict is therefore used in this study to underpin the complex 
patterns of intergroup relations and the competing attitudes that emerge within these 
confrontations to generate intergroup distrust and polarization. There is a host of 
literature that narrows the understanding of intergroup polarization in Kenya to ethno-
politics (Muigai, 1995; Zuckerman, 2009; Oyugi, 2000; Anderson and Lochery, 2008; 
Lynch, 2008; Oucho, 2002). While it may be true that ethnicity is an equally essential 
variable when seeking to understand the root causes of conflicts, some of these studies 
fail, in my opinion, to go past such conventional labels.  
Other scholars such as Gacheru (2005) have opted for an historical understanding 
of conflicts in Kenya, suggesting that Kenyan conflicts stem from colonial policies that 
not only changed the traditional modes of functioning but also fractured intergroup bonds 
that held many communities together. While this study acknowledges the fact that, in 
order for a conflict behaviour to prevail, the parties involved must be aware of the 
incompatibility of their goals or interests, it also argues that conflict behaviours are 
cognitively constructed through imagined social values and/or interests, all of which may 
not be necessarily transcendental or hereditary. 
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2.4. Ethnic conflict 
 
Ethnic conflict is also becoming a mainstream term used by various scholars to 
describe conflicts in multiethnic societies. While the term may seem straightforward, it 
has often been used to describe situations in which intergroup cohesion is endangered. 
For instance, the literature on social identity seems to suggest that ethnicity becomes a 
source of conflict when the relationship between minority and majority groups are 
interpreted along the lines of oppressor/oppressed dichotomies (Jenkins, 1997; Hall, 
1997; Cohen, 1994; Cohen, 1995). 
In this regard, ethnic conflicts become a question of one’s sense of belongingness 
and the defining characteristics of the alleged allegiances. Connor (1994), for instance, 
describes two aspects of ethnic conflicts: tangible (emphasizing the group’s uniqueness 
such as language, culture, and customs) and non-tangible aspects (highlighting secondary 
aspects of one’s belongingness such as sharing a region or nation). 
Wolf (2004) argues that ethnic conflicts can be understood by looking at three 
sets of minorities:  external minorities (living on the territory of one host state, but are the 
ethnic of another state, usually the neighbouring kin-state); transnational minorities 
(whose homeland is located across several states without forming a titular in any of 
them); indigenous minorities (those living in their ancestral homeland but on the territory 
of one state that is not the titular nation).  
These assumptions highlight the centrality of cultural identity in many ethnic-
based conflicts. The perceived identity is often created and perpetrated through myths 
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in Cyprus, the Basques and Catalans in France and Spain, the Hutu-Tutsi in Rwanda, and 
the Croat-Serbs conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are some of the many examples of 
ethnic-based conflicts widespread in peace-building literature (Wolf, 2004, Jenkins, 
1997, Lederach, 1997; Rothschild, 1997; Galtung, 2002). 
If conflict underscores a situation in which two or more people pursue 
incompatible and opposing goals, the notion of “ethnic conflict” will, in this study, 
describe “a form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets 
the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies, along an actually existing or perceived 
discriminating ethnic divide” (Wolff, 2004). In this case, an ethnic conflict may explain 
opposing forces within the structures of intergroup relations. These forces may occur 
across time and space and are often subject to change depending on the existing 
perceptions as well as “new forms” of presumed differences.  
There are at least 42 ethnic groups in Kenya. Although these groups share a 
nation, each group emphasizes various aspects they believe make them unique, such as 
language, territory, culture, and history. As such, many conflicts in Kenya have often 
taken the “ethnic label” (Mboya, 1970; Ogot, 1981; Ross, 1975) while downplaying other 
contingencies that may equally provide a constructive understanding of intergroup 
conflicts in Kenya.  
A host of scholarship suggests that general elections in Kenya have become a 
terrain within which intergroup differences are negotiated in a manner that generates 
intergroup polarization (Lynch, 2007; Kalyango, 2008; Onyebadi, 2008; Anderson and 
Lochery, 2008). Ethnicity becomes the driving force behind “electoral conflicts” as each 
group strives to have a spot within the top “government machineries”, and this, without 
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necessarily vetting the candidates of their choice (Ogot, 1981). That is, every community 
seems to be satisfied by the virtue of having one of their own within the system where 
major decisions are made (Cohen, 1995). Although the perception of ethnicity itself is not 
immutable, as discussed in previous sections, it remains one of the defining 
characteristics of conflicts. 
 
2.5. Self-determination  
 
The notion of self-determination continues to dominate the conflict resolution 
literature. In Sudan for instance, religion seemed to be one of the main factors that forced 
the Christian Southerners to separate from the Muslim Northerners in 2011, thus forming 
a new state of their own. This followed decades of a civil war that is believed to have 
ended in 2005 following the Sudan Peace Agreement protocol (Edozi, 2006; Kaufman, 
2006). Specifically, the supposed peace agreement provided the Southern Sudanese with 
the opportunity to choose between remaining within a united Sudan and forming an 
independent territory of its own. Although the people of Sudan shared the same territory, 
various factors such as religious differences, international influence and power 
discrepancy forced the Sudanese to divide their country along the lines of self-
determination.   
A similar pattern of conflict has been emerging at the Horn of Africa where the 
Kenyan Somalis and the Somalis from Somalia seem to push for the reunification of their 
people. Various scholars with extensive understanding of the Kenya-Somali border crisis 
have also pointed out the centrality of self-determination in the contentious conflict at the 
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Horn (Himbara, 1994). Some have argued that territorial disintegration during the 
colonial period that saw the splitting of Somalia into British Somaliland and Italian 
Somaliland, and then the formation of the New Republic of Somalia that reintegrated the 
“two Somali lands” generated repulsive forces in terms of self-determination and 
territorial integrity (Mamdani, 1996). 
The growing insecurity along Kenyan borders, especially the Kenya-Somalia 
frontier, has become one of Kenya’s security dilemmas in the wake of global insecurity 
(Ng’ang’a, 2006). In fact, recent attacks on Kenyan soil by militant groups believed to be 
linked to Somalia’s Al-Shabaab forced the Kenyan government to take military action 
against their uprising22. There have been claims that the Kenyan Somalis have often 
identified with their counterparts from Somalia, given their history, a factor that is 
believed to hamper national integration and security missions along the Kenya-Somalia 
frontier (Mamdani, 1996).  
As such, the concept of self-determination is also central in this study. It is used to 
depict “volitional actions that enable one to act as the primary causal agent in one’s life 
and to maintain or improve one’s quality of life” (Wehmeyer, 2006: 117). According to 
Wehmeyer and Field (2007), self-determination is characterized by: a) the ability of an 
individual to act autonomously, b) the level at which the observed behaviours are self-
regulated, c) the ability of an individual to initiate and respond to the presumed events in 
a psychologically empowered manner, and lastly d) the capacity of a person to act in a 
self-realizing manner. Self-determination can also exemplify the collective perception of 
                                                
22 Associated Press, 2011. “Somali, Libya, Uganda: US military increases focus on militants from Africa.” 
Washington post, October 27. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/from-western-to-eastern-
africa-us-military-increases-focus-on-militant-threats/2011/10/27/gIQA5siYMM_story.html 
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a group historical, cultural and democratic claim (Murphy, 2001; Freeman, 1999; 
Slattery, 1995; Milne, 1981).  
 
2.6. Nationalism  
 
Nationalism is regarded as a trigger of conflicts in multiethnic states (Connor, 
1994; Ignatieff, 1993; Snyder, 1968). According to Greenfeld (1992), nationalism is a 
twofold concept. On the one hand, he argues that civic nationalism describes a form of 
nationalism whereby citizenship becomes the defining characteristic. As such, 
nationalism is perceived as voluntary and can therefore be acquired through the politics 
of immigration and integration. On the other hand, Greenfeld contends that ethnic 
nationalism, which is more inherent, cannot be obtained, as whoever does not have it 
cannot acquire it through any means (cited by Guibernau and Rex, 1997: 5). In this case, 
one’s sense of nationalism may be correlated with blood and/or territorial ties.  
Fundamentally, the question of nationalism is demystified by one’s sense of 
belongingness, whether through culture, history, blood-ties or acquisition (Callahan, 
1998; Guibernau and Hutchinson, 2001; Smith, 1995). While the rise of ethnically 
described conflicts, after the Cold War, is often correlated with the growing public 
consciousness with regard to the perceptions they hold about their democratic endeavours 
(Ulrish and Wolff, 2004), various governments perceive these manifestations as a threat 
to national or political stability (Ignatieff, 1997, Ignatieff, 1993). This seems to be 
supported by the events of the “Arab Spring” that heightened in 2011 (and extended in 
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2012 with the Syrian case) where the superpower structures in the supposed authoritarian 
Middle Eastern regimes were challenged and sometimes ousted23. 
In this context, the notion of nationalism can be defined loosely as the sense of 
belongingness that one holds towards his/her nation-state making him/her to defend it 
despite the consequences that the chosen actions may lead to (Ignatieff, 1993; Jenkins, 
1997). It underscores the love for the nation although this love may vary with the 
problems of inclusion and exclusion across nation-states (Baker, 2001; Blanton et al., 
2001). Those who feel included in the system will therefore sometimes defend it 
regardless of the consequences, while those who feel excluded will often attempt to alter 
the system in their favour.   
In this study, nationalism describes a “form of consciousness by which the 
individual proclaims his supreme loyalty to the nation” (Snyder, 1968). The definition is 
broadened by Ignatieff’s (1993) definition that integrates political, cultural and moral 
domains of nationalism. As a political doctrine, nationalism is the “belief that the world’s 
peoples are divided into nations, and that each of these nations has the right to self-
determination, either as self-governing units within existing nation-states or as nation-
states of their own”; as a cultural belief, it is “the claim that while men and women have 
many identities, it is the nation that provides them with their primary form of belonging”; 
and as a moral faith, nationalism is “an ethnic of heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of 
violence in the defence if one’s nation against enemies, internal or external” (Ignatieff, 
1993: 5-15). 
                                                
23 See Anderson, L. (2011). “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011. http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/Anderson-Demystifying-the-Arab-Spring.pdf (accessed January 2012). 
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  The claims of nationalism have also been present in Kenya, especially during 
general elections. Intergroup relations seem to succumb to ill-defined notions of 
nationalism driven by political elites (Anderson and Lochery, 2008). The case of the 
“Ocampo Six”, the presumed masterminds of the 2007-08 conflicts in Kenya, is 
exemplary as it stirred nationalist sentiments during the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) hearings at The Hague24. While the pre-independence period (in Kenya) seemed to 
be marked by a collective nationalist dissent towards the British settlers, the post-
independence redefined the conception of nationalism.  
Before independence, various groups appeared to have a common conception of 
nationalism because the number one enemy during that period were the colonial 
occupiers. When the British left, the rhetoric around nationalism changed as dominant 
groups claim bigger shares of responsibility within the state’s machinery under the 
umbrella that “their people” sacrificed a lot during colonial occupation. This may explain 
ferocious fights between major groups in Kenya, especially in general elections that seem 
to be reduced to “the winner takes all” competition.  
Probably one of the good illustrations in this regard is the perceived fight between 
the Kikuyu and Luo groups to control the state machinery. Others suggest that 
nationalism, in this regard, has been associated with the group’s level of contribution to 
the pre-independence political struggles (Ross, 1975). As such, some scholars have 
claimed that the Luo and Kikuyus were the major groups at the centre of opposition 
politics before the country attained its independence in 1963 (Ogot, 1981; Mboya, 1970; 
Gacheru, 2005), a factor that would explain their struggles for political supremacy in the 
                                                
24 Ndegwa, Alex. 2011. “State requests access to evidence against Ocampo Six.” The Standard, October 7. 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/sports/InsidePage.php?id=2000044360&cid=4  
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post-independence era. When the two groups share views, the creation and adoption of 
various legislations appear to go smoothly. However, when they have differing views, the 
tensions appear to be heightened within the country. This may explain why some media 
outlets reduced the 2007-08 conflict to a Kikuyu-Luo conflict, yet many other groups 
suffered alike (Makinen and Kuria, 2008; Jamal and Deanne, 2008; Zuckerman, 2009; 
Anderson and Lochery, 2008).  
 
2.7. Peace-building 
 
Peace-building is another central term used in this study. Peace-building has not 
only become a common discourse in nations engulfed in wars and conflicts, it has also 
drawn attention within conflict resolution scholarship. Though it emerged before the 
1990s, its widespread use is believed to have been spearheaded by the former UN 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when he used it to describe the processes and 
efforts necessary in enforcing sustainable peace in countries or regions experiencing 
conflicts or wars (Byman, 2002; Knight, 2003; Wimmer, 2004).  
Peace-building became a pivotal concept defining UN missions in areas of 
conflict prevention (preventing conflict behaviours from transforming or relapsing into 
active conflict) as well as conflict intervention (reinstating peace in conflict situations). 
Yugoslav civil wars and the Rwandan genocide that occurred in the 1990s, helped 
reinforce the concept of peace-building within the academic fields.  
In this regard, peace-building can be defined as “a complex and multidimensional 
exercise that encompasses tasks raging from the disarming of warring factions to the 
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rebuilding of political, economic, judicial and civil society institutions” Knight (2003: 
246). This broad definition captures the most crucial elements deemed necessary in the 
reconstruction of war-torn or conflict-prone zones. In other words, the politics of 
peacekeeping or peacemaking, commonly embraced in UN’s peace rhetoric since 1945, 
were not enough to foresee a stable nation.  
Although the concept of peace-building appears to be widespread since the 1990s, 
Keating and Knight (2004) reminds us that the concept was used by Galtung in the 1970s 
to characterize “a means of preventing incipient violent conflicts by addressing root 
causes of poverty, political repression and uneven distribution of resources” (p. 247). 
Contemporary literature on peace-building seems to refocus its analyses on pre-
emptive and proactive practices believed to bolster sustainable peace (Keating and 
Knight, 2004; Lederach, 1997; Galtung, 1997). As such, conflict is perceived as a process 
without clear-cut starting and ending periods. Peace-building in this regard, also becomes 
a process. Although peace-building as process may sound promising, the divide between 
theoretical assumptions inherent in peace-building literature and the applicability of the 
proposed models is still worrisome. Often, successful models have been transposed from 
one nation to another with less attention given to the different socio-cultural and historic 
realities of these nations.  
In an attempt to go past these challenges, Byman (2002: 6-8) proposes some of 
the core values by which the success or failure of any peace-building initiative can be 
evaluated: a) Saving of human lives from mass killings: any peace-building process must 
end the killings or reduce the loss of human lives, failure of which would be regarded as a 
doomed; b) Self-determination: peace-building process must handle the claims for self-
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determination with care, as it is one of the values reinforcing ethnic or identity-related 
conflict. One of the challenges that Byman notes in this regard is the fact that “the 
international community has shied away from declaring a right to self-determination, 
preferring instead to emphasize the sovereignty of existing states over the claims of the 
people within them” (p.7); c) Sovereignty: in this regard, the author suggests that “the 
right and duty of intervention itself” must be thoroughly investigated before drafting any 
peace-building procedure for this might help in determining the best moment for external 
intervention; and lastly d) the author presumes that cultural diversity has also instigated 
different ways of “promoting assimilation and adherence to a common identity [...]” (p. 
8). This trend has, according to Byman, prompted tensions between different groups, thus 
causing ethnic conflicts. 
This study therefore embraces peace-building as a process whereby factors of 
conflict are addressed before, during and after a given conflict in order to reinforce 
collaborative attitudes and eventual understanding between the parties. That is, it 
describes a process in which actors involved in a conflict are called upon to bridge or 
negotiate their differences in a manner likely to strengthen mutual understanding rather 
than intergroup polarization. Peace-building, in this regard, is not confined to any specific 
stage of a given conflict as it is a continuous process.  
 
2.8. Vernacular radio 
 
The term vernacular is used in the study to characterize non-official dialects 
spoken and defended by different groups living in a multiethnic society where cultural 
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hybridism has not fully been successful (Arnold and Schneider, 2007; Cottle, 2000; 
Malinowski, 2000; Ojo, 2006). Despite the fact that various groups may share the same 
nation-state and speak the official languages, in a given national territory, various groups 
often identify more with their vernacular traits (Riggins, 1992; Caspi et al., 2002; Cutter, 
2001), not limited to language and culture. As such, the basis of unity in this kind of 
setting is not only linked to the articulation, accommodation and integration of values and 
creed into a shared meaning of nationhood, it also hinges on the acceptance of the 
presumed differences.  
In this context, vernacular radios is used to depict radios that broadcast in 
languages spoken by specific ethno-linguistic groups that live within a multi-ethnic 
society where the politics of cultural hybridism is weakened by inter-ethnic interests 
and/or claims of ethnic essentialism (adapted from Arnold and Schneider 2007; Shi 2009; 
Neyazi, 2010). Often, vernacular radios broadcast in non-official languages, although 
some societies are gradually recognizing local dialects as part of the official languages. 
This is the case of South Africa, where until 1994 Afrikaans and English were the official 
languages. Today, there are at least eleven official languages in South Africa such as 
Zulu, Northern Sotho, Ndebele, Sotho, Tsonga, Tswana, Xhosa, Swazi and Venda, most 
of which operate radios targeting these groups. Ndebele radio, also known as Ikwekwezi 
FM since 1996, is a good example of this gradual recognition. As Lekgoathi (2012) 
notes, 
Radio Ndebele flourished because firstly, it met its listeners’ desire for 
broadcasting in their own language, using native speakers; and secondly, the 
channel came to serve as a medium for ethnic mobilisation as well as for the 
reinvention of Ndebele traditions, culture and identity (Lekgoathi 2012: 59). 
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The main particularity of vernacular radios is that they are likely to appropriate 
and customize news story lines to slant towards the specificities of the groups they serve 
(Neyazi 2010; Arnold and Schneider 2007; Onguny 2012). In other words, their programs 
tend to show systematic biases towards the language, values and culture of the groups 
targeted as opposed to the official-language media. The study by Neyazi (2010) found 
that vernacular media in India was transforming India’s “imperial identity” towards what 
he calls “vernacular modernity.” That is, “while appropriating the content of English-
language newspapers, Hindi newspapers customize and reconfigure it, taking into 
account particularities in local society” (p. 912).  
In their quest to understand the functioning of vernacular media, some scholars 
often use the term “ethnic media” to characterize and emphasize their identity aspects 
(Malinowski, 2000; Arnold and Schneider, 2007; Guzman, 2006; Cutter, 2001; Caspi et 
al., 2002; Cottle, 2000; Ojo, 2006), thereby emphasizing ethnicity as the central factor in 
defining vernacular media. This study embraces the term “vernacular radio” rather than 
“ethnic radio” to underscore the uniqueness in both the language and identity of the 
groups served by these kinds of media.  
In other words, the shifting boundaries of ethnicity, already discussed, and the 
complex patterns of intergroup relations in Kenya make it difficult to conceive these 
media as “ethnic radios.” For instance, while the Kalenjins may be considered as an 
ethnic group, there are at least seven linguistic sub-groups within the Kalenjin dynasty 
(Tugen, Nandi, Marakwet, Kipsigis, Keiyo, Saboat, and Pokot). As such, a Kalenjin radio 
is likely to be tuned into by those who speak and share the Kalenjin culture. The same 
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goes for a Luo or Kikuyu radio. In other words, language, culture and ethnicity are some 
of the main defining characteristics of a vernacular radio.  
Although the term vernacular media is preferred in this study, some scholars have 
used the term “ethnic media” to underpin the perceived systematic stereotypes in 
mainstream media (with regard to minority groups) that may have led to the growth of 
what is believed to be an ethnic identity media (Arnold and Schneider, 2007; Ojo, 2006). 
In this perspective, Ojo (2006) supposes that ethnic media “provide room for cultural 
expressions in the sense that cultural folklore and languages are regularly used in 
reporting and programming. This draws them [minority groups] closer to the community 
and gives people in the community a sense of belonging” (p. 351).  
As such, ethnic media may play on a given group’s deep-seated emotions and 
cultural identity, stirring a wide range of sentiments. On this note, Arnold and Schneider 
(2007) write:   
Ethnic media cater to cultural identity: they communicate cultural pride, provide a 
link to home, and provide a platform for collective communication and 
representation of interest. They provide the basis for a symbolic community 
throughout the members of an ethnic group on a national level; and they support 
integration into an ethnic group on a local level by providing information on local 
policies, events, etc. (Arnold and Schneider, 2007: 120).  
 
While my understanding of vernacular radios is closely related to what has been 
called “ethnic radio”, much emphasis is put on the uniqueness of the languages of 
broadcast, target groups, ethnic differences and cultural practices that distinguish one 
group from another in a multiethnic society where the projects of cultural hybridism are 
not fully recognized.  
Furthermore, vernacular radios, as used in this study, should not be comprehended 
through the lens of community radio, alternative radio, rural radio, minority radio, or 
	   72	  
indigenous radio as developed in many other studies (Pietikäinen, 2008; Gathigi, 2009; 
Molvaer, 1991; Cutter, 2001; Cottle, 2000; Deuze, 2006; Sinclair, 2009; Moran, 2006; 
Srinivasan, 2006). While seeking to understand the dynamics and patterns of media 
outlets in ethnically heterogeneous settings, some scholars embrace the notion of 
“minority” to draw the differences between the “mainstream” and/or “official” media and 
the “other” media. For instance, while examining the media used by the Sami people 
inhabiting Russia and northern parts of Scandinavia, Pietikäinen (2008) perceives 
“minority/indigenous” media as those “made by and targeted on the ethnic minority 
community, often with a goal of offering alternative media representations, identity 
positions and participation practices” (p. 174).  
While Pietikäinen’s (2008) definition of “minority/indigenous” may be 
convincing, the term indigenous does not necessarily underscore the same meaning as 
minority or ethnic media, yet the author seems to use them as synonyms. The fact that the 
Sami people form a linguistic and an ethnic minority block in these regions, in my 
opinion, may not necessarily characterize their media as minority or indigenous. 
“Indigenous media” has often been used to characterize locally produced media, 
especially when differentiating them from international media sources (Anderson, 1991; 
Riggins, 1992).  
The term indigenous or minority media may also be ambiguous in settings where 
there are more than one ethnic minority or in societies where the borders between ethnic 
majority and minority are in constant transformation as in some European countries 
(Brooten, 2006; Georgiou, 2005; Rolston, 2007) or the US where the Hispanic minority is 
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gradually transforming into an ethnic majority (Moran, 2006; Guzman, 2006; Anderson, 
2008; Deuze, 2006). 
Equally, vernacular radios are quite different from community radios. A 
community may be composed of several ethnically diverse groups with linguistic 
particularities. Also, community radios seem to operate in local or regional languages that 
are shared by the interveners and residents (not ethnic groups) of that particular locality 
such as volunteers, professionals, and non-professionals (Jankowski and Prehn, 2002). In 
this regard, community radios are likely to be non-profit radios targeting a small-scale 
population for they are designed and run by the community to promote diverse voices in 
areas such as health, education, and poverty reduction (Deuze, 2006; Jankowski and 
Prehn, 2002).   
Some studies regard community radios as platforms through which civic 
engagement or “new humanism” is emancipated because they do not narrow their scope 
to a particular group or ethnicity (McChesney and Nichols, 2002; Balnaves, Mayrhofer, 
and Shoesmith, 2004). Although vernacular radios may strengthen civic engagement, 
they do narrow their scope to specific ethno-linguistic groups.  
 
2.9. Media frames  
 
The concept of media framing, detailed in the next chapter, is also central to this 
study. By definition, the term media is used in the study to underscore “the function in 
communication that is manifested through a carrier of signs to multi-point destinations” 
	   74	  
(Berger, 2002:22). It therefore encompasses all forms of communication whether oral, 
print, broadcast, audio-visual or online.  
As such, a media frame characterizes the kinds of narratives used by the media to 
negotiate, articulate and accommodate the values of the public while shaping their 
perceptions on a given object or subject. This implies that media frames include both 
conventional (print, broadcast, audio-visual, billboard, and online) and non-conventional 
(literary materials, music, art work, ceremonies, plays, comedies, etc.) media messages.  
The public’s opinion is thus shaped not only by the way the news is presented to 
them, but it is also influenced by the degree to which these perceptions are transformed 
into public agendas (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). This may explain why media narratives 
have been at the centre of conflict resolution discourses (Simons, 2008; Gitlin, 1980; 
Pillar, 1983; Pinkely, 1990). In other words, various studies have demonstrated the 
centrality of media narratives in the escalation or de-escalation of conflicts (Hoddie, 
2006; Gower and An, 2009; Zuckerman, 2009). Hoddie (2006) believes that “non-
democratic states attempt to employ their monopoly control of the media to their 
advantage when confronting restive ethnic communities.” Media frames would therefore 
possibly cover the narratives used by all types of media, whether print, broadcast, 
audiovisual or online media, to represent a given event or subject.  
The main question therefore is whether or not the media has the potential to 
determine the direction and patterns of a given conflict. Probably one of the many 
interesting studies in this regard is the work by Roth (1992) who examined the media 
coverage of the First Nations during a land-related dispute involving the Mohawk 
community and the governments of Quebec and Canada. Her findings suggest that the 
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public’s perceptions on the dispute were essentially a historical and cultural construction 
“brought to bear on the media analyses by journalists and their representative 
institutions.” In other words, the construction and accommodation of the Mohawk values 
within the Quebec or Canadian policies were a matter of media narratives. Whether or 
not these narratives genuinely represented the Mohawk, Quebec or Canadian relations 
depends on one’s positioning with regard to the matter. Sustained misperceptions or 
misrepresentations may therefore lead to sustained misunderstanding between members 
of a given community or nation. 
Past studies also support the fact that intergroup relations in Kenya are gradually 
becoming spongy since the late 1990s that saw the rise of vernacular media. Vernacular 
radios, in particular, seem to become terrains for ethnic solidarity rather than national 
unity. Vernacular radios have been accused of distorting and circulating false 
representations of some groups, mainly in the period leading to general elections 
(Wanyande, 1995; Oyugi, 2000; Odhiambo, 2002; Muigai, 1995).  
The case of the 2007-08 conflicts was exemplary as “live media” were at the 
centre of the government’s sanctions to contain the supposed inter-ethnic massacre 
(Zuckerman, 2009; Jamal and Deanne, 2008; Lynch, 2007; Onyebadi, 2008; Somerville, 
2009; Anderson and Lochery, 2008; Makinen and Kuria, 2008). The concept of media 
framing is central in this study as it is used to explore the kinds of narratives embraced by 
various vernacular radios to characterize the events leading to the 2007-08 conflicts: 
prior, during and after the crisis.  
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Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter provided detailed explanations with regard to the use of some terms 
within the body of this dissertation. As such, it provides the foundation for understanding 
the meanings attached to them throughout the thesis. That is, ethnicity is understood as a 
situational sense of belonging that people have of others or of their own identity.  
An ethnic group defines a group bound together by beliefs, values and history, 
which are particular to a given social identity. This sense of identity may shift depending 
on interests and one’s sense belonging in a multiethnic society. A conflict is defined as a 
situation where different (or same) group members confront each other due to differing 
views, often reinforced by issues such as power balances, cultural allegiances, religious 
faith and situational interests.  
An ethnic conflict defines a type of conflict where the actors involved locate the 
source of their divergent views with ethnic affinity. Self-determination is used to refer to 
the processes by which an individual or a group of people take charge of their lives and 
destiny. Nationalism underlines the processes by which an individual or group not only 
proclaims their love for the nation, but also take measures to defend or alter it in their 
favour.  
Peace-building describes a means by which actors involved in a conflict are called 
upon to bridge their differences in a manner likely to strengthen mutual collaboration for 
long-term peace processes. Vernacular radios describe the radios that broadcast in non-
official languages, often spoken by different identity groups within a given country. 
Lastly, media frames depict the manner in which news contents are rendered salient to 
influence audiences’ perception of a given occurrence. 
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The next chapter will review some of the literature on media and audience 
perceptions, including media and conflict framing. This chapter also presents the 
analytical framework adopted in the study. 
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CHAPTER III. LITERATURE REVIEW & ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section traces the theoretical 
trajectory relative to media and audience perceptions from classical approaches to 
contemporary paradigms. Section two presents some of the literature relating to media 
and conflict framing. In the third section, I layout my analytical framework that revises 
the theory of Protracted Social Conflicts proposed by Eduard Azar in the 1990s in an 
attempt to map out the contours of the 2007/08 conflicts.  
This chapter theorises how media frames lead to the escalation or de-escalation of 
conflicts, as intergroup cohesion or polarization also hinges on the media’s rhetorical 
trends.  
 
3.1. Media and Audience Perceptions  
 
The study of audience perception of different phenomena is not new within media 
or communication literature. Gripsrud (2002) situates the evolution of media audience 
studies in the broader context of three epistemologies: the pre-1940s that grounded 
communication research on powerful and omnipresent media; the period between 1940s 
and 1970s that emphasized audience selectivity; and lastly, the developments that came 
after the 1970s that emphasized culture and history, drawing most of its analyses from the 
German Frankfurt and the British Birmingham Schools of thought. 
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Prior to the 1940s, Gripsrud (2002) suggests that the media were mainly 
considered as a constructive medium through which ideas and attitudes were injected into 
the presumed passive public. Media hegemony was at the centre of media research. In 
line with this perspective, hypodermic needle theories became widespread within the 
media literature, where the passivity of audience vis-à-vis media products was often 
evoked (McLuhan, 1964; Hiersteiner, 1998; Berkowitz, 2010). For instance in 1914, 
German scholar Emilie Altenloh analyzed statistics on cinematic preferences of 
Mannheim and Heidelberg residents focusing mainly on “what movies meant to the 
public” rather than “film’s influence on morality” (Gripsrud, 2002). The far-reaching 
effects of cinema were explained in terms of the medium’s power to directly influence 
audience perceptions.  
Many studies were therefore centred on how media “inject” attitudes and feelings 
to the public who presumably changed their consumption patterns (Hiersteiner, 1998; 
Lowery and DeFleur, 1995). The proponents of the hypodermic needle theory professing 
a strong and immediate effect of media on the public profoundly bolstered this thought. 
For example, the Payne Fund Foundation Research that examined empirical data on the 
effect of motion pictures on children in the 1930s found that uncontrolled media 
messages presented a danger to the society as they presumably had far-reaching influence 
on people’s social behaviour (Hammer and Kellner, 2009; Lowery and DeFleur, 1995).  
Although the pre-1940 period were dominated by hypodermic needle theory, 
Gripsrud (2002) suggests that some studies ran counter to this perspective. For instance, 
the study conducted by Herta Herzog in 1941, Classical Study of American Women’s 
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Relations to Soap Operas, which according to Gripsrud, highlighted the centrality of 
media in influencing the choice patterns vis-à-vis political opinions.  
Apart from focusing on behavioural changes induced by the media, the 
scholarship on powerful media also centred on propaganda circulation, especially on how 
different governments (and elitist groups) control media narratives to win the public’s 
morale and confidence in times of war or national crises (Williams, 2009; Altheide, 2009; 
Flesher, 1982). Many of these studies borrowed from propaganda effects of the World 
War I (WWI) and later on, the effects of the World War II (WWII), which saw the rise in 
rivalry between Britain, Germany and France, among other European nations.  
For instance, Fletcher (1982) believes that the British, through its Information 
Research Department (IRD), was able to control its press and radio services to portray a 
positive image of itself in the Third World countries where it had significant influence 
while, at the same time, maintaining a different image in Europe to counter Soviet 
insurgency. Fletcher states that, 
IRD’s activities could perhaps be discounted were they not backed by a virtual 
monopoly of information on what Mayhew called ‘communist themes’. The flow 
of reports from overseas missions and intelligence officers backed by hundreds of 
researchers and analysts-both British and American-relating to the Soviet orbit 
which was virtually closed to independent observers, provided an invaluable 
source of information for academics, politicians and workers in the media 
(Fletcher, 1982:106). 
 
On the same note, while looking at the US’ role in the Cold War and the 
propagation of its capitalist ideology through cinema, Berkowitz (2010) alleges that the 
rise in American popular culture is directly linked to the culture industry. According to 
this author, not only did the culture industry render the American ideology accessible 
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throughout the world, it also made it resilient to financial challenges such as the Great 
Depression in the 1930s.  
Similarly, Hiersteiner (1998) believes that US popular movies did instil capitalist 
thinking among cinema audiences. That is, “to groom people to attend movies regularly, 
the writers and producers not only developed and used conventions and story lines to 
surprise and dazzle but played to the audience’s strong desire for predictability and need 
to identify with some film characters and disparage others” (p. 313). 
Fundamentally, propaganda messages are increasingly being integrated within the 
story lines of mainstream media the same way capitalist ideology was instilled to the 
public through popular culture (Williams, 2009; Berkowitz 2010). For instance, the 
ambivalences around the “War on Terror” following the aftermath of 9/11 have 
rejuvenated the debates around media propaganda (Altheide, 2007; Altheide, 2009; 
Kellner, 2003/2004). Some authors go further to assert that media houses encompass the 
same tactics exploited during World Wars I and II by governments to gain public 
confidence when justifying wars (Freedman, 2001; Altheide, 2009). 
Reliance on institutionalized, centralized and government-controlled sources of 
information has particularly been at the epicene of theses discussions. In this view, 
Altheide (2009) alludes that “the evidence for justifying the Iraq War was presented as 
part of a general feature of a war programming narrative, or the selective use of claims 
makers/news sources within a normative pattern, which include occasional detractors to 
give the appearance of debate and considering all sides” (p. 14). Kellner (2003) and 
Altheide (2007) contend that the American authorities have symbolically represented 
	   82	  
certain groups in a manner that they have been branded as “terror suspects” due to their 
lifestyles and religious beliefs.  
These assumptions not only serve to emphasize media hegemony, but also suggest 
that audiences’ resonance with media messages are somewhat linked to the medium and 
language used to convey the message itself. In other words, audiences’ resonance with 
media messages varies depending on the language and forms of media. Determinist 
acclamation by McLuhan’s (1964) early studies subscribes to this view. McLuhan 
perceived media as extensions of human faculty hence the famous acclaim prophesying  
“the medium” as “the message.”  
McLuhan argued that individuals do adapt to their environments depending on the 
way their senses are in congruence with a given communication medium, and that the 
“medium” per se becomes the “message” itself. McLuhan’s prophesies suggest, for 
instance, that watching a soccer game on a black and white television set would not have 
the same effects as watching the same game on a coloured television set. Likewise, 
hearing about a given conflict through the radio will not have the similar effects as 
hearing or watching the same conflict unfurl on a TV channel.  
Between 1940 and 1970, media research shifted from media hegemony to put 
emphasis on audiences’ activity and selectivity. The focus was on what people do with 
the media rather than what the media does to people. As such, most of the research 
conducted in this period reinforced the perception that “the media could not have much of 
an influence on people unless it played into what people already thought, especially if 
they did not combine forces with ‘local leaders’ in the immediate environment of 
audiences” (Gripsrud, 2002: 50). Central to this tradition, were the studies conducted by 
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Lazarsfeld and Katz that examined the factors that predetermined people’s votes, which 
in turn contributed to the patterns of presidential elections in the 1940s. Their findings 
suggested that people select and consume media products depending on psychological 
factors such as areas of interest and the ability of these messages to gratify people’s 
expectations. The functionalist approach as well as the sociology of media served as 
analytical frameworks to examine the creation or construction of social realities by the 
media (Lasswell, 1948; Berelson, 1959).  
Equally, Katz’s (1980) findings on voting trends and the circulation of 
propaganda and Lasswell’s (1971) “5W model” (Who says What in What channel to 
Whom with What effect?) both served to orient media and communication studies to 
audience and content analyses. Essentially, Lasswell’s content analysis on war 
propaganda pointed out that the likelihood that a propaganda message would shape or 
influence the public’s perception is directly linked to the number of people reached by the 
message itself. In other words, Lasswell’s findings emphasized the importance of 
message redundancy in shaping audience perceptions.  
Lazersfeld and Katz (1955) also proposed a “Two-step Flow of Communication”, 
emphasizing the role of “opinion leaders” in communication situations. Their findings 
suggest that media messages pass through “human filters” that, presumably, give more 
meaning to news stories. The supposed filters are not limited to political elites or 
administrators who may choose to render some topics more salient than others. Not only 
do Lazersfeld and Katz’s assertions reflect functionalist sociology of the media, they also 
claim that the psychological train of thought serves as an intermediary factor influencing 
media reception. These were some of the voids raised with regard to Lasswell’s formula. 
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That is, they pointed out that media users have differentiated patterns of consumption 
depending on their tastes, interests, and expectations (Katz, 1980; Berelson, 1959).  
Similarly, the proponents of the Uses and Gratifications Theory (U&G) 
emphasized the choice patterns of media audiences when it comes to consuming media 
messages (Fisher, 1978; Ronsengren, 1974; Rubin, 2002). While considering audiences 
as active and goal-oriented, the core assumptions of this approach were to: a) investigate 
how individuals use media to gratify their needs; b) examine the motives driving their use 
of a particular media; and c) identify possible circumstances (intended or unintended) 
emanating from media use (Ronsengren, 1974).  
Rubin (2002) goes further on these assumptions by claiming that contemporary 
U&G theory is a multilevel approach. For Rubin, contemporary U&G “sees 
communication influence as being socially and psychologically constrained and affected 
by individual differences and choice” (Rubin, 2002: 51). That is, people have differing 
expectations, personalities, attitudes, social structure and other conditions that are likely 
to influence use of media and their messages. In this way, the U&G theory shifted the 
focus from conceiving media as a powerful tool in shaping audience attitudes to the 
power detained by audiences in selecting and using media commodities to fulfil their 
needs. The significance of contextual inferences was thus central when seeking to 
understand people’s use of media.  
With regard to the studies conducted after the 1970s, media research focused on 
culture industries and the remaking of the new world order, especially on how the media 
plays a critical role in the whole process. Gripsrud (2002) believes that the agenda-setting 
purposes of media, supposing that the salience of media narratives are indirectly 
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controlled by dominant voices with media corporations. The proponents of the Agenda-
Setting Theory believe that the media reinforce public perceptions by selecting and 
eliminating news stories (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). As such, the salience of social 
phenomena is highlighted by the time accorded to them and the kinds of narrative used in 
an attempt to coil these issues within the public agenda (Scheufele, 1999; Gitlin, 1980; 
McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997).  
Various theories were also borrowed from different fields of study to understand 
people’s interaction with media messages. For example, the Cultivation Theory 
hypothesized that media influences people’s perception of reality over an extensive 
period of time (Gerbner et al., 1986), which may involve the cultivation of certain 
stereotypes for instance. Other theories are the Reinforcement Theory, which supposes 
that media portrayals strengthen established behaviours that media audiences bring with 
them while using different media, and that people’s backgrounds became crucial in 
understanding the uses associated with media consumption.  
Equally important was the Observational Learning Theory, which claim people 
may react to certain situations based on what they have learned from media portrayals, as 
the exposure to media is likely to teach audiences new ways of reading given phenomena. 
This explains why some of the games kids play involves imitations of the movies or 
video games they are exposed to.  
While it is true that audiences’ interaction with media messages may lead to the 
cultivation, learning and reinforcement of certain perceptions, it is less likely that 
universal behavioural patterns manifest themselves across different cultures and/or 
demographics. This is because individuals can also decide what kinds of programs appeal 
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to them based on their culture, individual character, environment, etc., all of which 
influence the way an individual is likely to use a given media (Grossberg, 1989; Davies, 
1995; Mosco, 1996; Hall et al., 1980). Media analyses were not only centred on texts, but 
also on the social conditions relative to the production and distribution of these texts.  
These perspectives laid the foundation for the critique of ideology, providing 
suggestions on how to decorticate texts (including media texts) in order to understand the 
forces that led to dominant classicism and how it was sustained through ideological 
constructions (Merrigan and Huston, 2004; Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). Most of the 
studies in this tradition emphasized pragmatism as a constructive conceptual framework 
for the interpretation of texts. Using constructivist and holistic methodologies, most of 
these studies confirmed the association between technology, media, culture and history 
(Mosco, 1996: Grossberg, 1989).  
The European Critical School, – also known as the Frankfurt School, is poised on 
this epistemology. The Frankfurt School blends critical and interdisciplinary methods 
(initially used by neo-Marxist theorists) to critique the culture industry that, according to 
them, laid the foundation for capitalistic consumerism and homogenized societal needs 
(Horkheimer, and Adorno, 1972). Their central argument is that technological inventions 
created room for the reproduction of ideology and cultural artefacts through the mass 
media, which in turn changed society’s modes of social organization (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 1972; Mosco, 1996).  
Equally, the British Birmingham School, whose contributions to media studies are 
often situated with the arrival of Cultural Studies, largely influenced media research in 
the 1980s. Like the Frankfurt School, the Birmingham School embraced multidisciplinary 
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methodology to emphasize the significance of cultural artefacts in understanding media 
reception and functioning (Davis, 1995; Grossberg, 1997). One of the most cited authors 
in this regard is Stuart Hall, whose recent works have focused on issues of representation, 
especially cultural representations and the signifying practices of such representations 
across societies (Hall and Meeks, 2007; Hall, 1997). 
From this perspective, one can argue that mass communication is essentially a 
channel through which capitalist hegemony is fortified by means of ideology and culture 
(Grossberg, Cary, and Treichler, 1992; During, 1993; Grossberg, 1989; Davies, 1995; 
Huntington, 1996). As such, studies in this regard focus on cultural artefacts, especially 
the sub-cultures, and how they resist to homogeneous dominant cultures. Most of the 
analyses are drawn from the Marxist theory of society, semiotics, ideology, and cultural 
hegemony to highlight the degrees of resistance witnessed in media audiences. Most of 
these approaches associate this resistance with the presence of sub-cultures that render 
the consumption of media products more challenging and equivocal. In essence, the focus 
on sub-cultures and their resistance to dominant cultural doctrines constitutes one of the 
main differences between the Frankfurt School and the Birmingham School.  
Although the Frankfurt and Birmingham schools are renowned for introducing a 
cultural perspective in media literature, contemporary scholars in the critical tradition 
have often centred their studies on the Political Economy of culture production, 
emphasizing economic systems within which cultural artefacts are produced and 
reproduced. By definition, political economy can be defined as “the study of how values 
of all kinds are produced, distributed, exchanged, and consumed (the economic); how 
power is produced, distributed, exchanged, and exercised (the political); and how these 
	   88	  
aspects of the social world are related at any given place and time in history” (Graham, 
2005: 2).  
In this view, a political-economic approach to media and communication studies 
presumes that socio-historical transformation transcends media representations, and that 
the transformations per se not only shape the way media audiences make sense of their 
personal experiences, but that they also transform the experiences that have already been 
established as verifiable world views (Manyozo, 2011; Mosco, 1996; Garnham, 2000; 
McChesney, 2008; Silverstone, 2006; Graham, 2005). This suggests that the political 
economy of communication as a theory, is on the one hand concerned with mass media 
industry structures such as media ownership and political systems, as well as with the 
political structures within which the media functions. On the other hand, it focuses on the 
conditions of production, distribution and consumption of media as a commodity. This is 
why some scholarship in this regard emphasizes the significance of the commodification25 
process of mass communication in that it aids the construction meaning through a series 
of socio-historical factors (Mosco, 1996).   
Given this complex process characterizing media consumption and political-
economic conditions of production and distribution, a number of scholars have tried to 
provide an inclusive definition of the political economy of communication as a theory. 
The initial definition of the political-economic approach to communication can be traced 
to the work of Harold Innis when he coiled the term “knowledge monopolies” while 
                                                
25In his book published in 1996, “The political Economy of Communication”, Vincent Mosco describes 
commodification as “the process of transforming use values into exchange values, of transforming products 
whose value is determined by their ability to meet individual and social needs into products whose value is 
set by what they can bring in the marketplace” (p.141).  
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studying the Canadian culture industry26. Innis argued that some social groups had the 
privilege, through history, to control information systems. As a result, Innis presumed 
that the dynamics of social relations were likely to be influenced by media, as they help 
in maintaining knowledge monopolies.  
Other scholars such as Herman and Chomsky (1988) also found that media 
institutions serve specific corporate interests, especially those of the elite and for-profit 
corporations, for they organize news according to corporate agendas and elitist views of 
society. For Herman and Chomsky, media consumption may not only be determined by 
the legislations put in place, but also a series of what they call “filters” that structure 
media functioning – ownership, financing and advertising, critical information feeds, 
corporate agenda, and anti-communist ideology. 
Contemporary definitions of political economy, as used in communication 
research, are often associated with the works of McChesney (2000), Graham (2005), 
Mosco (1996) and McKinney et al. (2005), among others. McChesney (2000) envisions 
political economy of communication as a twofold process: 
First, it addresses the nature of the relationship between media and 
communication systems on the one hand and the broader social structure of 
society. In other words, it examines how media and communication systems and 
content reinforce, challenge or influence existing class and social relations. It does 
this with a particular interest in how economic factors influence politics and social 
relations. Second, the political economy of communication looks specifically at 
how ownership, support mechanisms (e.g. advertising) and government policies 
influence media behavior and content. This line of inquiry emphasizes structural 
factors and the labor process in the production, distribution and consumption of 
communication (McChesney, 2000: 109). 
 
                                                
26See Meyer, P. (2003). Key Thinkers in Critical Media Studies: Harold Innis. 
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Recent studies by McChesney (2008) suggest that “monopolistic competition” has 
been heightened in the past few decades, forcing media institutions to seek friendly 
advertising policies such as embedding products within news lines to make it impossible 
for the public to disregard them. For McChesney (2008), these kinds of policies have 
served to perpetrate false values to the public through media messages.  
In retrospect, the theories on media and audience perceptions discussed above not 
only continue to restructure contemporary thoughts on media consumption as well as 
reception studies, but they have also influenced the direction of peace-media research that 
has looked at the centrality of media framing in influencing the directions and patterns of 
a given conflict. Fundamentally, the theories on media and audience perceptions 
presented above point to the fact that the media narratives are pivotal when seeking to 
understand audience positioning with regard to world views and/or social phenomena.  
The next section looks at some of the literature relative to media framing, with 
emphasis on how media narratives may determine the direction of a conflict. The goal is 
to present some of the studies highlighting the significance of media narratives in 
inflaming or containing probable conflicts, depending on the kinds of frames embraced. 
In other words, peace or conflict also hinges on the kinds of narratives and 
representations adopted by the media to characterize these situational events.  
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3.2. Media and Conflict Framing 
 
Framing research continues to dominate peace-media literature while offering a 
host of analytical viewpoints with regard to the understanding of core issues often 
inherent in many conflict situations. Early definitions of framing, as a concept, is usually 
linked to the work of Goffman (1974) who used it to highlight the cognitive structures 
that assist an individual’s interpretation of reality, where daily life experiences not only 
structure the perceived social order, but also ritualize and organize the representation of 
self in staged performances.  
The underlying assumption in Goffman’s argument is that framing is a twofold 
process: on the one hand, it portrays self as a construct hinged on selective 
representations of reality, while on the other hand, it mirrors one’s interaction with one’s 
immediate environment. In other words, frames reflect both the conscious (because 
individuals somehow manipulate situational norms to present their self in a controlled 
manner) and the unconscious (since normalized social order limits the individuals’ 
capacity to freely represent their self) state of mind.  
Although framing is a continuous process of sense-making that does not 
necessarily involve the media, its appropriation has been widespread in the academic 
literature, and thus has prompted diverse definitions depending on the fields of study. For 
instance, communication scholars such as Gitlin (1980) define framing as “principles of 
selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, 
what happens, and what matters” (p. 6). On the other hand, Entman (1993) considers 
framing as a process whereby people identify “some aspects of a perceived reality and 
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make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation” (p.52).  
More recently, several researchers have argued for an integrative approach to 
framing, implying that news frames not only disseminate persuasive angles of news 
interpretation, but also the reasons as to why the circulated frames are of great 
significance (Tewksbury and Scheufele, 2009; Matthes and Kohring, 2008; Matthes, 
2012; D’Angelo 2011; Shah et al., 2009). In addition, scholars such as D’Angelo (2011) 
see framing process as a dual concept where researchers tend to “bring together” various 
angles of news analyses to “fit into” a given conceptual frame of analysis. The former 
(bring together) “strives to slow down the proliferation of conceptual definitions of frame 
and framing”, while the latter (fit into) supposes that “a single study or even a whole 
research agenda accepts certain conceptual definitions of frame and framing and relies on 
specified theoretical constructs and mechanisms regarding frame building or framing 
effects” (D’Angelo, 2011: 356-358).  
Despite the conceptual and methodological challenges surrounding the definitions 
of frames and framing process, a host of scholarship continues to appropriate framing 
within its body of research. In mediation and negotiation literature, framing is used to 
underscore the cognitive bargaining processes in which disputants weigh their gains and 
losses (Putnam and Holmer, 1992). Seen through this lens, framing reflects the way 
meaning is systematically generated through rationalized social values, underpinning the 
significance of social cognition27. The salience of an occurrence, in this case, hinges on 
                                                
27 In their book, Social Cognition, published in 1991, Fiske and Taylor define social cognition as a 
metatheoretical approach whose focus is on the mental processes that guide social interaction. Social 
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what Benford and Snow (2000) call “frame amplification”: this happens when the 
perceived values or beliefs are idealized, embellished, clarified or invigorated, all of 
which make certain contents more salient than others.  
Frame amplification can also be characterized by a mixture of present and past 
experiences that people have had with regard to different issues. This may weigh on 
people’s attitudes and perceptions of a conflict, and what is at stake. On this note, Pinkely 
(1990) writes, 
Conflict situations elicit a well-defined cognitive structure based on past 
experiences with conflict as well as present concerns and interests. These 
cognitive structures or interpretations of conflict (referred to here as dimensions of 
conflict frame) may then guide disputant behavior, strategy selection, outcome 
concerns, and evaluations of the other party (Pinkely, 1990: 117). 
 
Scheweitzer, Dechurch, and Gibson (2005) make a similar point by declaring that 
“competitively framed negotiators tend to perceive their dispute as one in which one 
party gains at the other’s expense, [while] cooperatively framed negotiators tend to 
perceive their dispute as an opportunity to create an integrative agreement that benefits 
both parties” (p. 2124). Not only do these assumptions acclaim the centrality of language 
as a symbolic representation, they also underscore the challenges of frames as a 
congruent reflection of social or individual values. In this light, framing is regarded as a 
communicative and integrative process necessitating a thorough understanding of 
rhetorical structures.  
Generally, media and communication scholars associate framing with the 
selective processes that accompany the creation and circulation of news content 
                                                                                                                                            
cognition relates to “how ordinary people think about people and how they think they think about people” 
(p. 1). In other words, one’s social behavior hinges on motivations and intensions as guided by cognitive 
processes of perception. 
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(Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005). The notion of priming has also been coiled with 
framing to emphasize the fact both concepts involve the alteration of audience perception 
with regard to worldviews (Weaver, 2007; McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997). This is 
based on the assumption that media representations are, above all, controlled narratives 
whose directions are likely to influence the public’s opinion in a positive or negative way 
depending on their representational aptitudes (Simons, 2008; Lecheler and de Vreese, 
2012).  
Similar argument is raised by the proponents of Cultural Studies such as Hall 
(1997), who believe that language is not only able to construct meaning because it 
operates as a representational system, but it also serves as a vehicle by which thoughts, 
ideas and feelings are represented in a given culture. The central claim made is that media 
professionals “construct the symbolic representations of society that members of the 
public use to make sense of events and issues” (Bronstein, 2005: 785). Factors such as 
technological advancements, journalistic orientations, financial pressures, 
institutionalized sources and corporate interests, are indicative of some of the conditions 
that lead to slanted media frames (Matthes, 2012; D’Angelo, 2011; Entman, 2010; 
Matthes and Kohring, 2008). 
In this light, media frames can broadly be understood as a schema of 
interpretation socially constructed through news story lines to influence audience 
perception of a particular event or phenomenon (Price, Tewksbury and Powers, 1997; 
Tewksbury and Scheufele, 2009). The story lines can take several forms such as texts, 
audio, video, and image. Framing has also been used in articulation with the agenda-
setting theory to emphasize the cognitive processes by which the audience interprets and 
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understands media narratives (McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997), and as Hall (1997:3) 
puts it, “meaning is what gives us a sense of our own identity, of who we are and with 
whom we belong.” 
If media frames influence the perceptions that people have with regard to their 
understanding of worldviews, then one can argue that social order also hinges on the 
kinds of narratives adopted by the media to characterize a given occurrence. Studies that 
examine the relationship between media and social identity seem to lean towards this 
direction (Volkmer, 2008; Caliendo and Mcllwain, 2006). The main argument is that an 
individual’s social identity is constructed based on his group or collective frames of 
reference (Avraham and First, 2010; Brummans et al., 2008; Forsberg, 2008), a self-
categorization process likely to shift group boundaries depending on situational 
circumstances (Pietikäinen, 2008; Arnold and Schneider, 2007; Deuze, 2006). The result 
is that the self-categorization process, as portrayed by the media, informs intergroup 
interactions whether positively or negatively.  
In security studies, for instance, the emphasis is often put on how war or conflict 
narratives are perceived and/or received by the public (Norris, Kern and Just, 2003; El-
Nawawy and Powers, 2010; Gardner, 2001; Mellor, 2009; Hallahan, 1999), and how the 
narratives in question influence the patterns and directions of conflicts (Roth, 1992; 
Hamelink, 2008; Galtung, 2002; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005; 
Howard, 2003). Most of these studies seem to collectively agree on the fact that, in 
ethnically heterogeneous states, media framing is likely to lead to the escalation or de-
escalation of social conflicts depending on how the media represent a group or a coalition 
of groups. 
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In Europe, the war in the former Yugoslavia was a good example indicating the 
significance and the likelihood of media narratives, which influenced the direction of 
intergroup conflict. Scholars such as Ignatieff (1997), Sandole (1999) and Slattery (1994) 
have argued that media’s categorization of the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians as distinct 
ethnic entities (in and out groups) contributed to the violence between these groups. The 
case of Indonesia and India are also exemplary. According to Marthoz (2003), communal 
conflict in Indonesia and religious-based conflicts in India are, to some extent, products 
of the media’s insensitivity with regard to the claims raised by the minority groups. 
One event that drew much attention in the past decade, as far as media and 
conflict framing is concerned, was the coverage of 9/11 and the discourses on “War on 
Terror” (Simons, 2008; Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005; Christie, 2006). The “War on 
Terror” prompted criticism over the so-called “institutionalized sources”, where “military 
journalists” provided regular briefings on an on-going war, based on the information that 
the warring states provided (Altheide, 2009; Kellner, 2004; Volkmer, 2008), yet these 
states were already complicit in that given combat. Altheide (2009), for instance, believes 
that the invasion of Iraq by the Pentagon was based on a “crime-related discourse of 
fear”, and that American news channels framed 9/11 as assaults on the Americans by the 
Arabs. This implies that media framing, particularly in situations of conflict, is 
profoundly influenced by the cultures of proximity, which creates a symbolic community 
based on intended outcomes (Hemelink, 2008; Kolmer and Semetko, 2009). 
This brief literature on media and conflict framing review points to the duality 
inherent in the media framing process, especially in conflict situations. That is, there is 
need to understand the intricate relationship between framing as a persuasive discourse 
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involving strategic intensions of disputants and framing as a communicative processes 
exemplifying interpretive orientations (Kaufman and Smith, 1999; Benford and Snow, 
2000). As an interpretative tool, media framing can serve as mental maps that help people 
make sense of different situations based on worldviews and their daily life experiences. 
As such, the framing process provides disputants with the means to negotiate their 
perceived differences in a manner that reflects their collective ideals. 
From a strategic viewpoint, media framing hinges on persuasive discourses aimed 
at rallying opinions towards a particular cause, whether negative or positive (Kaufman 
and Smith, 1999). Perceived this way, the media may frame issues based on the interests 
shared by a particular group of people at the expense of the others. In this regard, the 
media are essentially a polarizing medium, as it can be seen as a threat given its 
hegemonic power to blacken or distort one’s image for self-serving purposes (El-
Nawawy and Powers, 2010). Indeed, “slanted framing results from the interaction of real 
world developments, cultural norms, and journalistic decision rules with the sometimes 
proficient and other times maladroit efforts of competing elites to manage the news” 
Entman (2010: 389). 
Despite the rich theoretical and analytical perspectives that the literature on media 
and conflict framing offers, little attention has been paid to the conditions that lead to 
attitudinal changes with regard to the audiences of vernacular radios, yet these radios 
have been at the height of politically driven conflicts in many multiethnic states, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Although there is a host of literature on media and 
social conflicts in Africa (Tomaselli and Muller, 2001; Posner, 2007; Anderson, 2005; 
Anderson and Lochery, 2008; Oucho, 2002; Wimmer, 1997; Okoth and Ogot, 2000), the 
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majority of these studies emphasize ethno-political stigmatization and how it affects the 
politics of intergroup cohesion. While it is true that such categorization may lead to the 
escalation or de-escalation of conflicts, little attention is still paid to the frame-building 
process and how it impacts intergroup attitudinal shifts in situations of conflict. 
In light of the forgoing discussions, the analytical framework guiding this study 
builds on Azar’s (1990) theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) by integrating media 
framing process, perceived as equally essential in the understanding of social conflicts, to 
unpack the discourses that surrounded the accommodation of intergroup conflicts in the 
events leading to the 2007/08 conflicts in Kenya. The goal is to illuminate the degree to 
which intergroup categorization in vernacular radios, coupled with other variables 
advanced by the PSC model such as lack of economic opportunity, influenced the 
direction and patterns of this particular conflict as well as the attitudes of the study’s 
target groups. 
The next section looks specifically at the proposed theoretical framework guiding 
this study that integrates media framing, a possible fifth cluster, to Azar’s (1990) four-
cluster theory of Protracted Social Conflicts.  
 
3.3. Proposed Analytical Framework 
 
The proposed analytical framework builds on media research and security studies 
literature. The blend between these poles of research is aimed at bringing into the open 
the salience of media narratives in socially protracted conflicts, an aspect that has often 
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been downplayed or ignored in the mainstream conflict transformation and peace-
building approaches (as briefly discussed bellow). Essentially, my analytical framework 
builds on Eduard Azar’s (1990) four-cluster theory of Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC) 
to integrate media framing as an equally crucial aspect of socially protracted conflicts, 
especially in multiethnic societies such as Kenya.  
 
3.3.1. Protracted Social Conflicts (PSC) 
 
Essentially, the PSC model posits that the understanding of protracted social 
conflicts stretches beyond internal and external dichotomies that have emphasized overt 
conflicts over covert ones, a trend that has, according to Azar, clouded over the 
underlying forces characterizing such conflicts. In his point of view, protracted social 
conflicts present unique properties whose manifestations strike at the centre of 
developmental needs, especially in multiethnic societies where their occurrence is 
sporadic. Given these patterns of conflict, Azar argues that protracted social conflicts 
have become the main challenge for national cohesion in developing countries since the 
end of the Second World War and Cold War. He writes, 
Many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are 
characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and 
actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in 
changing goals, actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear 
starting and terminating points…[As such] protracted social conflicts occur when 
communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the 
communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal 
chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. 
Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and 
the multi-communal nature of the society) play important roles in shaping the 
genesis of protracted social conflict (Azar, 1990: 6-12). 
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This endemic challenge posed by protracted conflicts, according to him, is not only 
explained by the socio-cultural-ethnic relationships that took shape following the 
disintegration of colonial ties, but also by the increasing underdevelopment that continues 
to shrink economic opportunities thus leading to struggles over the limited resources.  
Azar and Moon (1986: 395) suggested that social conflicts become protracted 
when: a) there is a stretch in temporal factor, b) there are fluctuations with regard to the 
intensity and frequency of a given dispute, c) the conflict spreads from one place to 
another; d) there is a somewhat partial stability; e) the termination of the conflict 
becomes uncertain and lastly, f) internal and external sources of the conflict in question 
become imprecise. Given these conditions, Azar (1990) proposed the PSC approach to 
map out the key dimensions of such conflicts.  
Fundamentally, the PSC model foresees the genesis of social conflicts as a 
fourfold communicative product of various conditions: communal content, deprivation of 
human needs, governance and the state’s role, and international linkages. First, Azar 
posits that communal content is based on the premise that protracted conflicts are 
commonly identity-based (ethnicity, race, culture, religion etc.) and that the 
“disarticulation between the state and society as a whole” explains the rigid correlation 
between the state and identity groups, especially in multi-communal societies where, 
according to him, colonial legacy has created a problematic relationship between the state 
machinery (controlled by a small identity/ethnic group or a coalition of group identities) 
and other social groups whose needs have been neglected by the state machinery.  
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In this way, the degree of cultural heterogeneity in a society is likely to influence 
the manner in which different identity groups accommodate each other, especially in the 
redistribution of state power. On the one hand, Azar’s communal content appears to 
borrow from social psychology where individual needs and demands are regarded as 
products of social processes (Kaufman, 2006; Prins, 2005). On the other hand, it draws 
from social identity research where conflicts are linked to the complexities surrounding 
the notion of identity (Rothschild and Olson, 2001; Rothman and Olson, 2001; Brown, 
1996; Keating and Knight, 2004; McRae, 1983). 
The second cluster, deprivation of human needs, underscores the fact that 
protracted conflicts are fanned by need deprivation and the failure, by the incumbent 
authority, to address these grievances in a responsive manner. In this view, Azar infers 
that need deprivation fosters collective action for they are “non-negotiable” (where needs 
are not limited to political access, economic development and cultural recognition). He 
argues that the ideological apparatus manipulated by political interests and antagonistic 
group relationships embedded in historic realities may generate mistrust between 
different communities and thus lead to attacks and counter-attacks. This cluster seems to 
be grounded on the human need theory assumptions highlighting the centrality of 
material and non-material satisfactions, and thus supports the studies emphasizing greed 
and/or fear for the future as key sources of armed conflicts in developing nations (Collier, 
2001; Lake and Rothschild, 1996). 
Thirdly, Azar argues that governance and the state’s role are perceived as key 
elements of contentment or discontentment of individual and communal demands. For 
him, the state is considered as a body with the mandate to protect, cater to, lead and 
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govern all groups peacefully or by force. As such, states that fail to provide its citizens 
with structures deemed necessary for individual and collective emancipation (for reasons 
not limited to corruption, authoritarianism and ineffectiveness) are likely to face 
protracted conflicts.  
In this perspective, the author presumes that in the newly formed nation-states 
(mainly post-colonial states), the Western liberal leadership model has failed, and that 
“dominant identity groups or a coalition of hegemonic groups” have monopolized key 
political institutions and used the state machinery for their own political gains while 
leaving the needs of other groups unaddressed. In this regard, protracted conflicts may 
characterize power struggles between various communities and therefore generate 
security dilemmas (Posen, 1993; Brown, 1993; Galtung, 1996; Galtung et al., 2002). 
Lastly, Azar presumes that international linkages describing politico-economic 
relationships around the globe have put both the stronger and weaker states on the same 
level of economic competition. This relationship, according to him, has not only created 
economic dependency, but also redefined military relationships and cross-border 
interests. Consequently, the sovereignty of weaker states has become more fragile for 
their socio-political institutions are greatly influenced by the international system.  
This suggests that the politics of control or co-optation of various conflicts can be 
illuminated by looking at the international linkages such as the global economic system. 
Indeed, Miall et al. (2005) argue that external military intervention in a conflict situation 
may raise several questions with regard to civil-military relations for there are instances 
where external actors are perceived as “enemies of the reconstruction process.”  
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Although the PSC model has well been received in peace-building literature as a 
relatively comprehensive and inclusive approach given its four clusters that are regarded 
as preconditions of protracted social conflicts (Wimmer, 2004; Keating and Knight, 
2004; Volkmer, 2008; Entman, 2008; Hamelink, 2008; Nyamnjoh, 2005), the model has 
also been criticized on multiple levels. Cordula Reinmann, a feminist scholar, argues that 
the model is gender-insensitive as it fails to account for family and/or power-relations 
that may surface prior, during or after conflicts28. Others have also pointed out the 
generality of the clusters (Byman, 2002; Galtung, 1996; Galtung et. al., 2002; Lederach, 
1997; Sandole, 1999). 
As a result, modest attempts to explain prolonged social conflicts continue to 
emerge. For instance, Galtung (1996) critiques Azar’s model on the basis that conflicts 
are a transformational process with both positive and negative manifestations, which 
cannot be perceived solely as a negative occurrence. For Galtung, conflict process may 
take a series of steps: articulation or disarticulation, conscientization or de-
conscientization, simplification or complexification, polarization or de-polarization, and 
escalation or de-escalation. In this view, conflict is regarded as a product of the socio-
economic structure and relational properties eminent in these structures. Galtung 
therefore argues that conflict per se is latent in people’s behaviours or attitudes, and that 
by addressing these contradictions (or asymmetric relationships), such conflicts can be 
mitigated or transformed in a positive manner.  
                                                
28 Cordula, Reinmann, “Why are Violent, Intra-state Conflicts Protracted? Looking at Azar’s Model of 
Protracted Social Conflict from a Gender-sensitive Perspective.” Accessed October 3, 2011. 
http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/AZAR.pdf  
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Concurrently, Sandole (1997/1999) argues for a conflict theory poised on what he 
calls a Three-Pillar Framework (3PF) that, according to him, provides a deeper 
understanding of the underlying issues in conflicts. Pillar one identifies the characteristics 
of any given conflict (elements of conflict such as parties, issues, setting etc.), pillar two 
locates the causes and conditions of the conflict (individual, societal, international or 
global level). Pillar three identifies intervention strategies (confrontational or 
collaborative processes). His approach primarily suggests what transforms conflicts from 
one stage to another. 
Another modest approach to conflict transformation is the work conducted by 
Lederach (1997). For Lederach, conflict is essentially a pyramidal transformational 
process involving the shift from war-system to peace-system with structural 
readjustments at multiple levels: elites and decision-makers, mid-level leaders (such as 
churches and social organizations), and community leaders. Time consciousness is 
therefore central to the transformations that occur at all levels. Lederach’s approach to 
conflict transformation is not only analytical but also hermeneutic as it stretches the 
understanding of conflicts beyond actors directly involved in any conflict situation.  This 
has helped to widen the scope of theories seeking to examine conflict at intervention 
level. 
In this light, Fisher’s (2007) Contingency Model for Third Party Intervention 
builds on Interactive Conflict Resolution (Fisher, 1993/2001) and Problem-Solving 
Workshop (Burton, 1990/1997) models while perceiving conflict as “a mix of objective 
and subjective elements, with the latter gaining in importance as conflict escalates, and 
that both aspects must be dealt with to achieve resolution” (p. 313). Essentially, Fisher’s 
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revised contingency model examines conflict in four stages: discussion (as conflict 
escalates direct discussions are replaced by interpretation of deeds), polarization 
(relationships also shift from those built on respect and trust, to those that are 
disrespectful and untrustworthy), segregation (perceived outcomes are negotiated in 
terms of defensive competitions based on win-loose dynamics), and destruction (actions 
taken are aimed at hurting the other party). 
Other scholars who have worked extensively on conflict theories include Wimmer 
(2004) who perceives post-war conflicts as a product of a “defrosting effect”. This, 
according to him, implies that the “authoritarian rule that was preserved through 
superpower rivalry melts away,” a factor that continues to generate intergroup hatred 
given the competitively articulated claims over self-determination and political 
autonomy. For instance, Wimmer supposes that the countries initially allied to the former 
Soviet-bloc are “simply too heterogeneous in ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious terms to 
function as ‘normal’ nation states29.”  
Furthermore, Wimmer (2004) believes that the globalization process has 
disintegrated geopolitical boundaries, exposing people to foreign structures of socio-
political organization that may not necessarily match what they are used to. This 
assumption forms the foundation of Huntington’s (1996) argument suggesting that the 
“new” world order is due to the clash of different civilizations, in which religious 
affiliations define relational bonds across cultures.   
                                                
29 The author alludes to the idea that the countries initially allied to the Soviet-Bloc have come up with their 
own path to national self-assertion while attempting to merge various homogenous states. The normal 
functioning is thus linked to the fact that Western liberal models have often failed to sustain in such 
settings.  
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Equally, Byman (2002) infers that contemporary conflict transformation literature 
can be classified into four broad categories: a) those emphasizing ethnic security dilemma 
(i.e. conflict occurs when certain groups feel threatened), b) those highlighting status 
concerns (i.e. conflicts occur due to fear of subordination or dominance by other groups, 
in both material and cultural ways), c) those putting emphasis on hegemonic ambitions 
(i.e. conflicts seen as a product of competitive socio-political values, where a group or a 
coalition of groups pushes their views to the rest of the groups), and lastly d) those 
underlining the aspirations of elites (emphasizing the role of elites who may play on 
ethnic fears to ascend to or maintain power).  
From this brief overview, it is evident that mainstream theories of conflict 
resolution (and transformation) not only provide a macro perspective with regard to the 
issues and actors involved in conflict situations, they are also suggestive as to what 
peace-builders need to take into account before designing intervention strategies. In spite 
of the rich analytical, interpretative and prescriptive nature of these approaches, they 
seem to ignore or downplay one key aspect of social conflicts: media narratives. That is, 
they do not explicitly explain how the perceived differences or incompatibilities, eminent 
in conflict situations, transform from their latent nature to overt manifestations (and vice 
versa).  
 
3.3.2. Rationale of Integrating Media Framing Within the PSC Model 
 
The proposed analytical framework of this dissertation is a modest attempt to 
reaffirm media narratives as an indispensable aspect in understanding protracted social 
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conflicts, especially in multiethnic societies where vernacular media continue to grow 
following the competing appeals and demands of different ethno-linguistic groups. The 
rationale is that social conflicts are a mix of complex elements, and that media narratives 
are likely to determine the patterns and direction of such conflicts.  
This is because “people seek information about the crisis and evaluate the cause 
of the event and the organizational responsibility for the crisis based on media coverage 
of the crisis” (Gower and An, 2009: 107). Volkmer (2008) also argues that “for decades, 
conflict events [have] shaped and reinforced the national public through a particular 
culture of national proximity” (p. 91). It is this culture of proximity that, according to 
Forsberg (2008), has been politicized in a manner that polarizes multiethnic societies. He 
writes,  
States characterized by ethnic polarization are confronted with greater uncertainty 
regarding the relative strength of groups and are, hence, especially susceptible to 
conflict contagion. […] Once a group becomes inspired by events in the conflict 
state, it is more likely to act on this inspiration process if it perceives a reasonable 
chance of winning a violent confrontation” (Forsberg, 2008: 287).  
 
The question, therefore, is not whether the media can influence the patterns or 
directions of socially protracted conflicts, but rather, to what extent can they lead to the 
escalation or de-escalation of such conflicts? In fact, several studies have demonstrated 
(mainly in a negative manner) how various media have been exploited by different social 
and political groups to stigmatize intergroup relations (Gathigi, 2009; Anderson, 2008; 
Harding, 2006; Tehranian, 2002; Jeffres, 2000; Forsberg, 2008; Hamelink, 2008).  
In Asia, the case of Burma, characterized by civil wars since the country’s 
independence in 1948 from the British, is exemplary. The attempt by the opposition 
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media to rally voices against military rule has only increased intermittent violence in the 
country (Brooten, 2006; Smith, 1999; Steinberg, 2001). On this note, Brooten (2008) 
writes, 
Burmese opposition media are many and varied yet have in common an 
opposition to the political landscape in Burma and a desire to oust the military and 
end the ongoing violence […] [They] can usefully be divided into two broad 
categories. The first is composed of a few well-funded, widely read, and 
increasingly professional independent media that are “unmarked” in terms of 
ethnic identification. These media include The Irrawaddy (in English and recently 
Burmese) and New Era Journal (in Burmese). They cover the activities of a wide 
variety of groups in Burmese society and address important issues in international 
news, especially if they concern Burma in any way. The second broad category 
that has developed, especially since the mid-1990s, are those media identified 
with the ethnic nationalities, which I will call ethnic media. These are produced 
primarily from locations along the border, although not exclusively, because there 
are also many ethnic-identified publications printed in Thai cities and by groups 
in exile, and a myriad of online sources maintained from outside Burma (Brooten, 
2006: 361-362). 
 
In the Middle East, the wavering Palestinian-Israeli relationship has been linked 
to media narratives exploiting identity symbols characterizing the conflict as 
Arab/Islamic and Israeli/Jewish ideological confrontations (Shinar, 2003). In essence, 
Shinar argues that the media continue to assume key roles in international relations, 
whether as catalysts or peace-brokers. He argues: “since late 2000, most explanations 
given by media about the changes in Palestinian-Israeli relations have dealt with the 
failure to reconcile rather than with the deeper roots of the conflict” (p. 8).  
In Latin America, El Salvador’s Radio Venceremos was accused of providing a 
rebel group with a “voice” to indict the Salvadorian army in the murdering Jesuit priests, 
sparking civil war. The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), a 
rebel group is believed to have exploited Radio Venceremos to publiclly accuse the 
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Salvadorian army of murdering the six Jesuit priests, a claim that continues to hamper 
peace processes in that region (Colbert, 2006; Consalvi, 2010).  
Europe’s Yugoslav civil wars involving the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians were also 
attributed to media effects (Wimmer et al., 2004). Characterized by sporadic conflicts 
along the ethnic compositions of the former Yugoslavia, this conflict became one of the 
worst and complex wars Europe had witnessed since the end of World Wars (Ignatieff, 
1997; Sandole, 1999; Miall et al., 2001; Lederach, 1997; Keating and Knight, 2004; Lake 
and Rothchild, 1998; Wimmer et al., 2004).  
In Africa, one of the most cited cases is the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where 
Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and Kangura press called for killings 
of Tutsis and Hutu moderates (Frère, 2009; Thomson, 2007; Chrétien, et al., 1996; 
Karega, 2004; Kuperman, 2000). In DR Congo, La Voix du Patriote was circulating hate 
messages that may have led to the escalation of the conflict into a civil war (Willame, 
1999). In Burundi, Le Témoin-Nyabusorongo also contributed to the escalation of the 
conflicts in 1993 (Kaburahe, 2004; Gilboa, 2002).  
The civil wars in Uganda’s Acholiland have also been attributed to media 
narratives that portray these groups as enemies of the state (Ogenga, 2002; Atkinson, 
1999). The case of post-apartheid South Africa also illustrates the significance of media 
narratives in reinforcing reconciliatory or vengeful messages (Krabill, 2001). The move 
by the Kenyan government to ban live media, mainly vernacular radios, during 2007-08 
conflicts (Zuckerman, 2009; Makinen and Kuira, 2008; Onguny, 2012; Onyebadi, 2008) 
also illustrates the significant role of media in conflict situations.  
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Although many of these examples focus on the negative ramifications of media 
narratives, the media can also transform conflicts from a destructive nature into a 
constructive dialogue between the adversaries (Hallin, 2006: El-Nawawy and Powers, 
2010; Shinar, 2003; Roth, 1992; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Tehranian, 
2002; Gilboa, 2002; Rothman and Olson, 2001; Kuperman, 2000; Hoddie, 2006; 
Avraham and First, 2010; Davidson, 1993; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Gardner, 2001; Kadende-
Kaiser, and Kaiser, 2003).  
In this view, social conflicts can be seen as a product of shifting perceptions 
inherent in the media framing process. That is, the “negativeness” or “positiveness” of a 
given conflict situation often hinges on how the competing claims (generating conflicts) 
are framed (whether in a differentiated or concerted manner) by the media targeting 
specific interest or cultural groups (Onguny, 2012).  
In this perspective, Shinar (2003) proposes three ways in which media narratives 
can transform a violent conflict into a peaceful process. That is, a) “as participants-at-
large” the media can be involved in the exchanges involving reporters, policymakers, and 
field personnel engaged in the search for peace, b) the media can also act as a catalyst as 
they may provide a platform for international dialogue or for shuttle diplomacy [and 
lastly] c), “as diplomatic brokers, the media conduct and sometimes initiate international 
mediation, in ways that often blur the distinctions between the roles of reporters and 
diplomats” (p. 5).  
This concurs with Gilboa’s (2002) assumption that the media can serve as 
diplomatic tools in violent conflicts for they can open structures of communication often 
blocked by misperceptions and thus de-polarize groups engaged in conflicts. Gilboa cites 
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the Station Ijambo in Burundi that, in 1995, used radio forums as a means through which 
Hutu-Tutsi misperceptions were “corrected.”  
Given these trends, one cannot undermine the centrality of media narratives when 
seeking to constructively understand the competing claims inherent in socially protracted 
social conflicts, and more so, in fragile multiethnic societies prone to such conflicts. 
While Azar’s (1990) PSC model is still one of the most influential theories in peace-
building scholarship, the media aspect is still missing, and yet media narratives, as 
discussed above, are at the centre of many socially protracted conflicts. For this reason, 
Azar’s PSC model could be substantially strengthened by integrating media narratives as 
a fifth cluster to explain the emerging trends of socially protracted conflicts in 
multiethnic states (Onguny, 2012).  
This is based on multiple reasons, adapted from the work of Shinar, 2003; Roth, 
1992 and Schrich and Bratic, 200730. First, as bridge or constituency builders, the kinds 
of media narratives adopted may reinforce or weaken relationship bonds that have existed 
for a long period. This is because the media shapes the audience’s positioning with regard 
to the “cultural other.” As Hamelink (2008) argues, “many societies maintain levels of 
stability because they employ rituals, customs and conventions that enable their members 
to engage in social interactions without having detailed information about who they really 
are” (p. 79). By condemning violent behaviour and promoting a positive image of other 
groups, the media may help in constructing positive relationships between the disputing 
groups, and ultimately reduce the degrees of intergroup polarization (Gripsrud, 2002; El-
Nawawy and Powers, 2010; Mellor, 2009; Altheide, 2007).  
                                                
30http://www.gppac.net/uploads/File/Programmes/Awareness%20Raising/Issue%20paper%20Media%20an
d%20Conflict%20Prevention%20-%20final%20version.pdf , accessed April 30 2009. 
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Secondly, as participatory tools or mediators, some media may choose to 
embrace frames that privilege or avoid certain ways of engaging with the public. That is, 
the media can provide a forum for discussion between conflicting parties. However, this 
must be dealt with carefully because it may lead to the escalation or de-escalation of 
conflicts depending on the people or parties that choose to participate in these forums 
(Kellner, 2004; Anderson, 1983; Curtis, 2000; Roth, 1992; Davidson, 1993; Carruthers, 
2000; Gardner, 2001; Wolfsfeld, 2004). Other members of the public can also be given a 
chance to ask questions directly to the opposing parties, a factor that might unblock 
communication between the disputing parties, and perhaps provide new insights into the 
root causes of conflicts. In this regard, it might be interesting to look at how audiences 
react to the voices salient in media narratives.  
Thirdly, as information providers or conduits, the analyses and documentation of 
conflicts by the media, whether critically or in a distorted manner, have far-reaching 
implications on how the public understands an ongoing conflict. As seen in the previous 
section, the proponents of the U&G theory argued that media audiences are likely to 
consume media messages that gratify their predetermined needs or appeals (Rubin, 
2002). Equally, agenda-setting theorists such as McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) 
claimed that media messages are likely to have influence on the salience of certain 
phenomena by rendering them more visible to the public. This concurs with other studies 
emphasizing interpretative properties of media narratives (McChesney, 2008; Hall and 
Meeks, 2007; Hall, 1997; Campbell, 2000; Rubin, 2002; McQuail, 1994; Williams, 2009; 
Kellner, 2004; Berkowitz 2010), suggesting that selective reporting often leads to slanted 
news analysis (Entman, 2010). As such, it may be important to examine the conditions 
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leading to media bias in an ongoing conflict. An elaborate analysis of such conditions is 
presented in chapter six. 
Lastly, as policy and diplomatic initiators, certain ways of solving or mitigating 
conflict may be privileged or underprivileged by the media. That is, the media may be 
regarded as third party sources providing information that can be deemed important when 
designing intervention strategies or peace-building processes in strife-ridden societies. 
This is particularly true as the media may unearth some of the hidden facts about a 
conflict. Indeed, a host of scholarship has demonstrated that the kinds of frames used to 
characterize events have far-reaching effects on the politics of conflict intervention or co-
optation (Norris, Kern and Just, 2003; El-Nawawy and Powers, 2010; Gardner, 2001; 
Mellor, 2009; Avraham and First, 2010; Brummans et al., 2008; Somerville, 2008; 
Simons, 2008; Pietikäinen, 2008; Arnold and Schneider, 2007; Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 
2005; Gibson, 2005).  
In this perspective, diplomatic initiatives also hinge on the kinds of narratives 
embraced by the media in the early stages of intervention, for this may either break the 
deadlocks or build confidence between the adversaries, or further intergroup polarization. 
In other words, the coverage of diplomatic sessions and the exchange of this information 
between the adversaries may help in transforming the conflict from its destructive nature 
into constructive processes.  
The factors highlighted above underscore the significance of media framing in 
transforming socially protracted conflict situations, whether positively or negatively. The 
revised theory of Protracted Social Conflict is thus used in this study to try and capture 
	   114	  
the contours of the 2007/08 conflicts and the accommodation of intergroup claims via 
vernacular radios in Kenya. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter looked at both the classic and contemporary theories that describe 
individuals’ interactions with media products, including in situations of conflict. The 
chapter began by looking briefly at the classic theories relative to media and audience 
perceptions, where the debate centred on the notions of media hegemony and audiences’ 
ability to selectively interact with the media messages that mirror their pre-established 
appeals and expectations. The central argument raised by the theorists examining media 
and audience perceptions is that the media messages have some influence on public 
opinion even though media reception can equally be moderated by the scepticism that 
media audiences have towards certain content.  
The second section focused on media and conflict framing. The theories presented 
in this section imply that media frames can lead to the escalation or de-escalation of a 
given conflict depending on the kinds of narratives embraced by news organizations to 
represent a given occurrence. This is because media framing itself is a communicative 
process (since it involves a persuasive discourse intended to convince media audiences to 
support specific causes with well-envisioned end-results) and an interpretive tool (as it 
serves as vehicle by which audiences make sense of a given conflict, its causes and 
consequences).  
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The last section presented the proposed analytical framework guiding this study, 
where media framing is integrated to Azar’s four-cluster theory of Protracted Social 
Conflicts (PSC). The rationale is that mainstream theories in security studies have either 
ignored or downplayed the centrality of media narratives as an essential aspect of social 
conflicts. By integrating media framing as a fifth cluster, to Azar’s PSC model, this study 
not only reaffirms the significance of media narratives in conflict processes, but it also 
emphasizes the need to draw from both the media and conflict theories when seeking to 
understand the contours and patterns of prolonged social conflicts, especially in 
multiethnic societies where the claims of cultural identity is very potent.  
The next chapter will focus on the procedures and methods of data collection that 
were embodied in this study. The epistemological stance of this study is also discussed in 
this chapter.   
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CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter I present the procedures that led to the data collection and analyses. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Fist, I present the epistemological orientation 
of the study to shed light on the sampling procedures and data collection methods that 
were used. Secondly, I provide detailed descriptions of the methods in question. Lastly, I 
explain some of the processes related to data organization and management as well as 
ethnical considerations, all of which will serve to explain the challenges encountered 
during the fieldwork. 
 
4.1. Epistemological Stance of the Study  
 
Historically, various methods of inquiry have been used to give meaning to 
different events relating to human existence. Reasoning and logic have therefore been at 
the centre of many schools of thought investigating the process by which knowledge is 
generated and shared across time and space. This has often led to interrogations as to 
whether social realities are intrinsic or extrinsic.  
One the one hand, some scholars have opted for inductive reasoning as the main 
path through which social phenomena can be transcended, thereby embracing a logic 
departing from specific facts to generalized conclusions with respect to the facts 
examined (Drew et al., 1996). Arguably, studies that subscribe to this epistemological 
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approach tend to be more flexible as they have less control over their object of study 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). 
On the other hand, there are studies emphasizing deductive reasoning on grounds 
that it provides the most accurate means by which social and physical phenomena can be 
explained. This school of thought is grounded on the assumption that researchers should 
draw conclusions starting from general accounts to specific facts. Given this 
epistemological stance, deductive reasoning is believed to increase the researcher’s 
ability to measure or quantify the proposed findings. The researcher holds a greater 
authority over the facts investigated as he/she can easily manipulate them to disambiguate 
his/her predetermined hypothesis, as a way of testing the validity of a theory (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1998).  
With these two epistemologies, it can be argued that reasoning and logic are the 
key components of knowing, or fixing a belief as Kerlinger (1973) calls it. Indeed, 
Kerlinger breaks down this process into four main perceptions: tenacity, authority, a 
priori, and science. For him, knowing through tenacity is not only based on the 
assumption that beliefs are significant when seeking to generate meaning, but also 
“something is thought to be true because it has always been true” (cited by Drew et al., 
1996). In this perspective, information or knowledge input tends to be minimal as there 
are pre-established truths about a given phenomenon.  
However, fixing beliefs through authority emphasizes well-known personalities 
or entities as the main source of information. As such, the researcher does not have to 
consider other alternative sources. In other words, knowledge provided in this respect, 
will depend mainly on the person or the entity providing the information and the method 
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used by the person collecting the information. The a priori approach, on the other hand, 
emphasizes presumptions, rationalism and intrinsic knowledge, rather than empirical 
data. Lastly, scientifically generated knowledge relies on objective observation. 
Knowledge in this regard is externally situated. The person collecting the data needs to 
design methods that would make him/her access the specific knowledge researched. This 
requires the use of logic to formulate various propositions in a manner that they explicitly 
or accurately shed light on the possible alternatives31. 
In this light, Drew et al. (1996) infer that methodology is intrinsically dependent 
on the nature of the research problems. For them, the creation of knowledge is twofold. 
On the one hand, it is based on rationality (positivist approach), emphasizing 
experimental and objective approaches to inquiry. This implies that the descriptions of 
social worlds follow a rationale based on a chain of causality. On the other hand, the 
creation of knowledge can be empirical (post-positivist approach), perceiving social 
realities as products of socio-historic construction rather than objectively preconceived 
truths. This also implies that the investigator is expected to gather factual data while 
measuring the patterns of their occurrence and also to blend the meanings that other 
human subjects give to these social realities (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). 
This study combines both the rational and empirical processes of knowledge to 
examine the conditions or production and reproduction of social conflicts in Kenya. In 
my view, this helps in providing a holistic and hermeneutic understanding of the 2007/08 
conflicts. In essence, my epistemological approach to this inquiry was based on the 
assumptions that the understanding of such conflicts is neither an obvious procedure nor 
an easy task, but rather a thorough procedure necessitating a cross-methodological 
                                                
31 See Kumar (2008). Research methodology. New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation.  
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approach to data collection and analysis. By virtue of its inclusive nature, mixed 
methodology takes into account both empiricism and rationalism.  
As such, this study asserts that knowledge is not a fixed entity; rather, it is 
malleable, socially constructed, shared and context-oriented. Embodying this kind of 
epistemology also implies that the relationship established between the objects of this 
study and me, as a researcher, was continually interactive. This mutual influence was 
geared toward providing eclectic analyses rather than confining the results to a causal 
linearity. The methods adopted here were employed complementarily. 
 
4.1.1. Other Factors that Determined the Choice of Data Collection  
 
This study was not based on an ongoing event but a recent past occurrence. This 
means that a careful approach to data sampling and collection was necessary to account 
for the temporal discrepancy. Technically, in order to capture the details and dimensions 
of protracted conflicts in Kenya, it would have been necessary to study the patterns of 
such conflicts over a very long period, a factor that was limited by the time frame and 
resources allocated for this study. However, thorough documentary research was 
conducted not only to fill this temporal void, but also to understand the historical 
contingencies that shed light on the undercurrents of such conflicts in Kenya.  
Similarly, I refined the scope of this study to emphasize the experiences lived by 
three distinct ethno-linguistic groups: Kalenjin, Luo and Kikuyu. As such, much of the 
documentary research also focused on these groups. This data supplemented the in-depth 
interviews that were conducted in the three locations of study: Eldoret (Kalenjin 
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majority), Kisumu (Luo majority) and Nyeri (Kikuyu majority). The objective of merging 
in-depth interviews with documentary research was aimed at overcoming this temporal 
disconnectedness.  
Interviews conducted during the four months of fieldwork became an organizing 
framework for the data relative to documentary research that was already gathered. This 
explains why small samples were drawn from the three research locations to construct 
and test the inferences between dominant discourses on social conflicts in Kenya, such as 
ethnicity, and other underlying factors that are often ignored, such as territorial 
insecurity32. That is, in order to explore the logical inference between the shifting 
narratives characterizing the 2007/08 conflicts and the perceptions held by the study’s 
target groups (following the information that they gathered from their respective radios), 
it was necessary to have direct contact with the human subjects who had been directly or 
indirectly involved in this conflict.  
By selecting small samples from three distinct locations, my intention was to 
explore other dimensions of the conflict from the standpoint of the victims33, rather than 
basing my study solely on what had been reported or written about them. This made it 
easier to tease out the linkages between the meanings generated by the respondents and 
those that were collected from various documents.  
 
                                                
32 See chapter six for detailed analyses. 
33 The term “victim” is used in relation to the 2007/08 conflicts and how the ordinary people from the three 
locations of research, some of which were highly affected by the dispute, talked about this particular 
occurrence.  
	   121	  
4.1.2. Choice of Research Sites 
 
Although various ethnic groups were affected by the 2007/08 conflicts, the study 
only targeted three distinct ethno-linguistic groups: the Kalenjin, Luo, and Kikuyu. 
Various reports and scientific articles support the fact that these three groups were among 
those highly affected by the 2007/08 conflicts (Jamal and Deanne, 2008; Kalyango, 2008; 
Lynch, 2008; Somerville, 2009; Onyebadi, 2008). The first step was to identify the 
provinces in which the targeted groups represented the majority of the overall population. 
After identifying these provinces, I selected one town from each of the three provinces to 
represent each of my target groups34. Three distinct ethno-linguistic locations, Kisumu, 
Nyeri and Eldoret, were purposively selected for this study. There were several reasons 
for choosing these locations. 
Kisumu was appealing because the Luo, one of Kenya’s major ethnic groups, 
remain the majority group. It is also close to Bondo town, home of Raila Odinga (also a 
Luo) who is the current Prime Minister of Kenya and the presidential contender in the 
contentious general elections in 2007. Odinga has also declared, once again, to vie for the 
presidency in the coming general elections (March 2013). Kisumu was also among the 
worse hit areas by the 2007/08 conflicts, and is often regarded as a base for the 
opposition politics since the split between Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first president, and his 
then-vice president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (father of Raila Odinga), in 1966. 
According to the 2009 population census, Kisumu has an estimated population of 
968,909, and is well served by major railway lines, airport, roads, and water, making it 
one of Kenya’s economic hubs. 
                                                
34 See chapter one for a brief description of the targeted groups  
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Eldoret was selected because it is home for the majority of the Kalenjin, also one 
of Kenya’s largest ethnic groups. Eldoret is close to Kabarnet, home to the former head 
of state, Daniel T. Arap Moi (a Kalenjin), who ruled Kenya for 24 years (1978- 2002), a 
period that saw Eldoret become one of Kenya’s major economic footholds, given the 
creation of an international airport and a public university. Furthermore, Eldoret town 
was one of the hot spots during the 2007/08 conflicts. This is where the much-hyped 
footage, during the 2007/08 conflicts, of people burnt alive in a local church, Kenya 
Assemblies of God Church in Kiambaa, took place. The 2009 population census 
estimates the total population in Eldoret at 894,179. The town has reliable access to 
electricity, roads, phone services and Internet connectivity. Most recently, Eldoret 
North’s Member of Parliament, William Ruto (also a Kalenjin) and a presidential hopeful 
in the coming general elections, has been indicted by the International Criminal Court in 
the alleged crimes against humanity committed during the 2007/08 conflicts. 
Nyeri was suitable because it is located in the Central province, near Mount 
Kenya in the former White Highlands, and is mainly inhabited by the Kikuyu, Kenya’s 
largest ethnic group according to the 2009 census – estimated at 693,558. Nyeri is also 
close to Othaya, home to Mwai Kibaki, the current President who was re-elected 
following the controversial elections in 2007. Kibaki hails from the Kikuyu group. The 
first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta (also a Kikuyu), came from Gatundu, in Central 
province, a constituency now represented by his son, Uhuru Kenyatta, a presidential 
hopeful in the next elections, who is also facing charges of crimes against humanity 
following the 2007/08 conflicts. The town is well served by public transportation given 
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its proximity to Nairobi, the nation’s capital, and has other reliable communication 
infrastructures such as phone and Internet services. 
 
4.1.3. Selection of Participants and Sampling Methods 
 
After the selection of research sites, I identified various locations where the 
respondents could easily be located and solicited for this inquiry. This included churches, 
schools, markets, and sports events. After introducing myself, I took down the names and 
contacts of those who were willing to take part in the study in order to arrange for a 
convenient time when they could be interviewed. Although everyone who was willing to 
take part in the inquiry was solicited for a possible interview, I embraced a purposive 
non-probability sampling method to further refine my sample size based on convenience 
and the objectives of the study.  
Sampling techniques may fall under two categories: probability and non-
probability (Berg, 2007; Babbie, 2002; Rossi, 1994). In probability sampling, 
respondents or study subjects are selected at random in order to give every subject the 
opportunity to take part in the inquiry. Conversely, non-probability emphasizes the 
selection of samples based on convenience and purposeful endeavours. While researchers 
are able to invoke some levels of judgment, based on knowledge and rationale of the 
study, to refine their samples in non-probability sampling, randomized selections are 
conducted in probability sampling to give everyone a fair chance of participating.  
Although probability sampling is often believed to be the most unbiased way of 
choosing participants as it is more representative of the general population (Drew et al., 
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1996; Marshall, and Rossman, 1998; Denzin, and Lincoln, 2000), this does not mean that 
non-probability sampling is flawed. Many studies have indicated the significance of such 
sampling methods when dealing with topics that require in-depth analyses. Scholars such 
as Kerlinger (1976) already argued that purposive non-probability sampling can be 
“necessary and unavoidable [and that] their weaknesses can be mitigated to some extent 
by using knowledge, expertise and care in selecting sample and by replicating studies 
with different samples” (p. 129).  
Patton (2002) goes further to suggest that purposive non-probability samplings are 
often chosen because they are information rich and illuminative. As such, they offer 
“useful manifestations of the phenomenon of interest, [as such] sampling are aimed at 
insight about the phenomenon, not empirical generalization of a sample to a population” 
(ibid. p. 40). In the same perspective, Merrigan and Huston (2004) point out that 
“randomization may not be a practical or desirable way to collect evidence about some 
research questions” (p.43). Essentially, purposeful non-probability sampling helps the 
researchers generate samples from the population they are interested in studying because 
it “includes subjects or elements selected for specific characteristics or qualities and 
eliminates those who fail to meet these criteria” (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006: 91-2). 
Given the complexity characterizing social conflicts, the focus of this study, 
purposeful non-probable sampling was deemed more relevant based on predetermined 
conditions that reflected the objectives of this research. This means that conflict is 
envisioned here as a complex process whose contours are multidimensional, and thus can 
neither be reduced to a few discrete variables nor be understood through linear cause-
effect relationships.  
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This explains why I purposefully chose the three research sites and target groups. 
This followed defined demographic factors such as gender, age and education level. For 
instance, not only did all respondents need to have completed at least primary school, 
they were also required to be between ages 18 and 65. Comprehensive knowledge of 
English was also necessary given that all the interviews were conducted in English to 
avoid translated materials that might not necessarily reflect what respondents alluded to 
“in their own words”. 
Regarding the sample size, 60 respondents were targeted for in-depth interviews 
from the three research sites: 20 respondents per research site (10 men, 10 women). The 
interviews were then complemented by another set of in-depth interviews with key 
respondents, selected based on their profession and involvement in the fields of media or 
peace-building. A total of 12 key respondents were targeted. Before the interviews, an 
oral consent35 was read to participants so that they could familiarize themselves with the 
objectives of this research. This provided them with the option to accept or to decline the 
interview. All the interviews were also recorded to make sure that the information 
provided was fully captured to increase the accuracy of the analyses. 
Regarding the response rate from the three research locations, 50 respondents 
were interviewed out of the 60 initially targeted. This is because some of the respondents 
either terminated the interview before addressing all the questions or declined to 
participate in the inquiry for personal reasons at the very last minute. In addition, some of 
the unrecorded interviews were discarded because they were unclear or incomplete, often 
because the respondents were talking too fast thus making it difficult to take notes. 
                                                
35 See the appendices, item “i” 
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An unequal number of respondents from each site was also noted: 18 in Kisumu; 
17 in Eldoret; and 15 in Nyeri. The response rate of the key participants was relatively 
high. Out of the 12 initially targeted, 10 managed to complete the interview. Out of the 
10, one respondent decided to terminate the interview due to personal reasons. This 
means that 9 out of 12 interviews were fully integrated in this category.  
Overall, 59 interviews were used in this study: 50 participants from the three 
locations of study and 9 key respondents. 
 
4.2. Methods of Data Collection  
 
As discussed previously, this study relied mostly on qualitative methods of data 
collection. Although the use of both qualitative and quantitative research can provide a 
more elaborate understanding of any given event, this study encompasses qualitative 
methods as it is mostly interested in exploring the perceptions that various groups had on 
the 2007/08 conflicts in relation to vernacular radio narratives.  
According to Paluck (2010:62), “qualitative methods of investigation are best 
equipped to explore the meanings of the behavior in the context of the study, possible 
social and political dynamics by which the behavior is produced, ripple effects, and so 
forth.” In a similar vein, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) believe that qualitative methods are 
more relevant when used to understand the undercurrents of a given social phenomenon, 
as there is more emphasis put on the meanings that people bring rather than the 
researcher’s thoughts a priori. In this regard, qualitative research can be seen as a multi-
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method involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter (Patton, 
2002; Drew et al. 1998).  
It is in this light that I found it worthwhile to explore the perspectives of target 
groups while inductively assessing possible links with the documentary research data 
gathered before and during my fieldwork. In addition, my epistemological orientation, 
discussed in the earlier paragraphs, served to deepen my interest in exploring qualitative 
methods. I perceive conflicts as a product of multilevel interactions involving a complex 
chain of interdependencies between variables occurring across time. This calls for the 
immersion into details and specifics of conflict processes to unfurl the patterns of such 
conflicts.  
This not only explains why I opted for cross-methodology, it also exemplifies my 
strong conviction that understanding such conjectures cannot simply be narrowed to the 
manipulation of quantifiable measurements; rather, it should be deeply embedded in the 
interactions between various socio-historical contingents. Qualitative approach to data 
collection was thus deemed more relevant, although quantitative data was also integrated 
in the study. 
Specifically, documentary research, observation and in-depth interviews were 
used as part of the qualitative methods. Articulation methodology was equally used 
within the Cultural Studies’ perspective to tease out the linkages between the data 
gathered through qualitative methods, and by extension, quantitative data. Below is a 
detailed description of how each method was used in the study. 
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4.2.1. Documentary Research 
 
This study examined a conflict that was not active at the time of my fieldwork. 
Conducting a thorough documentary research on the conflict (and past conflicts) was 
therefore one of the ways in which I mitigated this temporal disconnectedness. This was 
done in two phases, both involving an extensive research on the existing literature related 
to ethnic conflicts in Kenya (and sub-Saharan Africa). Various documents such as 
journals, books, articles, policy briefings, official reports, online documents, websites, 
statistical data, research and conference report were consulted to obtain related 
information. 
The first round of documentary research was conducted mainly in five libraries in 
Montreal (Canada): Université de Montréal, Concordia University, University du Québec 
à Montréal (UQAM), McGill University, and finally Bibliothèque et Archives Nationales 
du Québec (BANQ). At this stage, I targeted secondary data to contextualize the focus of 
the study, and to acquaint myself with the existing literature on this particular topic. This 
also included the exploration of theses and memoires available online through inter-
library loans via the portal of Université de Montréal’s library.  
The second session involved the collection of information from various libraries 
in Kenya during the four months of fieldwork. Generally, the majority of documents 
(published and unpublished) were acquired from Daystar University library. I also 
gathered information from the Kenya National Archives in Nairobi, most of which were 
useful in illuminating the background of this study. The information relating to media 
operations or practices in Kenya was mainly collected from the Nation Media library, the 
Standard Newspaper library, Daystar University library, the Communication Commission 
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of Kenya and the Media Council of Kenya. At this stage, I was interested mainly in 
obtaining locally available materials on my topic of interest, some of which are not easily 
accessible outside the country.  
The choice of documents was based on the dates of publication, authors, target 
audience, relevancy, type of document, and accessibility. The notes taken during the two 
phases of this documentary research were regularly organized in sub-topics to allow easy 
reference during data analysis. Although this study is centred on the 2007/08 conflicts, it 
was also necessary to journey back in time to integrate documents relative to past 
conflicts in Kenya.  This was done to uncover new patterns that would explain such 
conflicts and to avoid unnecessary repetition of facts already alluded to. In essence, 
conducting documentary research not only helped me navigate through the common 
truths about the 2007/08 crises, but also establish a profound background on media and 
social conflicts in Kenya.  
The main challenge that I encountered during documentary research was 
narrowing focus on the materials that centred on the 2007/08 conflicts. This partly 
explains the bulk of historical information provided in the study. Against the backdrop of 
this challenge, I refined the scope of search to materials that would help me analyze the 
conflict from its pre-event to post-event stages. Equally, accessing some documents was 
difficult especially those produced by the government and some media houses. There 
were also instances where quantitative data (statistical) relating to some events 
mismatched, making it difficult and an overwhelming process to assess to compare and 
contrast various documents in an attempt to overcome this challenge.    
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4.2.2. Observation  
 
After the completion of the first stage of my documentary research, I conducted 
four months of fieldwork in Kenya between June 1, 2010 and October 1, 2010. By 
definition, fieldwork involves “living with and living like those who are studied [as it] 
demands the full-time involvement of a researcher over a lengthy period of time 
(typically unspecified) and consists mostly of ongoing interaction with the human targets 
of study on their home ground.36” During this period, observation and interviews were 
used as a method of data collection to provide deeper insight into the events that led to 
the 2007/08 conflicts.  
Establishing a direct contact with the target populations was necessary to provide 
a nuanced understanding of the conflict and how this particular conflict manifested itself 
across distinct ethno-linguistic communities. As a method of inquiry, observation can be 
defined as an “involvement in the here and now of people’s daily lives […] [thereby] 
gaining access to phenomena that are commonly obscured from the standpoint of a non-
participant.37” Observation was not only relevant as a method because of the rich cultural 
backgrounds that inform the perceptions and the non-verbal cues of the groups targeted, it 
was also necessary because I needed to provide a broad description of the key features 
that characterize these groups and their habitats.  
As part of my observation method, I attended several conferences, information 
sessions, and workshops organized by different organizations (and institutions) involved 
                                                
36 See Van Maanen, J. (1988). Tales of the Field. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
37 See Jorgensen, D. L. (1989). Participant observation: Methodology for human studies. Newbury, CA: 
Sage. 
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in peace-building processes in Kenya such as the “Peace Festival Conference” held in 
Nairobi in September 2010. During these sessions, I listened to and took notes on areas 
that touched on my topic of interest.  
Equally, I had the opportunity, given that I was hosted by Daystar University in 
Nairobi, to interact with local students. These interactions provided me with new insights 
on the perceptions that people had regarding the conflict. Notice boards and commercial 
boards along the roadsides were also useful sources of observable data. Some contained 
information relative to peace-building processes that were underway. During this process, 
descriptive notes were kept in order to keep track of my daily personal experiences. I kept 
notes on conversations I had with people, their perspectives on different issues, as well as 
the settings where the discussions took place.  
Although observing people and the environment in which they lived seemed 
practical and easy, I did encounter some challenges. Self-disclosure was a major issue. 
When I mentioned (during informal conversations) that I was conducting research on the 
conflict, people became very sceptical about the whole conversation, attributing my 
thoughts to those of a particular group. This was also tainted by the fact that I am a 
Kenyan national belonging to a specific ethnic group. Using my first name instead of 
family name mitigated this challenge.  
 
4.2.3. Interviews (in-depth) 
 
Apart from observation, interviews were deemed useful as a follow-up to 
documentary research. The main purpose for using in-depth interviews was to establish 
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the general views of the public in the three locations of research about the implications of 
vernacular radio narratives in the 2007/08 conflicts. Equally, the views of the key 
participants were collected in an attempt to shed light on the nature and patterns of such 
conflicts locally. The use of in-depth interviews was also motivated by the fact that this 
study was based on recalls of the events that lead to the 2007/08 conflicts, an occurrence 
that required a thorough probing process.   
Berger (2000) defines an interview as an interaction between a researcher 
(someone who wishes to gain information about a subject) and an informant (someone 
who presumably has information of interest on the subject). In this perspective, in-depth 
interviewing is “a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive 
individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on 
a particular idea, program, or situation.38” This kind of interview method appeared to be 
more relevant for this study because I wanted to obtain detailed information about the 
perceptions and experiences that my target groups had on the 2007/08 conflicts.  
Given the sensitivity of this topic, individual in-depth interviews were conducted 
in order not to lose potential respondents who might have not been able to talk openly in 
a group. This is because the in-depth interviews provide room for one-on-one interactions 
at discrete locations. The data gathered from these interviews were essentially used to 
complement the data collected through observation and documentary research. This 
provided me with a broader picture of the conflict. 
                                                
38 See Boyce, C. & Neale, P. (2006). Conducting In-depth interviews: A Guide for Designing and 
Conducting In-depth Interviews for Evaluation Input. Online. 
http://www.pathfind.org/site/DocServer/m_e_tool_series_indepth_interviews.pdf?docID=6301 (accessed 
January 2012)  
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Before the actual interviews, e-mail follow-ups were sent to the already identified 
key respondents to confirm the appointments and arrange for suitable interview locations. 
I also visited the three research sites to familiarize myself with the settings as well as the 
communities targeted. I then conducted the interviews using open-ended interview 
templates39 that I had prepared and tested before the actual fieldwork. The purpose of 
using an open-ended interview guide was to minimize my control or authority over the 
information that respondents provided. Despite testing the interview guidelines before the 
actual fieldwork, I still had to modify, during fieldwork, some of the questions that 
appeared to be ambiguous to respondents.  
The first set of in-depth interviews targeting respondents in the three locations of 
the study started in mid-May 2010 and continued through August 2010. The pre-selection 
criteria, already explained in the previous paragraphs, were used to identify respondents 
in these locations. The interviews took about 45 minutes, though there were occasions 
where they took over an hour, given the probing and the manner in which some 
respondents developed their answers to these questions.  
The second set of interviews, with key respondents, began in August 2010 and 
continued through the end of September 2010 when I terminated my fieldwork. Nearly all 
the interviews with key respondents took place in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital. Key 
respondents were purposefully sampled based on their expertise and involvement 
(directly or indirectly) in media and peace-building in Kenya. Some of the respondents, 
under this category, were sampled from the Kenya Media Owners Association, Kenya 
National Council of Human Rights, Law Society of Kenya, National Council of Churches 
                                                
39 See Appendices  
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of Kenya, Communications Commission of Kenya, and Media Council of Kenya. A 
number of locally-based scholars from Daystar University, Nairobi University, Moi 
University, International Development Research Centre and Amnesty International 
(branches in Nairobi), and the United States International University (USIU) in Kenya, 
also took part in the study.  
Although an interview guide was initially prepared to collect data, closed-ended 
questions were avoided in order to allow respondents to express themselves in their own 
words. This allowed respondents to provide their innermost feelings and perceptions 
about the conflict. Self-administered questionnaires were also regarded as less applicable 
in this study because they do not provide room for this kind of interaction between the 
researcher and the respondent. In addition, it would have been necessary to distribute the 
questionnaires well in advance to provide ample time for respondents to respond before 
collecting them. For these reasons, I believe that self-administered questionnaires would 
have resulted in a low return. 
Although a tape recorder was used to collect all the details of the fieldwork 
interviews (between June 1, 2010 and October 1, 2010), all the transcriptions (interview 
recordings), coding, and classification of the fieldwork data took place in 2011 because 
of the quantity of data gathered during the fieldwork. Adequate time for transcription was 
necessary to facilitate data analysis and dissertation writing. At the same time, follow-up 
interviews were conducted over the phone with some respondents in 2011 and in early 
2012 (between January and April 2012) in order to follow the evolution of the 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) investigation on the 2007/08 conflicts. 
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4.2.4. Articulation 
 
Even though the concept of articulation is commonly used in the field of 
linguistics to underscore the degree to which a given text or speech is clear 
(unambiguous), articulation was transposed in this study in the context of cultural studies 
to underpin the “process of creating connections” (Slack, 1996). Articulation can be used 
both as a method and as a theory (Alhassan, 2003; Grossberg, 1997; Slack, 1996). As a 
theory, it can be used to examine various conjectures between factual elements. 
The parameters of articulation as a methodology is close to those defining the 
concept of intersectionality, which stems from feminist and racial studies to understand 
the correlation between subjugated identities (Valentine, 2007; Rasmussen, 2010). As a 
concept, intersectionality “conveys how meaning is contextually situated and how 
meaning should be perceived as emerging through the complex intersection of various 
categories […] such as politics, religion, violence and gender” (Rasmussen, 2010: 303). 
In essence, the intersectional approach recognizes the fluidity between categories as well 
as “the ways that individuals are actively involved in producing their own lives and so 
overcomes some of the determinism of previous ways of thinking about identities that 
often classified individuals into fixed categories as oppressed or oppressor” (Valentine, 
2007: 14). 
In line with the intersectional strands of identity described above, articulation 
methodology can be used to overcome deterministic schematization when examining the 
complex natures of culture and creed  (Grossberg, 1997; Slack, 1996). Indeed, 
articulation is essentially “a matter of contingency” as it involves a meticulous coding 
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process of knowledge pathways that disgrace preconceptions in any given inquiry 
(Alhassan, 2003). In other words, articulating methodology does not presume the linkage 
between various contextual elements, rather, “it involves the production of contexts” 
across time and space (Grossberg, 1997).  
Articulation methodology appeared more relevant in searching dislocated links 
between fieldwork data and the data generated through documentary research. This 
method was thus used to examine the possible connections between vernacular radio 
narratives and the structural causes of the 2007/08 conflicts, often correlated with 
ethnicity. In other words, it helped expand the understanding of the conflict beyond 
cultural allegiances such as ethnicity, which seem to form the nexus between conflicts 
and multiethnic states. Chapter six provides detailed discussion on the interconnections 
between ethnicity and other attributes of social conflicts.  
 
4.3. Data Organization and Management  
 
All the data collected during fieldwork, including those generated through 
documentary research, were typed and classified according to various themes. The raw 
data was classified using specific archival logs following this sequence: date of the 
activity, location/site, method of data collection, type of informants, and a sequential 
number. This was done to ensure easy access to all the fieldwork documents as well as to 
maintain high levels of accuracy when searching for specific topics covered during the 
activity in question.  
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Equally, backup copies of recorded tapes were saved on an external hard disc 
drive to avoid any unexpected loss. Each set of classification was also paired with 
suggested readings on different topics of the inquiry to allow further research whenever it 
was deemed necessary. Finally, a data checklist was created to ensure that no documents 
went missing and to preserve the confidentially of all the respondents with respect to 
ethical considerations.  
 
4.3.1. Data Analysis 
 
Following a thorough process of data gathering from different sources, I borrowed 
from articulation methodology and multilevel analysis to examine the relationships 
between vernacular radio narratives and the negotiation of intergroup relationships 
before, during and after the 2007/08 conflicts. Although the study did not conduct 
regression analysis, often used in multilevel analyses40, it borrowed the core assumption 
behind such analyses supposing that contextual variables can be used alongside 
individual-level factors to provide a deeper understanding of social phenomena. That is to 
say, multilevel analysis is essentially a matter of paying close attention to the context and 
conditions in which human behaviour actually occurs. 
Considering social conflicts as a form of human behaviour, this study involved a 
cross-methodological approach to see if there were any correlations between my initial 
hypotheses and central questions that guided data collection. Most of the analyses are 
found in Chapters five and six. General conclusions were then drawn from these findings 
                                                
40 See Bickel, R. (2007). Multilevel Analysis for Applied Research: It's Just Regression! NY: The Guilford 
Press.  
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by probing some of the dominant discourses that surfaced during the fieldwork process. 
This enabled me to draw attention to the main causes of the 2007/08 conflicts. This stage 
was therefore concerned with the interpretation of findings. 
 
4.3.2. General Methodological Challenges  
 
One of the main challenges encountered during this study was linked to the 
temporal divide. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the conflict in question had 
occurred two years prior to this field research. Although it seemed very fresh in many of 
my respondents’ memories, I was somehow obliged to rely on their reflective capacity, as 
there was no other way of getting this information from them. This explains why I 
conducted extensive documentary research on the subject. Other locally accessible 
secondary sources of information (such as newspapers and video footages) were also 
consulted from local sources to account for this temporal gap.  
Accessing some materials was a major challenge. Given the sensitivity of the 
topic, it was difficult to access certain documents from some sources. For instance, many 
media professionals, especially the radio hosts, declined my request for an interview, and 
would not allow me to use the documents that were available at the studios. This was 
mainly due to the ICC investigations that were underway. This kind of guilt was 
strengthened by the fact that the then ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, also 
deployed individuals to conduct independent investigations with regard to the 2007/08 
conflicts. In this regard, my e-mails to media houses remained unanswered. Only two 
radio presenters agreed to talk to me on condition of anonymity. Some of the stations that 
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responded to the emails argued that the topic was contentious and sensitive and that they 
were not sure about the motives of the study. 
Language was also a major setback. Given that the study was conducted in 
English to avoid errors in translating materials, many respondents were technically barred 
from taking part in the study. Some respondents used Swahili words within their 
sentences when they were unable to find the equivalent word in English. Given that I am 
fluent in Swahili, I was able to understand the Swahili words that were interspersed in 
interview recordings.  
Arranging for the interviews also proved to be an uphill task. Many of the key 
respondents had very busy schedules such that I had to rearrange appointments on several 
occasions. This prolonged the time allocated for the inquiry and data entry process. Some 
of the rearranged interviews ended up conflicting with other dates, a factor that became 
very difficult to manage. In addition, many respondents did not respect the meeting time 
that had been agreed upon for the interviews.  
Some of these challenges were moderated by providing my student identity card 
to assure suspicious respondents that this inquiry was strictly intended for educational 
purposes, and that the information they provided was to be kept anonymous. Apart from 
suspicions, several respondents also became emotional during the interview as they 
reflected on the conflict. This is because some respondents had lost their loved ones, 
making it painful to recollect the memories that led to their loss. In such situations, 
respondents were reminded that they had the option of not answering the questions that 
made them feel uncomfortable. They were also reminded that they could withdraw from 
the interview at any time if they wished. 
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4.3.3. Ethical Considerations  
 
All the data collected followed strict ethical guidelines set by the committee on 
research ethics at Université de Montréal. An ethics certificate was issued at the 
beginning of the fieldwork. Here are some of the ethical guidelines that were observed 
during the period of the field inquiry:  
Gender and cultural implications: As already discussed, this study targeted three 
specific groups (Kalenjin, Luo and Kikuyu) living in three distinct ethno-regional settings 
(Eldoret, Kisumu and Nyeri respectively). All the respondents were adults aged between 
18 and 65. Apart from key respondents whose selection was based on fields of expertise, 
this study targeted a total of 60 respondents from the three research locations. That is, 30 
men and 30 women from the three locations. This was my attempt to balance the gender 
equation and to observe cultural differences that characterize the Kenyan population.  
However, among the anticipated 60 respondents (from the three locations of 
research), 50 in-depth interviews were successfully conducted: 33 men and 17 women. It 
was particularly challenging to recruit women participants because the majority of them 
did not seem to be interested in topics focused on politics or social conflicts. This made it 
difficult to have an equal representation of men’s and women’s perspectives in the study. 
Informed consent of respondents: Before conducting or recording any interviews, 
informed consent from every participant was solicited. This was done by reading the oral 
consent form41 that I had initially prepared and had approved by the ethics committee. 
Hence, respondents had the choice of doing the interview with or without being recorded. 
                                                
41 See Appendices, item “i” 
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Moreover, participants were informed that their participation in this research was 
voluntary and that there was no compensation at the end of the interview. As such, every 
one of them had the choice to participate or decline the interview.  
Protection of research participants: All the information collected from 
participants was considered anonymous as a way of protecting their privacy and 
confidentiality. I therefore started the interviews with a brief explanation of the 
underlying objectives of this study, giving participants the opportunity to modify or 
withdraw statements during the interview. There were only two instances where 
respondents asked me not to record their statements. The majority of participants also 
allowed me to identify them by first name whenever they were quoted in this study.  
Circulation of the results: A number of the participants requested that the findings 
from this study be made available to them through publication, as a way of giving back to 
the community that made this research a success. However, considerable care was taken 
to avoid breaching participants’ confidentiality as discussed previously.   
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Chapter Summary  
 
The focus of this chapter was on the epistemological stance of the study, the 
methods of data collection, as well as the challenges encountered during fieldwork. It 
also emphasized the use and significance of qualitative methods given the context and 
sensitivity of the topic of interest.  
 The methods of data collection discussed include: in-depth interviews, 
documentary research, observation and articulation. These methods were found to be 
relevant to the scope of the study because of the context of the research topic and the 
temporal disconnectedness that characterized the study.  
The methodological approach of this study also speaks to the complexity of the 
topic itself, and by extension, acknowledges the fact that conflict is a process that cannot 
form an all-encompassing unit of analysis. In this light, the methodological limitations of 
this study can serve to strengthen future research. 
 The next chapter presents the findings of the study.  
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CHAPTER V. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
 This chapter presents the findings of the study. It starts by providing demographic 
information regarding the study’s sample. It then sheds light on the patterns of vernacular 
radio listening in the three locations where the study was conducted, before focusing on 
the factors that were linked to vernacular radio listening. The chapter concludes with the 
discourses that surrounded the accommodation of intergroup claims in the Kalenjin, Luo 
and Kikuyu radios prior to, during and after the violent conflicts.  
 
5.1. Demographics of the Study’s Sample 
 
Demographic trends have always proved to be essential when seeking to explain 
the dynamics and nature of any given fieldwork results. These are not limited to factors 
such as race, gender, occupation, education and age, all of which may influence the kinds 
of perceptions that respondents hold towards a given event of interest. In most cases, 
demographic information provides accounts on the population under study. As such, they 
can either be generalized, to reflect the total population of the areas sampled, or adapted 
to represent the specificities of the population and/or the people sampled.  
The demographics of this study subscribe to the latter category. As such, 
demographic information is used in the study to describe and understand the experiences 
of respondents in relation to the 2007/08 conflicts. Although the study does not seek to 
generalize the findings in the traditional sense, the inferences provided are likely to be 
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widespread in the three locations of the study (Eldoret, Nyeri and Kisumu) by virtue of 
their linguistic, cultural, and geopolitical nature.  
The study initially aimed at conducting in-depth interviews with 12 key 
participants as well as 60 other respondents purposefully sampled from the three 
locations of the study. By interviewing these distinct groups, the study aimed at bringing 
together diverse perspectives on the event of interest. While key respondents provided 
information from the “expert” point of view (those with the mandate to effect desired 
changes), participants from the three locations provided information from an “ordinary 
citizen’s” perspective (those directly affected by the suggested changes).  
Among the 72 anticipated participants (12 key respondents and 60 other 
participants), 59 interviews were successfully recorded. This placed the response rate at 
82%, which is a relative success. However, the study recorded an uneven number of men 
and women participants due to the constraints encountered during fieldwork. These 
limitations have been detailed in the methodology of the study.  
Demographic information used in this study includes: age and gender distribution, 
education, profession and the ethnicity of participants. Another factor that influenced the 
perimeters of the study was the respondents’ command of English (comprehensive) given 
that the study was exclusively conducted in English in an attempt to obtain first hand data 
without passing through translated scripts and/or interviews. The assumptions behind this 
approach were twofold. On the one hand, it provided the researcher with the opportunity 
to objectively engage in the collection of data. On the other hand, translated materials 
may insensibly reflect participants’ viewpoints, hence the purposive choice of 
participants to allow them to express their views in their own words.  
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5.1.1. Gender and Age-distribution  
 
This study aimed at interviewing participants who were at least 18 years old, but 
not above the age of 65. The choice of this age bracket (18-65) was influenced by the fact 
that the majority of Kenyans who speak English are under the age of 65, most of whom 
have at least completed primary education. Tables 1 and 2 show age distributions of male 
and female respondents from the three locations where the study was conducted. Table 3 
shows the gender and age distribution of the key respondents. All the key respondents 
were interviewed in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, where they were based.  
 
Table 1. Age of male participants interviewed by location of study 
 
Age group Nyeri  Eldoret  Kisumu 
18-23 0 1 1 
24-29 2 3 3 
30-35 2 4 2 
36-41 1 2 2 
42-47 1 2 1 
48-53 1 0 1 
54-59 1 1 1 
60-65 0 0 1 
Total  8 13 12 
 
A total of 33 men (excluding key participants) were interviewed in Nyeri, Eldoret 
and Kisumu. The number of male participants also varied from site to site. As table 1 
illustrates, the majority of the male participants were aged between 24 and 41, accounting 
for about 64% of all male participants. There was only one male participant who was at 
least 60 years of age, but not older than 65. It is important to note that these figures do 
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not include the information on male participants who were part of the key respondents. 
The latter is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 2. Age of female participants interviewed by location of study 
 
Age group Nyeri  Eldoret  Kisumu 
18-23 1 0 0 
24-29 2 2 1 
30-35 1 1 2 
36-41 1 1 1 
42-47 1 0 1 
48-53 0 0 1 
54-59 1 0 0 
60-65 0 0 0 
Total  7 4 6 
 
Although the study intended to have an equal number of men and women 
participants from the three locations (i.e. 10 men and 10 women in every location), only a 
total of 17 women (excluding the key participants) were interviewed. Similar to male 
participants, the majority of female respondents were between the ages 24 and 41. Table 
2 highlights this information.  
It was particularly challenging to recruit female participants, as many were not 
interested in topics oriented towards politics and ethnic conflicts, making it difficult to 
have an equal representation of men’s and women’s perspectives. Given the above 
challenge, the study incorporated additional male participants in an attempt to meet the 
initially targeted sample size from each location (target of 20 participants per location). 
This explains why in Eldoret and Kisumu, for instance, there are more than 10 male 
participants (see Table 1).  
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Table 3. Age and gender of key participants interviewed 
 
Age group Male  Female 
18-23 0 0 
24-29 0 0 
30-35 0 0 
36-41 0 1 
42-47 1 0 
48-53 2 2 
54-59 2 0 
60-65 1 1 
Total  5 4 
 
A total of 9 in-depth interviews (out of 12 initially targeted) were successfully 
recorded with key respondents. This sets the response rate of key participants at 75%. 
Compared to the proportion of men and women in Nyeri, Eldoret and Kisumu, there was 
not a major disproportion between male and female when it came to key participants. 
Overall, 59 successful interviews were conducted and integrated in this study. Although 
this was slightly lower than the sample size that was initially anticipated, the study’s 
overall response rate was about 82%. However, in terms of gender distribution, only 34% 
of respondents were female.  
Nonetheless, an overall return rate of 82% is relatively high given the initial 
sample size target. The high response rate may be attributed to the fact that the study is 
based on a small sample size purposively selected to meet the objectives of the 
dissertation.  
 
 
 
	   148	  
5.1.2. Participants’ Level of Education  
 
In order to take part in this study, all participants were not only required to have 
completed at least primary education, they were also expected to have a comprehensive 
knowledge of English in order to express their views in English. Table 4 illustrates the 
levels of education among the sampled participants. It presents information relative to the 
total number of participants with primary, secondary, post-secondary and university (or 
higher) education. However, Table 4 does not integrate the levels of education of the key 
participants since all had at least completed a university degree or higher.   
Although participants needed to have accomplished primary education (or 
higher), this was not only deemed necessary in the selection of participants with a 
comprehensive knowledge of English, but it also adds to the rigor with which the study is 
constructed. Furthermore, I determined that those with a comprehensive knowledge of 
English were likely to exploit diverse news outlets, a characteristic that was key to in-
depth descriptions of the event of interest.  
 
Table 4. Education level of participants interviewed  
 
Level of education 
Total number of 
participants 
Percentage 
(%) 
Primary  5 10% 
Secondary  13 26% 
Post-secondary – vocational training institutions 23 46% 
University degree or higher  9 18% 
Total  50 100% 
 
Table 4 illustrates that the majority of participants had either completed secondary 
education and started working, or had accomplished a vocational training course after 
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their secondary education. This group constituted about 72% of those who were 
interviewed (excluding key participants). Despite the fact that some respondents had 
successfully accomplished post-secondary education (or vocational training), it did not 
necessarily mean that all of these participants perceived their occupation as a “white-
collar” job.  
 
5.1.3. Occupation of Participants  
 
In terms of occupation, white-collar and blue-collar participants seemed to be at 
par. As indicated in Table 5, those who perceived their profession as a white-collar job 
constituted 40% of total participants. These were not limited to teaching, administrative 
work, and management. On the other hand, blue-collar represented 34% of total 
participants. Given the high costs of university programs, the majority of participants 
seem to have attended vocational training institutions to further their education with the 
hope of landing a good career within the competitive Kenyan society.  
Equally, 26% of participants did not see their profession as subscribing to the two 
previous categories.  The label “other” was therefore used to characterize these 
professions. This included participants who juggled between professions (white and blue-
collar jobs alike) and those who practiced other professions not limited to housekeeping, 
street vending and occasional workers. 
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Table 5. Occupation of participants interviewed  
 
Type of profession Total number of participants Percentage (%) 
White-collar 20 40% 
Blue-collar 17 34% 
Other  13 26% 
Total 50 100% 
 
Although white-collar workers represented 40% of participants, 60% of 
participants could not identify themselves as white-collar workers. This group seems to 
represent the structural base of Kenya’s population that is often frustrated in terms of 
unemployment, one of the many factors that were identified as contributing to a 
disproportionate representation of intergroup relations. The information provided in 
Table 5 does not encompass the occupation of the 9 key respondents because they all 
perceived their profession as white-collar jobs.  
 
5.1.4. Ethnicity 
 
In addition to the demographic information already presented, ethnicity (as 
defined in the conceptual framework) was used as a controlling factor in the collection of 
data. This is because the study’s target groups were the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luo, some 
of the groups that were significantly affected by the 2007-08 conflicts. Hence the 
purposive choice of research sites is an attempt to meet this objective: Nyeri (Kikuyu 
majority), Eldoret (Kalenjin majority) and Kisumu (Luo majority). Although the use of 
ethnicity as a controlling perimeter can be read as controversial in this study, its strength 
relies on the depth and richness of the descriptions used by various participants to 
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characterize the 2007-08 conflict and the ramifications it had on their respective regions 
and/or community.  
In other words, the salience of ethnicity cannot be undermined when seeking to 
understand the patterns and directions of the 2007-08 conflicts, largely characterized as 
ethnic-based. The main objective of using ethnicity as a controlling factor is therefore to 
assess its significance in terms of the narratives embraced by various vernacular radios to 
depict inter-ethnic relations before, during and after the violent conflict that cost lives and 
rendered many people homeless. As already explained in the background of this 
dissertation, inter-ethnic coexistence appears to be marked by historical grievances not 
limited to land allocations and power discrepancies between various communities.  
In this regard, ethnicity provided a means to gauge the differences in terms of 
dominant vernacular radio narratives in the three locations of study given the linguistic 
and cultural idiosyncratic nature of these regions. The study presumes that, by virtue of 
linguistic selectivity, vernacular radios are likely to negotiate their narratives in a manner 
that augurs well with collective perceptions of its target audiences, especially in conflict 
situations characterized by divergent interests.  
With this in mind, participants were sampled in a manner that reflected ethnic 
dynamics in the locations of the study. In other words, all participants from Nyeri were 
from the Kikuyu group, those in Eldoret were from the Kalenjin community and 
participants from Kisumu were all Luos. Given the sensitivity of this study and the 
investigations that were undergoing (during fieldwork) to determine the masterminds of 
the 2007-08 conflicts, participants who did not wish to be identified by name were 
assured of confidentiality.  
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Although various groups were also affected during the conflict in question, this 
study narrowed its analysis to Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin groups. This is not to say that 
the perspectives from other groups were less significant for the study; rather, it would 
have been unrealistic to have the views by every group represented since there are at least 
forty-two ethnic groups in Kenya. While ethnicity was observed when sampling 
participants from the three locations, it was less significant when selecting key 
participants because profession and knowledge on the topic of interest became pivotal 
factors. 
The next section looks at the patterns of vernacular radio listenership in the three 
locations of research as well as the patterns of vernacular radio listening among key 
respondents.  
 
5.2. Patterns of Vernacular Radio Listenership  
 
The patterns of radio listenership are determined by various factors. Among many 
others, this may include the language of broadcast, the target audience, programming, 
ownership, broadcast radius, regulatory mechanisms, and political atmosphere. In order 
to map out the patterns of vernacular radio listenership in the locations of study, 
respondents were asked questions relative to radio access and ownership, the frequency at 
which they tuned into these radios, their favourite vernacular radio stations, and if they 
simultaneously used other media outlets.  
By paying close attention to the patterns of vernacular radio listenership, the study 
aimed at examining the factors that influenced respondents’ use of these radios given that 
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there are various radios that broadcast in Kenya’s official languages, English and Swahili. 
The patterns of vernacular radio listenership also helped determine the penetration, 
concentration and distribution of vernacular radios in the locations where the research 
was conducted. The findings of this section highlight quantitative data relative to 
vernacular radio listening among the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo who took part in the 
study.  
 
5.2.1. Radio Access and Ownership Among Respondents  
 
This study also aimed at examining the relationship between radio access and 
ownership among respondents. The goal was to explore the ways in which participants 
interpreted or made sense of the information they garnered through these radios during 
the 2007-08 conflicts – whether as an individual or group (through discussions with 
family, friends or colleagues). In Kenya, radio consumption is still very widespread, 
especially among rural dwellers given the inadequate infrastructural measures and the 
costs associated with other forms of media such as television and Internet. Table 6 shows 
the distribution of radio access and ownership among those who were interviewed in 
Nyeri, Kisumu and Eldoret.  
As indicated in Table 6, all respondents in the three locations had access to radio 
devices, highlighting the centrality of radio in Kenyan households. The access is not only 
influenced by the low costs of radio devices, but also by the circulation of cheap radio-
enabled cell phones that provided respondents with a means to access various FM 
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stations without having to buy a radio device42. Only 6% of those interviewed did not 
own a radio device, but had access to radio through family, friends, colleagues, or public 
transportation.  
 
Table 6. Radio access and ownership among participants interviewed 
 
Research location  Access  Ownership  
Nyeri 15 15 
Eldoret  17 15 
Kisumu  18 17 
Total 50 47 
 
Although all respondents had access to radio devices, the broadcast radius of 
various vernacular radios is still limited to specific regions. In other words, some radios 
are confined to specific regions while others have extensive nationwide reach. This is the 
case of state-run radio, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and its affiliated 
vernacular stations whose signals are received in all parts of the country.  
In terms of diversity of stations, it is in Nyeri where respondents had a great 
variety of choices. This is linked to Nyeri’s close geographical proximity to Nairobi, 
Kenya’s capital, where many other public and private stations operate. In other words, 
while all respondents had access to radio devices, the access radio channels seemed 
fragmented and geographically imbalanced depending on one’s location. Nonetheless, 
radio access and ownership appeared to be fairly widespread among the respondents of 
this study. The disparity in access was only pronounced in terms of the variety of choices 
vis-à-vis radio channels.   
 
                                                
42 More information about mobile phone usage among respondents is found in Table 7. 
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5.2.2. Dominant Vernacular Radios by Location of Study 
 
Throughout the locations where the study was conducted, respondents had 
varying preference in terms of the vernacular radios they accessed. Figures 2, 3 and 4 
show the dominant vernacular radios in each of the three locations. The information 
provided in these figures is relative to the data collected during the interviews in terms of 
vernacular radio listenership. As such, it does not account for other radio channels that 
may broadcast within these areas such as the official-language radios, community radios, 
and youth radios. The goal was to assess and highlight the most popular vernacular radios 
in the three locations according to the interviews. 
 
Dominant Vernacular Radios in Nyeri 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the majority of Kenyans living in Nyeri town 
speak Kikuyu. As such, vernacular radios in this region mainly broadcast in Kikuyu 
language. Figure 2 shows the pattern of vernacular radio listening in Nyeri town. The 
information presented is drawn from the interviews conducted with participants from 
Nyeri.   
As Figure 2 indicates, Coro FM, a state-run Kikuyu-language station appears to 
have the widest reach compared to other vernacular radios in this location. Specifically, 
about 39% of those interviewed in Nyeri mentioned Coro FM as their favourite radio. 
The station is run through KBC, a state-owned media group. Despite the controversies 
that have surrounded its ownership, Coro FM remains the most popular vernacular radio 
in Central Province and in some parts of the Rift Valley Province where a number of 
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Kikuyu-speakers reside. Initially started in 2000, with a re-launch in 2006, the station has 
also managed to appeal to the larger Kikuyu group living around the Nairobi area. 
Although the station broadcasts mainly in Kikuyu dialect, a small percentage of its 
programs are in English and Kiswahili. 
 
Figure 2. Vernacular radio listening among respondents in Nyeri (%) 
 
 
 
The second most listened to vernacular radio among Nyeri respondents was 
Inooro FM. This is probably one of the fastest growing vernacular radios with an 
exclusive Kikuyu language programming. The station brands its name as a “sharpening” 
tool43. About 31% of participants from this region preferred listening to Inooro FM, many 
of whom were influenced by its programming that tends to be aired exclusively in the 
Kikuyu language. The station is owned by Royal Media Services, a company belonging 
                                                
43See http://inoorofm.co.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=61, accessed 
September 14, 2011. 
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to a Kenyan media mogul, S.K. Macharia, who also owns at least eight other vernacular 
stations and official-language media such as Radio Citizen and Citizen TV.  
Kameme FM comes third as the preferred vernacular radio among respondents in 
Nyeri. Licensed in 1999, Kameme FM was the first private radio station to ever operate 
independently as a vernacular radio station (excluding the state-run KBC vernacular radio 
services), where it dominated the vernacular radio market for years before its success 
story prompted many other vernacular radios nationwide. According to the interviews, 
22% of participants still prefer listening to Kameme FM instead of the “emerging” 
stations. As highlighted in its editorial policy44, the station targets audiences who are aged 
between 25 and 45, and aims at encouraging “the pursuit, respect and development of 
Kenyan culture, highlighting Kikuyu, Embu and Meru cultures in particular and the 
African culture in general”.  
In terms of broadcast format, the station blends music, mainly Kikuyu secular and 
gospel (60% of the total program) with cultural (30% of program share) and information 
on business and current affairs (10%). Initially owned by a businesswoman (Rose 
Kimotho) under Regional Reach Ltd. – a company that also owned K24 TV, the company 
was sold to TV Africa Holdings Ltd., another local media firm believed to have ties with 
the Kenyatta’s family (Kenya’s first president, whose son, Uhuru Kenyatta aspires to be 
the next president of Kenya). Kameme FM also blends in a few programs in English and 
Swahili. 
KBC Central Service, which broadcasts in Kikuyu as well as in other languages 
spoken in Central province, Kamba, Meru, Embu and Maasai, comes fourth in terms of 
listenership among those who were interviewed. Although KBC’s vernacular services 
                                                
44See http://www.kameme.co.ke/ , accessed September 14, 2011. 
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have been in existence since the 1950s, they have faced stiff competition from privately 
owned vernacular radios since the late 1990s, which saw the proliferation of private 
stations with a commercial and entertainment focus. Only 6% of those interviewed in 
Nyeri mentioned KBC Central service as their favourite radio station.  
However, it is still fair to note that KBC services remain the most popular among 
rural dwellers that sometimes have limited access to other stations due to the restricted 
frequency radius. The rest of the participants (2%) mentioned other stations that were not 
commonly cited by many respondents, some of which were community radios.  
 
Dominant Vernacular Radios in Eldoret 
 
Unlike in Nyeri where Kikuyu language is common, Kalenjin is widely spoken 
among the inhabitants of Eldoret town. As such, Eldoret is served by radios broadcasting 
in Kalenjin.  Figure 3 provides information relative to the dominant vernacular radios 
among participants in Eldoret. As Figure 3 indicates, Kass FM had the widest reach 
among the Kalenjin speakers who were interviewed in Eldoret. That is, 61% of 
respondents cited Kass FM as their favorite vernacular station. Equally, 24% of 
participants also identified with Chamgei FM, while 11% mentioned KBC Western 
Services (in Kalenjin). The rest (4%) mentioned listening to other radios such as Sayare 
FM, which has a Christian focus and broadcasts in English and Swahili, and thus could 
not be integrated in the study as a vernacular station.  
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Figure 3. Vernacular radio listening among respondents in Eldoret (%) 
 
 
 
Kass FM is probably one of the fastest growing vernacular radios in Kenya, and 
also the dominant radio in the Rift Valley Province. Launched in 2005, it reaches about 
4.5 million listeners per day45, making it Kalenjins’ favourite radio. The success of Kass 
FM in Rift Valley (and other parts of the country) is quite remarkable, as it has also 
opened international offices in Washington DC (US) and London (UK) where it invites 
Kenyans abroad, especially the Kalenjin diaspora, to share their thoughts on different 
issues affecting the country. Furthermore, Kass FM is available online for free streaming, 
a factor that widens its audience reach. Apart from managing the radio, Kass Media 
Group also publishes a magazine (Kass Magazine) and is in the process of launching 
Kass TV that will broadcast in Kalenjin46. If successfully launched, Kass TV will be the 
first vernacular TV to ever operate in Kenya. 
                                                
45See http://www.kassfm.co.ke/kassfm/aboutkassfm , accessed September 27, 2011. 
46See http://kassfm.co.ke/kass-tv/about-kass-tv , accessed September 27, 2011. 
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Chamgei FM also has a considerable following among participants in Eldoret. 
The station is among the radios owned by Royal Media Group (which owns at least eight 
vernacular radios). Specifically, 24% of those interviewed in Eldoret preferred listening 
to Chamgei FM over the other vernacular stations that were available to them. According 
to Royal Media’s website47, Chamgei FM targets mature audiences, mostly between the 
ages of 20 and 45. The company also reflects the diverse Kalenjin culture in its 
programming to appeal to the Kalenjins living in both the urban and rural settings.  
The government-run KBC Western Services (in Kalenjin) came third as 
participants’ favourite vernacular radio. 11% of those interviewed enjoyed listening to 
KBC Western Services (in Kalenjin), while the remaining 4% preferred other stations 
that were not commonly cited by other respondents. 
 
Dominant Vernacular Radios in Kisumu 
 
In Kisumu, Luo remains the language that is widespread. Hence, various radios 
targeting Kisumu inhabitants broadcast in Luo.  Figure 4 provides information relative to 
vernacular radio listening among those interviewed in Kisumu.  
As Figure 4 indicates, the majority of respondents in Kisumu (52%) appeared to like 
Ramogi FM. This was followed by Radio Lake Victoria at 30% then KBC Western 
Services (in Dholuo) at 13% and the rest (5%) listened to other radio stations such as 
Radio Maendeleo, which is one of the many community radios reaching for Kisumu 
residents, mostly in Bondo District. 
                                                
47See http://www.royalmediaservices.co.ke/radios/?q=cmg# , accessed September 26, 2011. 
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Figure 4. Vernacular radio listening among respondents in Kisumu (%) 
 
 
 
Ramogi FM is owned Royal Media Group. According to the station’s website48, 
Ramogi FM essentially targets audiences who are between the ages of 20 and 45. Its 
programming is tailored towards the representation of the “Luo identity”, whether urban 
or rural dwellers. The station also blends other informative and entertainment formats to 
capture audiences living in both rural and urban areas.  
Radio Lake Victoria comes second among respondents of this study. The station 
is run by a non-governmental organization (NGO) called OSIENALA, Osiepe Nam 
Lolwe (Friends of Lake Victoria), established in 1992 whose vision was to “create 
awareness locally and internationally about the problems facing Lake Victoria while at 
the same time creating structures that would support local communities to become 
responsible custodians of their environment and the lake49”. It is believed that Finnish 
                                                
48See http://ramogifm.co.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=61, accessed 
September 26, 2011. 
49See  http://www.osienala.org/Our%20history.php , accessed September 27, 2011. 
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donors initially funded the project. In the late 2005, the NGO launched its radio station, 
Radio Lake Victoria, with the aim of administering its objectives more efficiently 
through an independent communication channel.  
The state-run KBC Western Services (in Dholuo) is still somewhat popular 
among participants in Kisumu, given that 13% of those interviewed still regard it as their 
favorite station. It is in Kiumu where KBC appeared to have the highest following if 
compared to Nyeri (6%) and Eldoret (11%).  
In sum, the findings suggest that Ramogi FM (in Luo), Kass FM (in Kalenjin) and 
Coro FM (in Kikuyu) are the most dominant vernacular radios in the three locations 
where the study was conducted. Nonetheless, participants from Nyeri had an advantage 
over participants from Eldoret and Kisumu in terms of the choices they had among radio 
stations. Although KBC vernacular radio services were not commonly cited as favourite 
stations, their services were still represented in the three locations, with Kisumu 
recording the highest proportion of listeners in terms of preference.  
It is also interesting to note the centrality of Royal Media Group (a private-run 
company) in terms of cross-ownership of vernacular radios, a trend cutting across 
different ethnic groups and geographical zones. The group owns at least one of the 
commonly cited vernacular stations in each of the location where the study was 
conducted: Ramogi FM (for Luos in Kisumu); Inooro FM (for Kikuyus in Nyeri) and 
finally Chamgei FM (for Kalenjins in Eldoret).  
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5.2.3. Frequency in Vernacular Radio Listenership Among Respondents  
 
In an attempt to understand the patterns of vernacular radio listening in the three 
locations, this study also examined the frequency at which the respondents tuned to their 
respective vernacular radios. To capture this frequency, respondents were asked if they 
listened to vernacular radios on a daily basis, every other day, once or twice a week, or if 
there were other times when they would tune to these stations. Figure 8 highlights the 
findings of the study by location where the data was collected.  
As illustrated in Figure 5, the majority of participants either listened to vernacular 
radios on a daily basis or tuned to these radios every other day. This was a common 
pattern in the three locations of the study, although it also emerged that nearly all 
participants from Nyeri (10 out of 15) listened to vernacular radios on a daily basis. The 
findings from Kisumu were quite different from the two other locations. That is, there 
was more or less an equal number of participants who listened to vernacular radios on a 
daily basis and of those who tuned to these radios every other day (6 and 7 respectively).  
Other participants also mentioned listening to vernacular radios depending on 
their moods or location and could not therefore situate their listening patterns. For 
instance, some respondents indicated listening to vernacular radios only when visiting 
upcountry. In this regard, their listening patterns depended on the number of trips they 
would make upcountry.  
Equally, some indicated that they would listen to vernacular radios only at 
friends’ houses whenever they visited them. Given the difficulty in discerning all these 
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patterns, the category “other” was created to account for some of these listenership 
dynamics.  
 
Figure 5. Frequency of vernacular radio listenership among respondents by location 
of study 
 
 
 
Although there are differences in terms of listenership patterns, it is worth noting 
that there were an unequal number of participants in each location due to fieldwork 
constraints that have been explained in the previous sections (a total of 15 participants in 
Nyeri, 17 in Eldoret and 18 in Kisumu). The target was to sample and conduct in-depth 
interviews with 20 participants per location of study. As such, Figure 8 should be read in 
relation to the total number of interviews conducted per location.   
The listenership patterns of vernacular radios by key participants were somewhat 
different compared to the patterns noted in the three locations of study. Figure 6 provides 
a close picture of the frequency at which key participants tuned to vernacular radios of 
their choice.  
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Figure 6. Frequency of vernacular radio listenership among key respondents 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows that key respondents did not necessarily listen to vernacular radios 
at specific times. Four out of the nine interviewed mentioned not having specific times or 
days to tune to vernacular radios, while three indicated listening to these stations on a 
daily basis. The rest either listened to these radios once or twice a week (1), or every 
other day (2).  
 
5.2.4. Simultaneous Use of Other Media 
 
Although the study mainly focuses on vernacular radios, participants were also 
asked if they used other media outlets to supplement the information they gathered while 
listening to their respective vernacular radios. Table 7 shows some of the media that were 
commonly cited during the interviews.  
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Table 7. Simultaneous use of other media by respondents interviewed 
 
Type of media Number of respondents 
Official-language radios 59 
TV channels 42 
Press 25 
Internet 22 
Mobile telephony 51 
Word of mouth 49 
 
As many as 80% indicated that they simultaneously accessed other sources of 
media to complement the information they garnered through vernacular radios. This was 
especially common with the key participants as all mentioned consulting other types of 
media (print, audiovisual and electronic), to gain more insights on various issues around 
the country and abroad. 
 
Official-language Radios 
 
As highlighted in Table 7, official-language radios had the most following 
compared to other types of media. All participants (59) indicated listening to official-
language radios, implying that official-language radios are just as important (to 
participants) as vernacular radios that broadcast in the local languages. This supports the 
idea that radio not only remains the most accessible source of information, but also the 
most consumed media. Some of the most popular privately owned radio stations in Kenya 
are as follows: Citizen FM, Capital FM (went on air in 1996 to become the first private 
radio in Kenya), Kiss FM, House of Reggae, Easy FM, Classic FM, and Hope FM.  
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State-run radio stations also have a considerable national and regional following. 
This includes KBC English Services, KBC Kiswahili services, and KBC Metro FM with 
entertainment focus. It is also worth noting that KBC radio services are not only popular 
in rural areas, but they also have the widest reach nationwide. Some respondents also 
mentioned tuning to international or foreign radios. Some of the radios that were 
commonly cited are: Radio France International, Voice of America, BBC Africa, 
Transworld radio, Sound Asia, and China radio. These radios rebroadcast in both English 
and Swahili, the two official languages in Kenya thus reaching a significant segment of 
Kenya’s population.  
 
TV Channels 
 
Television was also common among respondents as an alternative source of 
information. Out of the 59 respondents who were interviewed, 42 reported watching TV 
at least once a week. Unlike radios, TV sets are somewhat expensive and consume a lot 
of power, meaning that they could not be easily run by means of batteries (although some 
households used car batteries as a source of power for their TV sets), a factor that limited 
some respondents from owning a TV set. Nonetheless, some respondents also indicated 
watching TV at friends’ or relatives’ homes.  
In terms of local TV consumption, Kenya Television Network, KTN (owned by 
The Standard Group), Citizen TV (owned by Royal Media Services), and Nation TV, 
NTV (owned by Nation Media Group) appeared to be the most watched TV channels by 
the respondents of this study. Other privately owned TV stations that were watched by 
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study’s respondents include Family TV, East African TV (based in Tanzania), Classic 
TV, and Sayere TV. These channels broadcast in both English and Swahili. The state-run 
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and its affiliate channels (mainly KBC Metro 
TV available through satellite pay-TV) were also commonly watched but appeared to 
face stiff competition from privately owned channels. The majority of participants 
indicated their preference for privately owned TV channels supposedly because KBC was 
less critical of the government.  
Respondents also mentioned watching various foreign TV channels, many of 
which were available through pay-per-view satellite and cable channels, mainly 
MultiChoice, STV (formerly Stellavision), and Cable Television Network (CTN). 
Various channels can be accessed through these satellite and cable channels. The 
channels that were mainly cited by study’s respondents include BBC World, CNN and 
Al-Jazeera English.  
Time and locality seemed to be the main factors that explained why some 
participants watched TV in an attempt to supplement the information they gathered via 
vernacular radios. Those who watched TV mainly did so in the evening once they got 
back from work or school. As such, they would have a broader sense of what had 
happened during the day. 
 
Press 
 
Newspaper readership was relatively low among the respondents of the study. 
Only 25 out of the 59 people interviewed reported reading newspapers, mainly the key 
respondents. Those who read newspapers argued that the press provided in-depth 
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coverage of various issues that were skimmed by on the radios or TV. Equally, some 
indicated that they read newspapers because they are easily portable. 
The most-read private newspapers include the Daily Nation, The Standard, The 
People, East African, and The Star. Some respondents also cited the state-run Kenya 
Times as one of their favourite newspapers. Although there are a number of newspapers, 
past studies have demonstrated that the most dominant newspapers in Kenya remain the 
Daily Nation and The Standard, as they control more than 70% of the newspaper 
readership (Onyebadi, 2008; Gathigi, 2009; Kalyango, 2008).  
Nation Media group also publishes The East Africa, Mwananchi (a Swahili daily 
in Tanzania), The Citizen, Business Daily, Taifa Leo (in Swahili) and The Monitor (a 
daily in Uganda). The group also owns some radio stations (Q-FM, Easy FM, and K-FM) 
and a TV station (Nation TV). On the other hand, The Standard Group, which is the 
oldest newspaper (established in 1902 as a weekly), also runs Radio Maisha, Kenya 
Television Network (the first private TV station in Kenya established in 1989) and a 
distribution agency (Publishers Distribution Services). 
 
Mobile Telephony  
  
 Mobile telephony is increasingly becoming a key information outlet, not because of 
calls that subscribers could make, but because phone companies now offer radio and 
Internet enabled phones to their subscribers. As Table 7 indicates, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents (51 out of the 59) used their phones to access different sorts of 
information, mainly news briefs, radio stations, and Internet. In other words, mobile 
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phones provided some respondents with the means not only to stay connected with 
friends and family through phone calls, but also a way through which they would stay 
informed on what is happening around them via radio and Internet.  
 According to the data gathered from the Communication Commission of Kenya 
(CCK), the industry of mobile telephony in Kenya was established in 1992, with only a 
handful of subscribers due to the expensive analogue telephone system (Extended Total 
Access Communication System - ETACS) that was in place. Consequently, the cost of a 
mobile telephone device was as high as Ksh. 250,000 (about $2940 USD) between 1993 
and 1999, with a total estimate of subscribers of less than 20,000 within the same period. 
 However, the creation of the Kenya Communication Act in 1998 that introduced 
competition in the cellular phone industry led to an exponential mobile growth of about 
60% in 2008. In 2010, CCK estimated the number of mobile subscribers at 22 million, 
representing about 86% of the total population.  
 
Internet  
 
The Internet recorded the lowest following compared to other types of media. Out 
of the 59 respondents, only 22 used the Internet. Although there is an increase in the use 
of mobile phones to access the Internet, 9 out of the 22 had access to Internet at home or 
through their phones. Others either accessed the Internet at work, school or at nearby 
cyber cafes. According to a report published by CCK in 2008, only 1.7 million Internet 
users were recorded in 2007, representing only 5% of the total population.  
The report attributes the low Internet penetration to factors such as inadequate 
infrastructures to support these kinds of communication services, illiteracy in terms of 
	   171	  
technology use, and lack of local content that appeal to the users. Alongside these hurdles 
are issues around policy and regulations. However, the report also advances that the 
government’s initiative to waive import duty on personal computers (PCs) expanded the 
growth of Internet subscribers to about 22.1% of the population in 2010. The report notes 
the centrality of mobile operators who control an estimated 98% of the total Internet 
market share.  
Some participants “actively” used the Internet as a means through which they can 
broaden their understanding of specific issues they deemed important in their lives. In 
other instances, participants appeared to obtain information “passively” (without 
necessarily searching for or locating these kinds of information), especially on issues that 
were not necessarily of interest to them. 
 
Word of Mouth 
 
The study also found that the majority of respondents relied on word of mouth as 
a source of information. Table 7 shows that 38 respondents still relied on word of mouth 
to provide or garner information on issues of interest to them. This type of person-to-
person communication remains one of the many ways in which the participants acquired 
and shared information on different topics. On many occasions, participants reported 
talking to their family members, friends and colleagues at school or work and in the 
process, they would learn about different issues that were salient.  
However, respondents who used this medium, mentioned issues of credibility vis-
à-vis some of the information that was exchanged. In other words, trust and one’s 
entourage appeared to serve as filters when it came to consuming or rejecting the 
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information provided through word of mouth. In some cases, respondents would exploit 
other media once they became aware of various issues in order to further their 
understanding with regard to the topics that stirred their curiosity. Joel, a 24-year-old 
mobile vendor in Eldoret, describes why obtaining information through word of mouth is 
important to him.  
Even though I listen to radios to follow what is going on around me, I think I get a 
lot of information from my family and friends because we talk all the time. When 
you sit down with friends, there are so many things that you learn at a time, and 
this is why I like hanging out with friends in the evenings after I am done at the 
kiosk. We can talk about politics, business, sports and all other stuff you can 
name. We make jokes, drink and laugh but in the process we learn about things 
that actually affect all of us. You know, you can’t be aware of everything even if 
you watch TV or read newspapers everyday. Friends and family therefore become 
my alternative sources of information. 
 
In essence, the findings suggest that word of mouth was equally central as a 
means through which respondents were kept informed about various issues that affected 
their lives and/or environment. By talking to their peers, participants indicated gaining 
insights on other issues they might have not been aware of. In the process, the 
information gathered through word of mouth complemented those obtained through other 
media. The quality and authenticity of such information remained the main concern 
among participants.  
The next section looks at the main factors that were associated with vernacular 
radio listening in the three locations of the study. 
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5.3. Main Factors Associated with Vernacular Radio Listening  
 
The findings suggest that respondents tuned to vernacular radios for multiple 
reasons. Five broad categories are used in an attempt to regroup factors that seemed to be 
closely linked to one another: information-seeking purposes, socio-cultural factors 
economic reasons, political causes, and educational forum. 
 
5.3.1. Information-seeking Endeavours 
 
Apart from the official-language media, vernacular radios still remain important 
sources of information to many Kenyans, especially those with limited command of 
English and Swahili, the official languages in Kenya. Although the majority of the 
respondents acknowledged using other sources of media to stay informed about what was 
happening around them, vernacular radio listenership was mainly linked to individual 
personalities and education, as well as the curiosity that respondents had with regard to 
current affairs.  
For instance, it appears that those with a secondary degree or higher 
simultaneously exploited other media outlets such as reading newspapers to supplement 
the information they gathered via vernacular radios. As such, they would compare 
information from different sources before drawing a conclusion on any given issue. 
Location was also an important factor linked to whether or not a respondent listened to 
vernacular radios. That is, the likelihood that one would tune to vernacular radios to gain 
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insights into current affairs was linked to whether or not the respondent was at work, 
school, home, market, driving, taking public transportation, farming, etc.  
Another factor that appeared to determine whether or not respondents used 
vernacular radios as an information-seeking tool was linked to respondents’ relationships 
or contacts with colleagues, family, or with friends at work or school. Although many 
respondents tuned to vernacular radios for information-seeking purposes when at home 
with their families, some respondents indicated listening to vernacular radios when alone, 
especially in the mornings and evenings when driving to school or work.  
Those who took public transportation, commonly referred to as the Matatus, had 
no choice but to listen to what the driver tuned to, mostly the official-language radios. 
That is, while it is common to listen to official-language radios while on board the 
Matatus, some drivers would tune to vernacular radios of their choice despite the fact that 
some passengers may not necessarily understand the language of the broadcast. This was 
common in the three locations of research.  
Time also appeared to determine whether or not the respondents tuned to 
vernacular radios for information-seeking reasons. Many respondents only listened to 
vernacular radios in the mornings when they were getting ready for work, school or other 
daily activities. For instance, participants who owned TV sets would mostly listen to 
radios in the morning and watch TV in the evenings to have a recap on what had 
happened during the day once they were done with their daily routines.  
Although respondents listened to different vernacular radios, some radio outlets 
seemed to enjoy a strong regional following compared to others that targeted the same 
region and/or group. The regional popularity of the radios was linked to the kinds of 
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programs that were on-air and radio hosts. In Nyeri for instance, Coro, Inooro and 
Kameme FM stations, broadcasting in Kikuyu language, were the most popular 
vernacular radios.  
The majority of respondents in this location cited Coro Matũrainĩ (Coro at 
grassroots), a program seeking to give voice to people from the marginalized regions of 
Nyeri and its surroundings. The popularity of this program was linked to the fact that it 
pays attention to the issues affecting the common person, whose problems or views are 
often neglected by the mainstream media. This is what Ruth, a real-estate agent based in 
Nyeri, had to say about Coro FM’s program.  
Coro Matũraini is one of my favourite radio programs. The program addresses 
issues that many media ignore although they may be very distressing to the people 
they affect. As a woman, sometimes the society does not pay attention to what we 
have to say or think, especially here in Kenya where politicians seem to control 
everything. I remember one day during the program when Coro [FM] guys were 
interviewing a woman who lost some of her land to a politician. No one was 
willing to listen to her, even the local authorities because she didn’t have money 
to bribe the policemen so that they can do their job. […] The moment Coro [FM] 
started making the story visible to the public, a lot of people seemed to be 
concerned as they offered lots of advice on what the woman could do to address 
her situation. I was very emotional when I heard the poor woman talk about all 
the efforts she has made without any success. I am in the real-estate business and I 
know how it may be difficult to get your property back if you are not well “wired’ 
in the system, more so, when you do not speak Swahili or English. I know some 
people who have lost their lands after signing documents that they don’t even 
understand because they are easily drawn into these kinds of frauds. Coro [FM] 
seems to pay attention to these little problems. This may be the reason why people 
like Coro Matũraini. 
 
The interviews in Kisumu also pointed out the significance of vernacular radios as an 
information-seeking tool. Ramogi FM and Radio Lake Victoria appeared to be the most 
popular vernacular radios in this regard.  
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The audiences of these stations had varying reasons as to why they listen to 
programs aired on these radios. Jacob, a Boda Boda50 operator in Kisumu, listens to 
Ramogi FM mostly because it blends news briefs (Weche Machuok and Thuond Weche) 
with Benga music (a type of Luo music rhythm), he thus stays informed about current 
affairs while, at the same time, being entertained.  
Other respondents in Kisumu listened to vernacular radios because they provided 
them with information on health and economy. This is the case of Nancy, a tailor and a 
mother of five children who finds Radio Lake Victoria to be more informative on 
regional issues affecting Kisumu residents such as health, environmental concerns, 
politics, and human rights. Although she acknowledges listening to Ramogi FM, she 
associates the latter with the younger audiences who are more into entertainment.  
In Eldoret, Chamagei and Kass FM stations seem to the most popular vernacular 
radios. Though there are other stations that were also cited by respondents from this site 
(such as Sayare FM), Kass FM appeared to command a considerable number of Kalenjin 
speakers in Rift Valley. One of the factors that contribute to Kass FM’s popularity may 
be attributed to the fact that it is also available for live streaming on the Internet. Also, 
through Kass Sports, a membership club destined solely for Kass FM audiences, the 
station has managed to demarcate itself as the “voice of Kalenjins” within the Rift Valley 
province where the Kalenjin community remains the largest ethnic group.  
One of the news programs that appeared to be cited by many respondents is the 
breakfast show Kass Lene Emet (Kass’ world views at a glance). Many participants 
mentioned that the program addresses issues such as market prices for local farmers, 
                                                
50 Boda Boda is a name given to bikes and bikers who transport goods and people for a living. 
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human rights issues, and politics. Philip, a college student living in Eldoret puts this in 
perspective.  
Kass FM is very a fun radio station to listen to, especially in the morning and 
evenings. […]  Though I don’t listen to it every day, I especially enjoy the 
morning breakfast show, Lene Emet by Joshua Arap Sang, that provides us with 
information about everything you would ever want to know, even regarding 
education which is important to me. The presenter is also a very funny guy, and 
this makes the show even more interesting, with nonstop calls from people as they 
head to work. […] I also listen to other FM stations in Kiswahili and English, but 
Kalenjin stations keep me posted on what is going on within my community, and 
that’s the main reason why I listen to Kass FM. There is also a comedy program 
called Kass Bomori, which is also fun to listen to.  
 
Though vernacular radios seemed essential when it comes to information-seeking needs 
of those interviewed, some respondents also mentioned skimming through other media51 
for other topics that appealed to them, especially political information.  
Political information seemed to be one of the main topics that stirred a lot of 
curiosity among the study’s participants to an extent that they became, somewhat, “active 
seekers” of these kinds of information. That is, as many as 63% of those interviewed, 
excluding the key participants, reported soliciting other sources of information to further 
their understanding of political issues that they may have initially obtained from 
vernacular radios.  
Unlike the respondents from three locations who talked to their peers, tuned to the 
official-language radios or watched TV as an “alternative” news to vernacular radios, the 
study found that key respondents were more likely to exploit a wide-range of online and 
offline news sources. This may be due to fact that they have the means to access these 
alternative sources to gauge their perspectives on different issues. Professor Macharia 
                                                
51 See Table 7, Simultaneous use of other media 
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Munene who teaches history and international relations at Nairobi’s United States 
International University (USIU) described how he stays informed about current affairs: 
I read the newspapers, watch TV, talk to people and brush through the electronic 
media, just the general ways of keeping in touch. I read what is in the regular 
media, such as the newspapers that everybody buys two or three of them, and the 
irregular media, what I call the alternative press that are mainly electronic, which 
not everyone has access to. […] I also listen to vernacular FM stations that are 
said to occasionally indulge in news analysis of some kind, their views of course, 
as they target particular audiences. So I also listen to them to hear what they are 
saying, mainly Inooro, Kameme and Coro FM stations because I can understand 
them. But I also listen to other FM stations in Kiswahili or English such as Radio 
Citizen, Capital FM, etc. I listen to international radio stations as well, such as 
BBC, the Deutche Welle, Voice of America, and China Radio. […] I watch TV in 
the evenings when I am done work, so I have a recap of everything that happened 
during the day. I also go online sometimes to read what’s out there, mostly the 
international news. 
 
Despite the fact that some respondents still searched for alternative news in order 
to complement the information they gathered through vernacular radio listening, both the 
key respondents and other participants reported considering vernacular radios just as 
important sources of information as the official-language broadcasts. The only difference 
pointed out between the two was the language of broadcast. Not only do vernacular 
radios gauge the attitudes and moods of the groups they serve, they also delineate other 
groups from understanding what they discuss given the language of broadcast. 
 
5.3.2. Socio-cultural Reasons 
 
Vernacular radios also serve as a means through which respondents fulfilled their 
socio-cultural needs such as entertainment, language and cultural heritage, 
companionship, religion and proximity. The majority of respondents perceived 
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vernacular radios as platforms through which different cultures are maintained and a way 
by which ethno-cultural norms are passed on to the younger generations who seem to be 
more comfortable with Swahili and English.  
In this regard, respondents reported that vernacular radios have come up with 
specialized programs that discuss cultural issues relevant to the groups they serve. This 
included language, creed, customs, values, ceremonies, and interests. Indeed, the 
interviews indicated that vernacular radios provide respondents with forums for 
discussing topics or issues that are innate to their cultures or ways of life, some of which 
were sensitive or considered as taboo.  
When I met with Felix, a father of four boys who owns a pub in Kisumu, he told 
me his insights about the significance of vernacular radios in strengthening cultural 
cohesion. Felix describes vernacular radios as a replacement of the elders who used to 
narrate stories to their grandchildren with the aim of teaching them cultural issues that 
were relative to that particular identity group. He believes that vernacular radios provide 
a forum for discussing culturally innate issues that may not surface in the official-
language radios. This is what he had to say during the interview: 
Just like many other Kenyans, people of Kisumu are proud of their culture. I don’t 
think they would like to see this disappear although we are obliged to use the 
official languages on a day-to-day basis. I am 65 now, when I was young, my dad 
would tell us stories about my culture, my people and what I needed to observe as 
a Luo man. Many of our elders have passed away now, so it becomes quite 
difficult to know one’s roots because these kinds of informal education rarely 
exist in out current society. Vernacular radios have replaced elders. Programs like 
Abila [house of the patriach] and Duol Jokanyanam [Voice of the Luo elders] that 
are aired on stations such as Ramogi and Radio Victoria have kept the Luo 
language and culture alive. The members of the Luo Council of Elders, a 
community of Luo elders, usually present these programs. […] They talk about 
many issues such as marriage, burial, property inheritance, giving birth, naming 
children, family conflicts, traditional dances and ceremonies, religious beliefs, 
and customs particular to boys-girls relationship that need to be passed on from 
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generation to generation. I believe other communities have similar programs 
where they discuss issues that matter to them the most. 
 
This assumption not only affirms vernacular radios as social forums where knowledge on 
customs are shared amongst people with the same cultural beliefs, but also a platform for 
group participation and engagement in socio-cultural matters.  
Vernacular radios are also regarded as a form of companionship. Some 
respondents indicated listening to vernacular radios when doing housework, when bored 
or when they lack someone to talk to. Others reported listening to vernacular radios while 
performing different activities such as grazing animals or cultivating farms. This is the 
case of John, a 25-year-old from Eldoret who considers his portable radio as a companion 
when he is out in the fields with his herds of cows. He states,  
I never leave my portable radio behind whenever I am looking after my cows. I 
can’t talk to the animals in the field so my radio becomes my best friend who 
entertains me in the fields. I love the music they play at Kass FM, so I sing along 
with the radio. Honestly, I feel like time gets shorter and shorter when I have my 
radio by my side. You don’t see the time go by because it feels like you have 
someone to keep you company, make jokes, and talk to. When I get sick of one 
station, or when they talk too much, I just tune to another station, so I basically 
listen to what I want. I do prefer listening to the Kalenjin Kass FM because the 
presenters are fun, they don’t talk too much, and I also speak Kalenjin so I can 
easily understand the discussions. 
 
In a similar vein, Irene, a 21-year-old housekeeper in Nyeri town mentioned 
listening to Kameme FM most of the time while cleaning the house, cooking, and 
laundry. She explains, 
I spend most of my time cleaning stuff and taking care of the baby when my 
employer goes to work, so I cannot sit and watch television. I just turn on the 
radio and I can hear it from wherever I am in the house. […] I like listening to 
Coro FM and Inooro FM because the presenters are funny. It is like having a close 
friend talking to you and making jokes at the same time. The music is also cool 
[…]. The days we have blackouts [power rationing] I feel like my day gets longer 
because I have nothing or no one to keep me company.  
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Vernacular radios are also regarded as suitable means through which friends and 
family could stay in contact. In other words, friends, family and relatives could send and 
receive greetings on-air despite their geographical locations.  
In Kisumu, a number of respondents mentioned listening to Mos (greetings), a 
program aired on Ramogi FM and Budho Mar Odiro (evening get together), an evening 
social program aired on Radio Lake Victoria that combined music, greetings, and talk 
shows. During this program, people call to place song requests while sending greetings to 
their friends, relatives and family within the country or abroad. Radio Lake Victoria is 
also accessible online, expanding its reach outside the Kenyan frontiers.  
In Eldoret, the majority of participants listened to Kass and Chamgei FM stations, 
where they would also send and receive greetings. For instance, those who listened to 
Kass FM cited Kass Lene Emet and Kass Nam Nam, programs that blended greetings, 
music and discussions on key issues that appealed to the Kalenjin people.  
Inooro, Coro and Kameme FM stations, targeting the Kikuyu audiences also had 
programs served for greetings. Sending and receiving greetings is a common practice 
among Kenyans, and vernacular radios have embraced this practice in their programming 
to attract large audiences.  
Some participants also indicated that they would listen to vernacular radios to 
follow church sermons in their own languages or listen to the gospel songs once they got 
home from church. Going to church is a very common practice in the lives of many 
Kenyans, sometimes considered as a cultural act. The majority of those interviewed 
appeared to be Protestants, although there were a number of Catholics as well. Many 
vernacular radios therefore program church sermons over the weekends. For example, 
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respondents from Nyeri mentioned listening to Coro FM’s Tuthomere Bibilia, 
Guthathaiya Ngai and Ciuria na igeranio cia bibilia that blended Christian teachings 
with gospel music mainly on Sundays.  
Other respondents from Nyeri listened to Inooro FM’s Hutia Mũndu, which 
combined religious teachings with youth sexuality. Another program that was common 
among Nyeri participants was Ithaa rĩa kwĩbanga that was broadcasted by Coro FM, and 
was mainly listened to by young married couples to gain more insights on religion and 
their everyday lives. For participants in Kisumu, programs such as Nyasae Ber, a 
breakfast show aired on Radio Lake Victoria appeared as favourite religious programs. In 
Eldoret, Kass FM’s Haleluyah Hour was one of the common programs that had a 
religious focus. 
 
5.3.3. Economic Purposes 
 
Vernacular radios are perceived as tools for local and regional development. 
Nearly all respondents acknowledge the significance of vernacular radio programs in 
strengthening regional and local development, especially in rural areas and among elderly 
citizens with poor command of English and Swahili. The majority of respondents 
indicated their preference in following development-oriented programs in their respective 
languages. This was associated with the idea that some of the jargons used in those 
programs were not easily understood in Swahili and English.  
Respondents cited several programs, with economic focus, that were aired on 
vernacular radios to bolster self-sufficiency among the target groups, many of which 
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were agricultural. As mentioned in Chapter one, agriculture still remains the main source 
of income for the majority of Kenyans. Often, each household, especially in the 
upcountry, has a small farm where it grows various crops for consumption. Many 
respondents thus appreciated farming techniques and the information on various markets, 
which were passed on on-air through various talk shows, most of which are 
“personalized” and “regionalized” to reflect the regional realities of the people served. 
In Eldoret, the interviews pointed out that farmers acquired useful information 
through the Kalenjin radios that helped them refocus their farming practices as well as 
marketing trends. My interview with Robert, a high school teacher and a farmer living in 
Eldoret, shed light on this aspect. Robert understands the significance of vernacular radio 
in the region, especially when it comes to agricultural programs. This is how he described 
it:  
Rift Valley is one of Kenya’s agricultural hub, so we do feed many parts of the 
country, if I may put it that way. Here in Eldroret, we produce a lot of crops, such 
as tea and maize, which not only serve the people of Eldoret, but also other parts 
of the country. The problem is that a number of farmers are manual workers who 
only speak Kalenjin. Some of the agricultural programs aired on Chamgei [FM] 
and Kass [FM] have been helpful in providing these farmers with the information 
to sell their produce. […] Some farmers may speak Swahili, but speaking to 
someone in his own language makes things much easier. For instance, there is a 
season when some sort of a crop disease infected many farms leading a major loss 
of crops. Thanks to the information that some farmers obtained through these 
radios, they were able to identify what kinds of chemical to buy so that they can 
prevent further loss. 
 
This perception concurred with that observed in Nyeri town, where Elizabeth 
(who owns dairy and poultry farms) described vernacular radios as “village instructors.” 
Elizabeth believes that vernacular radios provide the rural famers with an array of 
farming practices and market opportunities. She pointed out Inooro FM’s Mũgambo wa 
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Mũrĩmĩ (Farmers’ voice), an educational program with a focus on sustainable agricultural 
practices. The program not only provides farmers with advice on how to increase their 
farm produce, it also brings on-air successful farmers to share their “secrets” with regard 
farming practices. This is how she described why she listens to vernacular radios: 
Look, I am a small-scale farmer and I don’t have the same amount of money to 
distribute my produce on a national scale as large-scale farmers do. If I rely on 
official language broadcasts for these kinds of information, they will inform me 
about markets that are out of my reach or that are not realistically possible given 
my means. I live close to Nyeri, if you tell me that there is market for my milk in 
Mombasa, I will need to equip my farm with very expensive equipment to be able 
to process my milk and send it Mombasa. I don’t have that kind of money, so I 
distribute my produce within Nyeri, sometime to large-scale farmers within. To 
be honest with you, since 2006 I managed to penetrate some markets here thanks 
to the information that I acquired from Inooro FM’s Mũgambo wa Mũrĩmi. 
 
In Kisumu, fish vendors such as Caroline, a single mother of six, whom I had the 
opportunity to interview in her shop, reported having increased her sales thanks to some 
of the information she obtained when listening to Ramogi FM, one of the radios that 
broadcast in Luo. Although she could not remember the name of the program or the day 
and month that it was aired, Caroline recollects that the discussions were about small 
loans given to small-scale farmers and traders. She goes on to say that the information 
she received gave her ideas that helped her transform her business from a small local 
business where she would only target Kisumu clients, to a large-scale production with 
shops in many parts of the country that sell fish.  
Ramogi FM and Radio Lake Victoria have been really helpful in identifying 
markets for traders here in Kisumu. I never knew that people like me would ever 
receive a small loan to expand my fish business, but I managed to get some 
money through a development fund that I identified through a program that was 
on Ramogi FM. I can’t remember the name of the program, but all I know is that 
it changed my life as well as my business. Now I am able to sell my fish even in 
Nairobi where I also own few shops. I never used to listen to vernacular radios 
that much, but now I do listen to them on a regular basis. 
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This assertion affirms the centrality of vernacular radio programs in overseeing economic 
empowerment of the populations they serve.  
 
5.3.4. Political Objectives 
 
Vernacular radios are also means by which groups stay informed with regard to 
political beliefs, and by extension, the political party or parties that represent their cause. 
They are the “gate-keepers” when it comes to groups’ political ideologies or interests. As 
already mentioned, each vernacular radio serves a specific ethno-linguistic group with 
well-defined beliefs, customs, and interests.  
Respondents considered vernacular as a forum for exchange and dialogue on the 
issues that affected their lives as an ethnic group and a means by which they would 
articulate their political ideologies and policies in a language understood by their 
communities. Phone-in and talk shows programs were at the centre of many political 
debates. Often, the presenters of these radios chose very carefully the kinds of music, 
comedy and commentaries to intertwine with these debates. This led to mixed reactions 
as to whether or not vernacular radios were agents of intergroup hate and mutilation.  
While some respondents praised, “ethnicized political information,” suggesting 
that they mirror the values and beliefs of the people they represent, others argued that 
ethicized politics only generated negative competitive attitudes amongst the Kenyan 
groups, and compromised national self-determination. This is why some respondents 
such as Lucy, a High School teacher in Kisumu, disgraced ethnicized political 
information. Lucy argues that some programs, often accompanied by traditional music, 
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cut deep into the preconceived stereotypes, in a negative light, that describe intergroup 
relations in Kenya. Lucy was particularly concerned with the content of some of the Luo 
Ohangla52”songs that, despite their controversial political messages, have become one of 
Kenya’s music sensations. This is what she had to say: 
Vernacular radios have a special connection with the people they serve because of 
the language intimacy. They broadcast in the languages used by the groups they 
serve, they play their kinds of music, and they also support their cultural practices 
as well as the political views. Just pay attention to the content of the music these 
[vernacular] stations play and you will understand what I am talking about. I am 
not saying that all songs are political, but the majority of the songs are, apart from 
the gospel of course. These guys [radio hosts] know exactly what they are doing 
because we witnessed what happened during the campaigns of the 2007 
presidential race. These guys [radio hosts] only played songs that were very 
political, some demonizing other political candidates, yet people were just happy 
listening to them and singing along. […] Ohangla is so popular here [Kisumu] 
such that at every corner you pass, all you hear is Tony Nyadundo and Onyi Papa 
Jay’s songs in praise of Tinga53. […] I guess what I am trying to say is that 
vernacular radios play an important role in group’s social psychology and I am 
not surprised that Kenyans will always trust one of their own before welcoming 
the views of other ethnic groups, especially when it comes to politics. 
 
This assumption shows the significance of vernacular radios in reinforcing 
collective perceptions, especially when it comes to regional politics.  Cultural proximity 
and language appear to be the main factors render ethnicity more salient in regional 
politics.  
 
                                                
52Ohangla is a Luo traditional song, which has become very popular in the past few years, cutting across 
ethnic groups and urban dwellers given its catchy rhythms and dances. Initially, Ohangla was performed 
during ceremonies such as weddings and funerals, where it was mostly associated with the old. Today, 
Ohangla blends both traditional and contemporary beats thus embraced by both the elderly and the younger 
generations.  
53 Tinga is a nickname given to the then-presidential hopeful Raila Odinga, who is currently the Prime 
Minister of Kenya. Odinga is also a presidential contender in the next general elections in March 2013. 
Literally, Tinga is a Luo term for a tractor.  
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5.3.5. Educational Uses  
 
As educational platforms, vernacular radios were regarded as an effective means 
through which health and civic empowerment programs are passed on to the public with 
limited knowledge of English and Swahili. Health education programs seemed to be 
appreciated the most by respondents in all of the three locations where the study was 
carried out. Major health threats such as HIV and AIDS were mainly communicated to 
vernacular radio audiences mainly in comic formats, talk shows and drama series. These 
are the main formats that seemed to resonate well with rural dwellers who represent the 
majority of vernacular radio audiences.  
In some rural areas of Kisumu, where wife inheritance is still a common practice, 
Luo vernacular radios have made a great effort in integrating health-awareness programs 
in their talk shows or phone-in programs. In this light, Kenya’s Ministry of Health in 
partnership with different health professionals and Radio Lake Victoria spearheads 
Voluntary Male Circumcision (VMC), a health campaign that is often aired on different 
vernacular radios to reinforce male circumcision while providing other useful information 
relating to sexually transmitted diseases (STD).  
Vernacular radios therefore inform their audiences on various locations where 
they can find well-trained health experts to attend to their health problems at a relatively 
low cost or free of charge, mainly for HIV patients. During my visit to Kisumu, I happen 
to interview a respondent who was HIV positive. The respondent described vernacular 
radios as “virtual doctors” since they serve as a vehicle by which health awareness 
programs are channelled “on-air” to help many patients cope with their HIV status. He 
recounted his distressful fight with the disease, although he says that his life is now better 
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thanks to the countless pieces of advice that he receives through Radio Lake Victoria’s 
Duol Jokanyanam, a program with focus on the issues affecting the residents of Kisumu, 
such as HIV and AIDS.  
Similarly, William, another respondent from Eldoret pointed out that Chamgei 
and Kass FM radios air programs on health education, with focus on the youth 
population. Murtha liked the fact that some of the radio hosts interviewed health workers 
who encouraged the local residents to visit regional centres that provided free counselling 
for HIV and AIDS patients, most of which were funded and staffed by the national and 
international humanitarian organizations.  
Vernacular radios were also considered as forums for civic and democratic 
education, and by extension, a vehicle for social change.  In this regard, the essence of 
vernacular radios seemed to lie in their capacity to speak to and for the groups they serve 
through basic education on various principles of human rights such as democracy and 
voting. During my interviews in Nyeri, I had an interesting exchange with a local 
craftsman who calls himself “officer Kamau.” He listens to a number of Kikuyu radios, 
but prefers Inooro FM supposedly because it is more educational on matters of advocacy 
and human rights. “Officer Kamau” perceives Inooro FM as a democratizing radio:  
I think these [vernacular] radios provide us with information that helps us stay 
alert on different issues affecting the country. This is why I like Inooro FM 
because its programs are more educational than other radios such as Kameme and 
Coro FM that focus on entertainment. Inooro FM provides good information on 
how to work on the differences that divide our community, especially when it 
comes to politics or family relations. They [Inooro FM] bring on-air educators 
from the community to talk about issues that affect our people such as abusive 
relationships, land grabbing, etc. […].  They also help people realize when 
politicians are manipulating them for selfish purposes. These are some of the little 
things that these guys do to inform many people on ways in which they can 
protect themselves from abuse or manipulation. Inooro [FM] is a real “eye 
opener” when it comes to issues of democracy and advocacy in our community.  
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In Eldoret, Kass FM’s Nengung Kut appeared to be among the popular programs 
on civic education. During the program, the audiences call or send Short Message Service 
(SMS) on-air to radio hosts and share their views on the abuse or neglect of women.  In 
the process, listeners who may have had similar experiences are encouraged to seek help.  
Educational programs were more likely to be successful or influential when 
passed on through comic, drama, or phone-in formats.  Regular formats, such as 
interviewing a health professional, were considered boring and difficult to assimilate in 
one’s own language. Conversely, comic formats were seen as simple and fun. Equally, 
respondents indicated that educational programs presented by funny, friendly, and well-
known radio hosts were more appealing.  
As an educational platform, vernacular radio programs offered respondents with 
information to fight ignorance with regard to matters that affected their daily lives. The 
ability of these programs to be influential hinged on the kinds of formats chosen and the 
presenters in the studios.  
The next section focuses on the dominant vernacular radio discourses that 
characterized intergroup relations prior to, during and after the 2007/08 conflicts. 
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5.4. Framing Intergroup Claims in Kalenjin, Luo and Kikuyu Radios 
 
This section presents the findings relating to the accommodation of intergroup 
relations by the Kalenjin, Luo and Kikuyu radios in the events of the 2007/08 conflicts. 
Emphasis is put on how respondents made sense of the conflicts and intergroup relations 
following the information they received from their respective vernacular radios. The 
section begins by presenting descriptive accounts relative to the discourses that 
dominated the pre-conflict phase. It then focuses on the dominant frames that surfaced 
during the violent conflicts, before concluding with post-conflict (violent) frames.  
 
5.4.1. Dominant Frames Prior to the (violent) Conflict 
 
The findings suggest erratic and dissimilar patterns of frames adopted by the 
Kalenjin, Luo and Kikuyu vernacular radios prior to the 2007/08 conflicts. At this stage, 
the radios in the three locations appeared to be relying on deep-seated historical 
contingencies coupled with intergroup disfigurement to provide their respective 
audiences with an interpretative framework, most of which served to reinforce divisive 
attitudes in the events leading to the 2007 general elections. 
 
Kalenjin Radios 
 
The interviews with Eldoret participants indicate that, prior to the 2007 general 
elections, historical land grievances dominated Kalenjin radios. This was articulated in 
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terms of the thorny historical relationship that characterize the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu 
groups that live in the Rift Valley. As discussed in Chapter one, historical resettlement 
schemes led to the relocation of some groups, mainly the Kikuyu, to various parts of the 
Rift Valley such as Nakuru and Naivasha. This came amid the need to create room for the 
White Settlers who occupied the fertile Highlands, previously inhabited by the Kikuyu 
and other groups. 
These historical settlements were at the centre of debates, many of which were 
aired on Kalenjin radios. One of the arguments that surfaced during the interviews is the 
notion that the first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, acquired large parcels of land in 
Rift Valley following the end of colonial rule, and disbursed most of it to the Kikuyu 
community to which he belonged. Although there are other groups such as the Luo and 
Luhya who worked on the farms, and acquired land in Rift Valley, the latter did not 
appear to cause uproar in Kalenjin radio rhetoric.  
The negotiation of the Kikuyu-Kalenjin relationship took the form of “foreign-
indigenous” discourse. In the process, the narratives of “stolen ancestral lands” 
dominated the Kalenjin airwaves suggesting that the Kikuyu who lived in Rift Valley 
illegally occupied Kalenjins’ ancestral lands, and the plight to recapture the supposed 
stolen lands. The interviews also indicated that the majority of radio presenters in the 
region provided ODM party members with more time on-air than their PNU counterparts. 
The interviews during phone-in and talk shows programs were often conducted 
with politicians affiliated to the ODM party. Central to these talks was the Majimbo54 
Constitution, which generated a lot of confusion amongst the residents of Rift Valley. 
                                                
54 Majimbo is a Swahili word for regionalism or devolution.  
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The meaning of Majimbo was two twofold, and depended on whether the speakers 
supported ODM or PNU as a political party.  
On the one hand, the meaning of Majimbo was associated with land reforms in the 
1990s that generated social unrest in the Rift Valley. This caused panic and fear among 
different groups living in the Rift Valley. According to the interviews, politicians who 
pushed for Kibaki’s re-election bid, such as the retired President Daniel Arap Moi, 
perpetrated this view. In the process, the ODM party that campaigned on Majimbo 
Constitution was painted as a vehicle by which intergroup violence and internal 
displacement would be encouraged.  
On the other hand, Majimbo was articulated in terms of devolution of national 
resources to the regional level. This position was mainly held by those who supported the 
ODM party, suggesting that centralized governance was the root cause of economic 
disparity between groups in Kenya. The key figure in this regard was William Ruto, a 
“junior” Kalenjin politician who emerged as the new Kalenjin symbol of hope, and this, 
despite Moi’s plight to belittle his campaigns on ODM’s ticket. The majority of the 
Kalenjin radios thus focused Ruto’s campaign and the “fight” between him and the 
retired Head of State (Moi) to control the Kalenjin dynasty. The conflicting discourses 
emanating from the proponents of different political parties added to the ambiguity that 
surrounded the Majimbo debates.  
Apart from political fights, opinion polls conducted mainly by Steadman 
Research and Infotrack also dominated the Kalenjin airwaves. According to the 
interviews, the polls indicated a strong support for Odinga’s ODM in the Rift Valley as 
well as nationally. The majority of radio audiences thus believed that ODM was bound to 
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win the 2007 general elections, and that it was unlikely for the Odinga team to lose unless 
the votes were rigged. The rhetoric of vote rigging thus became central to the radio 
debates. Whether this was true or not, it had different ramifications on the perceptions of 
Kalenjin voters who were about to head to the ballot.  
Popular and traditional Kalenjin songs were also carefully intertwined within call-
in programs, as interludes and signature tunes, to reinforce pre-established intergroup 
categorizations. Most of the songs were used during the sessions presided by the Kalenjin 
Council of Elders. In this light, the song Rift Valley (in Kalenjin) by Keiyo Stars Band 
that calls the Kalenjin community to “guard and protect Rift Valley from being invaded 
by wild beasts” dominated the Kalenjin radios. The song enlists the groups forming the 
Kalenjin family and integrates the Maasai and Turkana as part of the larger “Rift Valley 
Family”.  Other major groups living in Rift Valley such as the Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo 
are omitted. Respondents believe that such songs resonated with the Kalenjin group 
mainly because of the territorial insecurity characterizing the inhabitants of the Rift 
Valley.  
It appears that the pre-conflict narratives were fragmented along historical 
grievances. Land and territorial insecurity remained the force within which the Kalenjin 
identity was negotiated. In the process, the radios served to purport intergroup 
categorization based not only on the kinds of people they interviewed, but also on the 
songs they played. This served to shape voters’ opinions with regard to in-group and out-
group members in the period leading to the 2007 general elections, with ODM party and 
their affiliates becoming the key beneficiaries of these kinds of discourses.  
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Luo Radios 
 
Unlike in Eldoret where territorial insecurity dominated the Kalenjin radio 
airwaves, Luo radios seem to have focused on Odinga’s (then ODM flag bearer) political 
profile and personality while branding him as a Luo political enigma55 with an 
inconceivable national command. According to the interviews, Luo radios depicted 
Odinga as a revolutionist who has risked his life to oversee democratic reforms in Kenya. 
This negotiation took historical perspectives characterizing the thorny relationships that 
characterized the Luo and Kikuyu since Kenya’s independence in 1963. 
On the one hand, Odinga’s ODM was framed as a revolutionizing party likely to 
promote equal opportunity, supposedly because Odinga has a long history of political 
reforms since he joined the politics. This focus shifted the spotlight from ODM as a 
political party to Odinga’s persona. Much emphasis was put on the struggles that Odinga 
had gone through in his political career, claiming that he was worth becoming Kenya’s 
next president by virtue of the alleged reforms. ODM party was thus equated with Oginga 
as a person, a frame that might have weakened ODM’s messages in Kisumu but 
strengthened Odinga’s presidential bid based on his popularity.   
                                                
55According to the interviews, Odinga has a strong command of the Luo community since the passing of his 
father who is believed to have enjoyed the same kind of support from the community. This personality is 
also attributed to him given his past detentions while fighting for multiparty democracy in the former 
president Moi’s predominant one-party state. His first detention was in 1982 when he was charged with 
treason and put in prison for six years for allegedly plotting a foiled coup against the former Head of State, 
Daniel Arap Moi. He was also re-arrested in 1988 and 1990 for supposedly collaborating with advocacy 
groups that questioned Moi’s dictatorship and suppression of politically dissenting views. Odinga’s 
consistent opposition to government’s politics has given him various images, ranging from communist to 
radical. This is also reflected in the kinds of nicknames that have been given to him over the years – 
“Agwambo” (Luo word for mystery or enigma), “Tinga” (Luo word for farm tractor – implying that he can 
handle anything and everything). 
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On the other hand, Odinga’s presidential bid was often associated with the 
footprints of his late father’s determination and dream56 that remained unfulfilled until his 
passing in 1994 after a short illness. The Odinga family has been very influential in Luo 
politics, and one of the key pillars in Kenya’s post-independence opposition politics. 
While Odinga’s father was praised as an emblematic figure in Kenya’s “First Liberation,” 
Odinga the son, was now hailed as an advocate of the “Fourth Liberation,” often 
associated with youth’s deliberation and empowerment. The interviews also indicated 
that historical grievances that characterized the government of Jomo Kenyatta (first 
president of Kenya) and his then-vice president, Oginga Odinga, became key angles of 
news analysis in the Luo radios.  
The underlying assumption in this regard was the supposed political supremacy 
between the Luo and Kikuyu groups. Phone-in programs were often geared towards the 
divisions that reign within the two communities in terms of power relations. PNU was 
framed as a “Kikuyu party”, often linked to affluent political elites within the Kikuyu 
community, while ODM rebranded as the party representing the non-Kikuyus. In a 
similar vein, Kibaki’s accession to presidency in 2002, that ended Moi’s 24-year rule, 
was now linked to Odinga’s Kibaki Tosha (Kibaki is fit) campaign slogan believed to 
have generated support for Kibaki in 2002, especially among the Luo community.  
Odinga’s support for Kibaki in 2002 is believed to have been based on the fact 
that Kibaki promised to deliver a new Constitution during his presidency to address 
                                                
56Odinga’s father, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, was a Luo elder and one of the few prominent freedom 
fighters in the periods leading to Kenya’s Independence from the British. After independence in 1963 and 
the swearing in of Jomo Kenyatta as Kenya’s first president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga also became 
Kenya’s first vice-president. Given his outspoken personally and divisions that emerged between him and 
Kenyatta, he was detained for two years after which he was only able to return to politics following the 
death of Kenyatta in 1978. His return to politics was marked by struggles for multiparty politics during 
Moi’s reign, in which political dissent was unlawful. He created and involved in various parties where he 
unsuccessfully vied for presidency until his death in 1994. 
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presumed violation of executive powers and fraudulent activities that characterized the 
previous regime. Equally, Kibaki and Odinga signed a memorandum of understanding to 
see the creation of the Premiers position that was to go to Raila Odinga. This did not 
happen during Kibaki’s first term as promised. Instead, it is believed that politicians close 
to Kibaki dismissed the idea of amending the Constitution since Kibaki had different 
policies compared to those of his predecessors. The failed promise became a sore point 
between Odinga and Kibaki, with radios framing the issue as a betrayal of the Luo by the 
Kikuyu. My interview with Patrick, a tailor in Kisumu, puts this into perspective: 
[…] There was a sense of betrayal from the Kikuyu once Kibaki became president 
in 2002. When Odinga campaigned so hard for him in 2002, Kikuyu and Luos 
were best friends. Once they [Kikuyu] got what they wanted, they decided to turn 
their backs from the people and disregarded what Odinga and other politicians 
campaigned for. […] It was normal for the Luo voters to be reminded about what 
happened in 2002 so that they are not fooled again.  
 
Central to the radio debates were also the perceptions of foul play by the 
incumbent Kibaki who, prior to the 2007 general elections, decided to appoint the 
majority (19 out of 22) of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) without consulting 
the opposition, contradicting what Kibaki himself had campaigned for prior to succeeding 
Moi in 2002. The underlying argument raised by the callers was that in 1997, KANU (the 
then-ruling party) and the opposition had agreed to share the appointments equally.  
Kibaki’s government was thus associated with corruption and mischief. 
In the same perspective, the economic successes of the majority of the Kikuyu 
group were framed in terms of corruption and marginalization of other groups within 
Kibaki-led government. The radios alleged that, similar to Kenyatta’s government (1963-
1978), Kibaki’s regime provided the Kikuyu group with more opportunities compared to 
other groups. Odinga-led ODM was thus cast as a vehicle by which equal opportunities 
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would be observed. This was backed by the fact that he is the elected Member of 
Parliament (MP) representing Nairobi’s Lang’ata Constituency, which includes Kibera 
slum, one of Kenya’s biggest low-income areas inhabited by unemployed youths.  
The narratives about the soaring youth unemployment were coiled with a youth-
led campaign, Vijana Tugutuke Ni Time Yetu, colloquial Swahili for  “wake up youths it 
is our time”. Although the campaign was organized by a coalition of non-governmental 
organizations at the national level, Luo radios integrated some of the campaign slogans 
within their programs in a manner that suggested that Kibaki’s government had failed to 
address the worrying youth unemployment. 
Equally, the radios focused on the discourses perpetrated by the Luo Council of 
Elders (LCE) and their views on Luo votes. Abila, a talk show program aired on Ramogi 
FM and Radio Lake Victoria, created the platform through which the supposed elders 
enlightened the Luos on the political aspirations of the community. While some of the 
talks centred on historical grievances between communities, they also emphasized the 
need for the Luo group to vote as a block for the Odinga-led ODM party.  
Luo traditional songs, often depicting Odinga as a revolutionary selfless hero 
representing the poor Kenyans, accompanied most of these talk shows. Songs by militant 
and influential Luo artists such as Toni Nyadundo, Onyi Papa Jey, and Osogo Winyo 
dominated the Luo radio airwaves. For instance, the songs Raila Igalagala (Raila is 
sturdy) and Wadinonu (You’ve been cornered) by Toni Nyadundo alleged that ODM had 
already amassed the support it needed to block Kibaki’s re-election. The songs created an 
atmosphere of celebration within the Luo community while the campaigns were still 
underway. The meaning and symbolic imagination that the songs brought to light prior to 
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elections were rife with critical messages about the Kikuyu and the alleged killings of the 
Luo politicians by previous governments.  
Unlike in Eldoret where the narratives of territorial insecurity characterized the 
tensions amongst the residents of the Rift Valley, the interviews in Kisumu pointed out 
that the discourse surrounding the struggles for political supremacy dominated the 
airwaves. The Luo were also painted as marginalized groups within the presumed 
Kikuyu-dominated government. 
 
Kikuyu Radios 
 
While the Kalenjin and Luo radios seemed to direct their attacks against the 
Kibaki-led PNU party, the narratives of the Kikuyu radios seemed to counter the attacks 
by painting ODM as an opportunist party rooted on ethnic bigotry and personal interests. 
As such, territorial insecurity and struggles for political supremacy were all embraced as 
angles of news analyses by the Kikuyu radios, but with a different approach. 
While the discourse on territorial insecurity was characterized by the Kalenjin 
radios in terms of “foreign occupation”, Kikuyu radios articulated the same issue in terms 
of planned attacks, creating a sense of fear and panic among the members of the Kikuyu 
community. Debates around Majimboism thus predominated the airwaves, with the latter 
linked to clashes that emerged in the Rift Valley in the 1990s.  
Kikuyu talk shows and phone-in programs dismissed ODM’s Majimbo suggesting 
that it was likely to foment targeted-inter-ethnic conflicts under the guise of federalism. 
The underlying assumption is that the ODM party, now narrowed to a Luo-Kalenjin 
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party, was exploiting deep-seated land grievances to amass support within the Rift Valley 
while putting other communities at risk of planned attacks. The relationship between the 
Kalenjin and Kikuyu were articulated along these lines. 
Historical rivalries between the Kikuyu and Luo groups also surfaced within the 
narratives of the Kikuyu radios to provide angles of interpretation with regard to Odinga-
Kibaki campaigns. ODM’s manifesto was equated with Odinga’s struggles to become 
Kenya’s president in vain, most of which borrowed from the historical ethnic rivalries 
between the Luo and the Kikuyu. The split between Jomo Kenyatta (first president, 
Kikuyu) and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (first vice-president, Luo) was also evoked to 
contextualize the deteriorating relationship between the two groups.  
At the centre of the Kikuyu radio narratives was also a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) that was reportedly signed by ODM and the Muslim community, 
claiming that the agreement was partly aimed at adopting Sharia Law (Islamic law) in the 
predominantly Muslim provinces of Kenya, such as Coastal and North Eastern. The 
interviews indicated that the majority of the guests who were invited during the MoU 
talks were mainly the Bishops and Church leaders from the Kikuyu community to 
disclaim the alleged pact, while suggesting that ODM leadership would threaten Kenya’s 
predominant Christian faith. In the process, Odinga’s Christian faith was also questioned.  
Furthermore, fears that Odinga’s presidency would mirror that of the former 
Uganda’s dictator, Idi Amin, also dominated the airwaves. The parallel between Odinga 
and Idi Amin was often used to suggest that Odinga was, by nature, a dictator who could 
not be trusted with the governance of the state.  Similarly, cultural differences between 
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the Luo and Kikuyu groups such as the notion of circumcision and the passage to 
adulthood were also used to represent Odinga’s personality in a negative light.  
Some callers claimed that an uncircumcised leader could not lead the nation, 
possibly alleging that Odinga’s leadership would be a shame to the country given that his 
community did not routinely practice circumcision. Phone-in programs moderated by 
different radio hosts and eminent personalities within the Kikuyu Council of Elders 
(KCE) seem to be the basis from which cultural-based attacks emanated. Most of the 
attacks belittled Odinga’s imagined personality as well as his presidential ambitions. 
Kibaki’s progressive economic record was also at the centre of radio debates. 
Unlike the Luo and Kalenjin radios that focused on youth unemployment supposedly 
under Kibaki’s watch, Kikuyu radios emphasized the 5-6% national economic growth 
that Kenya recorded in the first years of Kibaki’s government. Interviews with affluent 
businesspersons who praised Kibaki’s government dominated the airwaves, alluding that 
Kenya’s economy was on the brink of collapsing, following Moi’s (Kibaki’s predecessor) 
presumed mismanagement of public funds.  
The radios thus emphasized Kazi Inendelee (Let the work continue), a campaign 
slogan by the Kibaki re-election camp that dismissed all the allegations about 
disproportional resource allocations. Constituency Development Funds (CDF) and free 
primary education (including plans for free secondary education), all of which were 
initiated by the Kibaki regime, were hailed as Kibaki’s positive economic indicators.  
While Kikuyu traditional songs were also used as signature tunes and interludes, 
most of them did not appear to praise Kibaki’s persona or his political career, rather, they 
focused on the oath of honour to the Kikuyu politics and way of life. Some songs 
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suggested a strong alliance of the groups representing the GEMA57 community and their 
plight to remain united despite episodic political disturbances. Christian and gospel songs 
also dominated the Kikuyu radios. This played on the emotions of the Kikuyu as a group, 
creating a feeling of solidarity, as many already believed that they were prime targets in 
the period leading to the 2007 general elections. The songs by leading Kikuyu artists such 
as Muigai Wa Njoroge, Ben Githae, Lucy Muthumbi and Sarah Mbogo were among the 
most played.  
In general, it appears that the discourses adopted by the Kikuyu radios to 
negotiate intergroup relations prior to the 2007 general elections were also 
disproportionate, just like those that stemmed from the Kalejin and Luo radios. While 
land and territorial insecurity became the symbolic label of the Kikuyu-Kalenjin 
contentions, the Luo-Kikuyu disputes were negotiated in terms of power and political 
supremacy, with Odinga’s candidacy being narrowed to “Luo militancy” and an 
“oppositional career.” In the process, the ODM party was associated with arrogance and 
violence.  
 
5.4.2. Dominant Frames During the Violent Conflicts 
 
While the pre-conflict frames centred on historical contingencies such as the 
contentious land ownership and political alienation, the period characterized by the active 
conflict (violent) was framed in terms of intergroup mutilation and cross-victimization. 
The previous angles of news analysis shifted from electoral discourse to embrace 
                                                
57 GEMA is term used to describe the three-member (Gikuyu, Embu and Meru) community association that 
was created between 1960 and 1970 by various politicians from Central province to mobilize support for 
the Kikuyu communities that were resettled in parts of the Rift Valley during colonial period.  
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ethnicity. In the process, historically situated claims and perceptions with regard to 
intergroup relations were transformed into the narratives of groups’ survival such as 
invasion and eviction, attacks and counterattacks, and rebellion and revolt.  
 
Kalenjin Radios  
 
When asked about the kinds of issues that dominated the Kalenjin radios during 
the active (violent) conflict, respondents from Eldoret indicated that the narratives around 
land requisition remained prevalent. That is, the Kalenjin radios sustained their portrayal 
of the Kikuyu as “foreigners” inhabiting Kalenjin “ancestral lands.” As a result, call-in 
programs seemed to be bombarded with calls to clear and protect the perceived Kalenjin 
territories from “invaders,” who, supposedly had contributed to the shortage of lands and 
overpopulation in the Rift Valley.  
This incited some of the Kalenjin youths to take to the streets to contest the 
electoral results that gave Kibaki a second term, a move that was now interpreted as 
PNU’s plot to abort the supposed plight of the Kalenjins vis-à-vis land claims. Although 
land claims were still at the forefront of the debates, the violent conflicts that culminated 
into targeted attacks were now justified on the grounds of vote rigging, with PNU 
supporters regarded as the primary triggers of the mayhem.  
At the same time, the discourses of suppression by the Kibaki government were 
emphasized, giving the impression that the that the government had not only failed to 
address the electoral discrepancies that had sparked the violence, but it had supposedly 
directed the police to target the alleged ODM strongholds, especially Eldoret, Kisumu 
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and Nairobi’s Kibera slums. My interview with Mary, who runs a grocery store in 
Eldoret, puts this into perspective: 
When the news broke out, I was following the elections over the radio because I 
couldn’t watch TV and attend to my clients at the same time. I don’t know if it 
was through Kass FM or Chamgei FM, but I remember hearing about some 
callers saying that the police that had been transported in our villages even before 
the results were announced. They [callers] said that some of the police were also 
transported to Kisumu. Why is it that the police were not sent to interfere with the 
Central people? I think the government already knew that it rigged the elections 
and the people from these areas were not going to accept the outcome. 
 
Equally, there were allegations that a “gang” associated with the Kikuyu youth 
identified as Mungiki, organized retaliatory attacks within the Rift Valley, killing mainly 
the Luos and Kalenjins whom they linked to the attacks on the Kikuyu group. The attacks 
and the counterattacks increased the intensity of the conflicts especially in the Rift 
Valley. My interview with one of the radio journalists at Kass FM provided deep insights 
on how journalists of different vernacular radios struggled with their editorial focus 
during the violent conflicts. 
The violence we witnessed in Rift Valley is by far one of the defining moments of 
my journalism career. As a journalist, we are normally trained to be objective in 
news reports at all times, but when you see your relatives or cousins being 
slaughtered or shot in front of you, it becomes very difficult to remain objective 
[…] I feel that it was normal for our news team to refocus the news content in a 
manner that our people would become aware of what was on their backyards so 
that they can be well prepared to fight back. […] Although we were advised not to 
take sides on-air, callers who vowed to retaliate the attacks or called upon the 
community to get out and protect their territories from being invaded by these 
gangs [Mungiki] were given more airtime so that their messages could be heard. 
Did you expect us to sit back and watch our people being butchered? Our message 
was clear, the Kalenjin had to protect themselves from these forms of this 
brutality. 
 
Whether the allegations raised above were a fallacy or not, it appears that the 
majority of the Kalenjin radios framed the conflicts in terms of invasion and the right to 
protect one’s self. This might have reinforced a sense of insecurity, leading to the 
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intimidation and attacks on other groups perceived as PNU proponents, mainly the 
Kikuyu. Finger pointing and victimization became the central narrative within which the 
violence and the group’s survival were justified in most of the Kalenjin radios.  
 
Luo Radios 
 
In Kisumu, the violence was justified on the basis of a “stolen victory.” Just like 
Kalenjin radios, call-in programs predominately suggested that the Luos were victims of 
the government’s maltreatment, and that the community had to keep up the fight to 
protest their supposed “stolen victory.” In the process, PNU supporters were sidelined as 
the primary beneficiaries of the rigged elections, and by extension, of the fraudulent 
government that was now discredited. ODM supporters were thus called upon to reject 
the results and maintain the pressure towards the government with the hope that the 
Kibaki would step down to allow a recount of the votes.  
The discourses on vote manipulation were often backed by the opinion polls that 
had previously shown Odinga as a consistent frontrunner until the official results of the 
2007 general elections showed otherwise. The radios also emphasized the results that 
were independently reported by various newsrooms that placed Odinga ahead of Kibaki 
in the majority of polling stations. In this sense, Luo radios created a strong belief that the 
elections were fraudulent, and that Kisumu voters who backed Odinga’s candidacy had to 
reclaim their victory. Joshua, a real-estate agent in Kisumu, recollects his memories on 
the moments the violence broke out in Kisumu and the confusion that reigned amongst 
Kisumu residents: 
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Kisumu voted for Raila and the surveys also indicated that Raila was the clear 
frontrunner even during the actual vote tallying. […] A day before the release of 
the official results, there was confusion all over, with contradictory messages 
coming from different journalists. At one point, we hear that Raila had been 
declared the winner, the next minute we hear that it is actually Kibaki who took it. 
This is what sparked anger and violence against the PNU members. Everyone 
went to vote in peace and they started playing around with people’s will. […] You 
don’t expect us to keep quiet and let go our hard-earned victory. It is like stepping 
on a snake expecting it not to bite back.  
 
In a similar vein, it was alleged that the government had implanted the police 
force in Kisumu prior to the announcement of the official results, subjecting the residents 
to police curfew. Whether the assumptions were valid or not, they served to create panic 
among the residents of Kisumu. Moreover, fear and panic also extended to Nairobi’s 
Kibera slum, which hosts a sizable proportion of the Luo group. Similarly, callers who 
feared for the arrest of the ODM leader also circulated false rumours about Odinga’s 
arrest, adding to the violence towards PNU supporters in Kisumu.  
Equally dominant were the allegations that affluent Kikuyu elites within Kibaki’s 
government had sponsored the Mungiki mercenaries to carry out the counterattacks 
against ODM supports. The interviews indicated that Naivasha and Nakuru towns of the 
Rift Valley, where the Kikuyu are the majority group, were reported as hubs from where 
the outlawed Mungiki group directed their attacks towards ODM supporters who were 
narrowed to the Luo, Kalenjin and Luhya groups.  
In general, the interviews pointed out that during the violent conflicts, Luo radios 
reinforced the perception that the elections were rigged, and that it was necessary to 
reclaim the “stolen victory”. The narratives of victimization with an emphasis on police 
mistreatments became the main angles of news analysis.  
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In the processes, PNU supporters were sidelined as the key perpetrators of the 
alleged attacks, a factor that sheds light on the patterns of the attacks and counterattacks. 
Equally, the radios also strengthened the perception that the conflicts were not primarily 
mayhem between the Luo and the Kikuyu, but rather Kikuyu versus the “rest of 
Kenyans.”  
 
Kikuyu Radios 
 
Given the magnitude of the violence that rocked the Rift Valley, in which the 
Kikuyu seemed to be the target group, some Kikuyu radios adopted narratives of self-
defence. In this light, the Eldoret church incident58 became the central element in 
justifying retaliatory attacks in the Rift Valley.  
The Kikuyu radios rejected the allegations about vote rigging that seemed to have 
spread all over the country. Many of the debates suggested that Raila Odinga was a 
radical politician who would not concede defeat for personal interests. As such, PNU and 
its supporters were encouraged not to give up their fight to make sure that PNU retained 
power. The callers claimed that PNU rightfully won the elections and that Kibaki had no 
reason to succumb to the pressure from the opposition.  
Just like the Kalenjin and Luo radios, Kikuyu radios embodied the narratives of 
cross-victimization and the right to “self-defence”, alleging planned attacks on the 
members of the Kikuyu group. The attacks were often articulated in parallel with 
Rwanda’s genocide to supposedly awaken the Kikuyus elsewhere in the country in the 
                                                
58 During the violence in Eldoret some individuals believed to be members of the Kikuyu group were found 
burned to death while seeking refuge inside a church building.  
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event of further attacks. The underlying assumption was the fear of decimation by the 
alleged “gangs of Kalenjin warriors”. Ethnic cleansing, massacre, genocide, and civil war 
were among the commonly used frames to characterize the perceived atrocities carried 
out against the Kikuyu group.  
Equally, the narratives of group solidarity dominated the phone-in programs, 
often accompanied by Christian and gospel songs to appease the victims of the violence. 
My interview with Margaret, a resident of Nyeri who lost a cousin during the violent 
outbreaks shared her perspectives on how vernacular radios played a significant role in 
ensuring solidarity among the Kikuyu community.   
The first time I heard about the violence, I didn’t know that my community was 
the one targeted. Properties and houses belonging to the Kikuyu people were 
being looted and burned down in Eldoret. All the radio stations that I usually 
listen to talked about us being killed around the country. At this point, I panicked 
a lot because my cousin and his family lived in Eldoret. […] The radios were very 
important because people were calling to console one another and to offer their 
support to those who were displaced from their homes in various parts of the Rift 
Valley.  
 
In essence, the findings suggest that the narratives of victimization and finger 
pointing, which served to reinforce rebellious attitudes among the Kikuyu community, 
characterized the violent conflict phase. This may have led to the attacks and 
counterattacks in the guise of self-defence.  
 
5.4.3. Post-conflict (violent) Frames 
 
Given the magnitude of the violence and the inability of the two rival parties to 
find a common ground, the international community and the civil society, notably the 
humanitarian organizations and church leaders, intervened in an attempt to quell the 
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crisis. At the same time, vernacular radios in the three locations shifted their narratives in 
a manner that renegotiated intergroup relations, with much emphasis put on the 
intergroup cross-dialogue and co-optation. This shift appeared to have transformed 
divisive and rebellious attitudes, witnessed prior and during violent conflicts, into 
collaborative attitudes between and amongst the warring parties.  
On the one hand, the negotiations between Odinga and Kibaki that were mediated 
by the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, were now conveyed 
through the radios as a means to contain the upheaval. This shifted the narratives from 
intergroup hostility and victimization to intergroup negotiations. Rather than highlighting 
the peak of the violence that traumatized and displaced hundreds of thousands from their 
homes, the focus was put on the press conferences held by both the PNU and the ODM 
delegates.  
An immediate outcome of the negotiations (two months after the announcement 
of the controversial results and subsequent violence) was a power-sharing deal between 
the two leaders in form of a “National Accord” that Odinga and Kibaki signed to oversee 
major political reforms that included the amendment of the Constitution. At the same 
time, phone-in programs were tailored towards the agreement and how the two leaders 
were to share the executive powers. This is because the centralized structure that 
exemplifies Kenya’s politics has always confined the executive powers to the incumbent 
president.  
In the process, efforts towards peace-building and intergroup reconciliation were 
facilitated by locally based organizations on multiple levels.  For instance, local 
musicians organized free concerts where they called on Kenyans to reunite and condemn 
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the violence that had claimed the lives of innocent citizens. This proved to be a sizable 
effort towards breaking communication barriers between various communities.  
As mentioned in Chapter one, music, comedy, soccer and worship are some of the 
common activities that seem to unite different communities irrespective of their cultural 
allegiances or regional attachment. By calling upon different groups to take part in the 
activities, the radios appeared to have played a critical role in bridging the 
communication gaps that had previously characterized various communities.  
One of the key voices that dominated the airwaves was that of Eric Wainaina, a 
well-known Kenyan artist whose songs are composed in English, Swahili and the major 
languages spoken in Kenya. One of his songs, Daima Mimi Mkenya (I will remain true to 
Kenya) became one of the emblematic songs played in many radios. Other nationalist-
driven songs were played repeatedly included: Kenya Nchi Yangu (Kenya My Country) 
by the late music veteran Kakai Kilonzo, which advocated for unity among Kenyans, 
Wakenya Pamoja (united as Kenyans), a song that was composed and sang by a coalition 
of popular Kenyan artists emanating from various communities.  
Rather than playing provocative songs as interludes or signature tunes, radio hosts 
appeared to choose songs that advocated peace and unity among all groups while 
appealing to Kenyans’ collective pride by reminding them that the images of the conflict 
jeopardized Safari tourism and the international marathon. The songs also recounted the 
colonial struggles that brought Kenya to independence while, at the same time, warning 
that the violence was in the process of reversing all progresses that had been made over 
the years.  
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Church leaders also organized mass rallies in their respective regions to 
encourage prayers for a country that was on the brink of a civil war, and whose stability 
laid in the hands of the two political rivals. The rallies were also aired live on various 
media across the country, including vernacular radios. Rather than emphasizing the 
contentious claims such as land ownership and struggles for political supremacy that had 
previously taken over the airwaves, radio talk shows were dominated by peace missions 
carried out by these groups. An informant from the National Council of Churches of 
Kenya said the following: 
Some of the tribal kingpins used the local language radios [vernacular radios] to 
advance their personal agendas while forgetting that Kenya does not belong to a 
group or to an individual. […] Although there are claims that some churches took 
sides during the conflicts, it was necessary for the Council of Churches to find 
ways in which it could indirectly take over the radio airwaves to divert the 
bitterness that had formed between communities. We had several meetings 
amongst us and agreed to arrange for interviews with various media around the 
country. This is why the majority of radios were dominated by religious programs 
so that we can pray for peace between communities.  
 
Media organizations also took initiatives to refocus the messages that were 
circulated within their affiliated radio outlets, especially in post-conflict reconstruction 
stages. Probably one of the success stories in this regard has been the The Churchill 
Show, a comic talk show presented by Daniel Ndambuki, a renowned Kenyan comedian 
who is also a radio and TV host. The show blends popular Kenyan songs with stand-up 
comedy to provide a forum for discussion on the key issues that continue to challenge 
peace initiatives as well as intergroup relations in Kenya.  
Not only does the show bring together some of the big names in Kenyan politics 
to embrace humour while discussing ways in which the country can avoid a repeat of the 
2007/08 conflicts, it also reunites the best artists in the Kenyan culture industry to 
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entertain the audiences. The Churchill Show has become a sensation for all age groups 
irrespective of their backgrounds, as it covers, in a comic manner, the sore points of the 
perceived differences that tore the country apart in the events leading to the 2007/08 
disturbances. This is partly because it is highly mediatised, even through vernacular 
radios, to reach diverse populations. The show is produced to encourage peaceful co-
existence between groups, through comedy and music, giving new hopes to redress 
political opportunism and intergroup mutilation, ahead of the next general elections that 
are looming.  
Fundamentally, post-conflict frames were tailored around transformative 
relationships between groups. Unlike the pre-conflict and active (violent) conflict stages, 
where intergroup differentiation was emphasized, post-conflict transformation frames 
were more collaborative. Radio narratives in the three locations appeared to convey 
peaceful messages that did cut across the perceived differences.  In the process, 
previously held perceptions on vernacular radios as a liability in the conflict also 
changed, a shift that could be attributed to various factors such as the editorial influence. 
They were now regarded as viable assets in conflict management as they helped contain 
the violence from transforming into a civil war.  
Despite their language of broadcast, nationalistic characterization was at the 
centre of all radio narratives. This highlights the fact that shifting radio discourses are 
likely to determine the patterns of a latent or an ongoing conflict. They can close or open 
new spaces for various claims to manifest themselves, especially in situations of stiff 
intergroup competition. In this case, vernacular radios serve neither as the cause nor the 
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effect of conflicts, but a vehicle through which claims are idealised to match the 
expectations or appeals of the groups served. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presented the findings of this research, which focused on the 
demographic information of participants, the patterns of vernacular radio listenership, the 
factors linked to vernacular radio listening, and the narratives relative to the framing of 
intergroup claims prior, during and after the 2007/08 violent conflicts. 
With regard to demographic information, the study found that male participants 
were more open to talk about political issues than women respondents. This explains why 
the majority of participants were male. A sizable proportion of participants were also 
between the ages 24 and 41. Equally, 60% of participants (excluding key participants) did 
not identify themselves as white-collar workers, a factor that may explain the salience of 
the narratives relating to unemployment. 
Concerning the patterns of vernacular radio listenership, the study found that 
access and ownership of radio devices were widespread across all the target groups. Only 
a fraction (6%) of those interviewed did not own a radio device. The findings also 
illustrated that Kikuyu’s Coro FM (39%), Kalenjin’s Kass FM (61%) and Luo’s Ramogi 
FM (52%) were the dominant radios tuned to by the respondents in Nyeri, Eldoret and 
Kisumu respectively. Although vernacular radios were regarded as important and reliable 
sources of information, many respondents also used other media to complement the 
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information they gathered through vernacular radios. For example, 80% listened to the 
official-language radios as an alternative source of information.  
In line with the factors linked to vernacular radio listening, respondents indicated 
listening to vernacular radios for several reasons: information-seeking, socio-cultural 
connectedness, economic and developmental familiarity, political positioning and 
educational awareness. More emphasis was put on the fact that vernacular radios served 
to maintain cultural diversity, which is characteristic of the Kenyan population. 
With respect to the framing of intergroup claims prior, during and after the 
2007/08 violent conflicts, the interviews indicated an erratic pattern of frames at different 
stages of the conflict. Prior to the conflicts, Kalenjin, Luo and Kikuyu radios framed the 
conflict in terms of historical contingencies that previously shaped people’s perception of 
intergroup relations. This transformed into the narratives of intergroup deformity, while 
creating fear and despair among different groups in the period leading to the 2007 general 
elections. In this period, divisive attitudes were at the forefront of vernacular radio 
narratives. 
During the violent conflicts, the narratives shifted from intergroup mutilation to 
embrace the discourses of survival and the right to self-defence. In this period, the radios 
appeared to perpetuate the assumption that the groups they served were the primary 
targets of various kinds of oppression. This transformed into the narratives of cross-
victimization and finger pointing. Each group was a victim of something: government 
mistreatment (Luo radios), “foreign” invasion (Kalenjin radios) and planned eviction 
(Kikuyu radios). This served to reinforce rebellious attitudes between and amongst 
different constituents. 
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After the violent conflicts (conflict transformation stage), the radios shifted their 
narratives to embrace the discourses of cross-dialogue and peace, often highlighting the 
mediation processes that were underway. Rather than emphasizing the contentious issues 
such as land ownership and power incongruity, the radios focused on the activities 
organized by the local and international organizations to facilitate peace and the 
negotiation processes that were in progress. As such, intergroup characterization took the 
form of unity, solidarity and the observation of shared civic ideals. This reinforced 
collaborative attitudes between different actors.  
The next chapter discusses the results of the study in relation to the research 
questions initially formulated.  
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CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter, I conduct a cross analysis of the fieldwork findings and 
documentary research to discuss the variables that helped answer my research questions, 
which were as follows: Why (searching for motives) and how (relative to conditions) did 
the 2007/08 conflicts shift from electoral discourse to embrace ethnicity? How do 
Kenya’s vernacular radios accommodate and/or negotiate intergroup claims in situations 
of competition and/or conflict? What makes different groups choose to act according to 
the prompts of ethnic allegiances? 
As explained in the previous chapters, the objective of this dissertation is not to 
develop a model for conflict resolution, as conflicts are situational and context-based, or 
to downplay the centrality of ethnic particularism in the events of the 2007/08 conflicts, 
but rather to explore and map out the dominant discourses that surrounded the 
accommodation of intergroup claims in the events leading to this particular conflict. In 
this light, the study also aimed at: a) mapping out the patterns of vernacular radio 
listenership in the three locations of research; b) determining the dominant vernacular 
radio stations; and c) finding out why vernacular radio listenership is important in the 
lives of those interviewed. 
I start the chapter by discussing the significance of vernacular radios in different 
contexts, and then I look at the accommodation of intergroup claims during the events 
leading to the 2007/08 conflicts. The last section explains the shifts in media frames and 
how they influenced intergroup accommodation at different stages of conflict.  
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6.1. Significance of Vernacular Radios in Kenya 
 
The findings highlight the centrality of vernacular radios in the lives of the 
study’s participants. In general, radio still has the widest geographical reach in Kenya, 
with about 80% of the population still relying on it as a source of information. Not only 
does this position radio as a viable medium of communication in Kenya, but also as a 
suitable tool in conflict transformation, given the fact that radio has the highest number of 
audiences compared to other media such as TV, newspapers and the Internet.  
The majority of vernacular radios are privately owned and most of their programs 
are commercial oriented. Perhaps the Royal Media Services, a private company that runs 
about 12 radios broadcasting in different ethno-regional languages, serves as an example. 
Although the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) also has radio 
programs offered in the major vernacular languages, privately owned vernacular radios 
appear to have a sizeable following in all the locations of the study. Trust in news content 
was the main factor associated with the low audience of the state-owned vernacular radio 
services. Nonetheless, Coro FM, a state-owned vernacular radio broadcasting in Kikuyu 
language, had a substantial following in Central Province where Nyeri, one of my 
research sites, is located.  
One of the greatest advantages of radio was linked to the fact that it can be tuned 
to while performing other activities and moved around from one location to the other 
because it is portable. In the process, people can entertain themselves, follow news or 
seek information relating to what is happening around them on a daily basis, whether on 
sports, religion, health, farming, cooking, relationships, marriages, etc. Other advantages 
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that radio had over other media were associated with the cost, accessibility, and the oral 
nature of radio as a medium of communication.  
In terms of broadcast formats, drama, music, comedy, lectures, talk-shows, studio 
discussions, and phone-in programs were some of the formats used by vernacular radio 
programmers to disseminate different kinds of information. The blend between some of 
these formats appeared to be very influential because they attract many listeners. For 
instance, respondents indicated that when health-related programs are produced in comic 
formats and engaging music, they are more likely to attract huge audiences (mainly the 
youth) compared to long interviews conducted with heath experts.  
The findings on listenership patterns indicate that vernacular radios have a strong 
following in the regions they serve, affirming the assumptions that media audiences are 
likely to select and use the media that fulfil their needs or expectations (Rubin, 2002; 
Ronsengren, 1974; Gripsrud, 2002). This was associated with the language of broadcast 
and the appropriation of news content in a manner that resonated with the values and 
expectations of the groups served. Access and ownership of radio devices were also 
widespread. Although 6% of those interviewed did not own a radio device, all 
respondents had access to at least one radio device, supporting the fact that radio still 
remains the most accessible medium of communication in Kenya. Indeed, radio-enabled 
cell phones played a central part in terms of widening radio accessibility.  
As developmental tools, vernacular radios served as a vehicle by which 
development-oriented information, such as farming practices, was channelled to different 
populations, especially in the rural areas where people often have a poor command of 
English and Swahili, which are the two official languages in Kenya. The findings indicate 
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that vernacular radios run different programs that target the groups they serve, most of 
which are structured in a manner that takes into account the social, economic and 
political characteristics of these groups.  
Culturally, vernacular radios serve to uphold Kenya’s diverse languages and 
cultural identities. As a social and cultural forum, vernacular radios provide their 
audiences with the means to maintain their cultural particularities by focusing on a 
group’s intrinsic values that were once passed on from community elders to the younger 
generation through storytelling. This may explain why some respondents found 
vernacular radios as suitable tools for communicating complex customary issues such as 
circumcision and how it reduces the chances of men to attract HIV virus, and cross-ethnic 
marriages and how they foster or challenge intergroup cohesion. Vernacular radios were 
regarded as the proper means by which such topics can be addressed, given the language 
and cultural proximity that these radios hold and the communities they serve. 
Vernacular radios are essential in reinforcing regional ideologies and politics. Not 
only do these radios privilege the “voices” of their own, as shown in the selection of 
people to interview during studio discussions, they also play politically-driven music that 
is likely to strengthen the ideologies they (programming and editorial board) believe 
resonate with the groups targeted. This is in line with the earlier studies on media and 
audience perceptions that implied that media messages pass through “filters” that give 
more meaning to news stories (Lazersfeld and Katz 1955; Katz 1980).  
One implication here, however, is that the supposed “filters” are further facilitated 
by the linguistic characteristics of vernacular radios that make it easy to use metaphoric 
characterizations to represent other political candidates in a negative light while 
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reinforcing the preconceived perceptions of intergroup relations. The power of vernacular 
music, in this perspective, is expected to build emotional support with regards to the 
kinds of ideologies advanced.  
Thus, the main challenge for vernacular radio content is the accommodation of 
intergroup claims in times of stiff competition or conflict. This means that the same 
programs and formats discussed above can also be appropriated in a negative light to 
generate intergroup polarization, especially in situations of intergroup competition. 
Consistent with earlier studies on propaganda circulation (Katz, 1980; Lasswell, 1971), 
this study found that vernacular radio messages also serve as a vehicle through which 
“communal” propaganda circulates to slant the group’s perception of “others” in 
situations of conflict. However, the same findings also suggest that the slant in the 
representation of the “cultural others” changes with the stages of a given conflict. 
The next section discusses some of the discourses that surrounded the 
accommodation of intergroup claims in the period characterized by the 2007/08 conflicts. 
 
6.2. Accommodating Intergroup Claims in Conflict Situations 
 
The findings suggest a high level of interdependence or intersectionality between 
five broad issues around which intergroup accommodation appeared to be grounded: 
cultural allegiances, political affiliations, economic pressures and territorial insecurity, 
all of which hinged on media categorization, referred to here as media frames (vernacular 
radio frames).  
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Using Figure 7 as an illustrative diagram, I indicate the recursive nature of these 
broad factors and discuss how they interact to aid sense-making processes in both covert 
and overt situations of conflict.  
 
6.2.1. Cultural Allegiances 
 
Cultural allegiance is used here to refer to the identity-based social categorization 
of various social groups. The categorization process can either be “internal” or “external” 
depending on one’s level of socio-cultural consciousness. Internal explanations of 
cultural allegiances are mainly concerned with how an individual sees him/herself within 
a given society; the selfhood. External explanations of cultural allegiances, on the other 
hand, hinge on how others see you; the personhood. In other words, how you see or 
portray yourself may not necessarily concord with how others see or portray you 
(Jenkins, 2004).  
The data gathered through documentary research indicate a strong emphasis on 
cultural allegiances, especially ethnicity, and how it influences socio-political processes 
in Kenya (Maina, 1995; Githongo, 2006; Kagwanja, 2003; Ndegwa, 1997; Osamba, 
2001). Recent studies that have examined the 2007/08 conflicts also centre on ethnic 
particularim and political opportunism as the primary causes of the 2007/08 upheaval 
(Makinen and Kuira, 2008; Kalyango, 2008, Jamal and Deane, 2008).  
While ethnicity is a relatively significant factor in explaining intergroup 
cohesiveness and/or polarization, the results of this study indicate an erratic pattern of the 
conflict, including the claims advanced by different communities as sore points of 
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intergroup relations. This serves to question the centrality of ethnicity per se as the 
starting point in conflict situations.  
 
Figure 7. Dimensions of intergroup accommodation during the 2007/08 conflicts 
 
 
 
As an episodic process and a form of group categorization, ethnicity only 
exemplified around the perceived elements of content and discontent such as land 
ownership, political associations, economic disturbances and the media’s representation 
of the candidates in a negative or a positive light. As such, ethnicity should be examined 
with the larger cultural structure explaining intergroup relations.  
Probably one of the key attempts to deviate from the “collective” approach, 
perceiving social conflicts as a unique product of ethnic categorization, is the study 
conducted by Somerville (2009), which critiques the coverage of the 2007/08 conflicts by 
the British newspapers. He argues that the emphasis on ethnicity by the British 
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newspapers overshadowed efforts toward a constructive understanding of the 2007/08 
conflicts. Hall (1997) also points out that ethnicity itself is a matter of signifying 
practices that are situational, depending on one’s conditions (cultural, social, economic, 
political, religious…) and perception of self; the selfhood and the personhood. 
Understanding this intricate interrelationship between the two forces of identity is 
a major step towards unpacking the discourses embraced by different vernacular radios to 
categorize intergroup relations as the 2007/08 conflicts unfolded. As explained in the 
previous chapters, there are about 42 ethno-linguistic groups in Kenya, meaning that 
mutual understanding between the groups is only possible when national languages, 
English and Kiswahili, are used. However, not everyone speaks or understands these 
languages.  
This is why vernacular radios are important in the lives of many Kenyans. They 
are an important means through which distinct socio-cultural groups satisfy their 
respective needs related to language and cultural heritage. This supports recent studies 
suggesting that media audiences are likely to incline towards the media that mirror their 
imagined social, political and cultural values, especially in competitive situations such as 
elections (Entman, 2010; Matthes, 2012; Mellor, 2009; Avraham and First, 2010; 
Consalvi, 2010; Onguny, 2012). This may explain why some respondents perceived 
vernacular radios as a “replacement” of the cultural elders whose mandate was to educate 
communities on issues of culture.  
If ethnicity appeared to be one way of giving meaning to the deteriorating 
relations between groups in the period leading to the conflicts, it is because the ethno-
linguistic fragmentation of the Kenyan people continues to create an environment where 
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cultural differences such as ethnicity, language, religion, ancestry, and blood kinship still 
serve as pathways through which people make sense of power relations and social 
processes. In this view, the negotiation of power relations between groups may partly 
explain the shifting discourses that characterized vernacular radio narratives prior, during 
and after the violent conflicts. In the process, ethnicity serves as a vehicle by which 
power is vested and negotiated along the lines of cultural allegiances. 
By taking a close look at the historical power relations that have exemplified 
intergroup relations in Kenya, one may comprehend why cultural allegiances, within 
which ethnicity is potent, are regarded as the main building blocks of intergroup 
relations. This is because they have served to cement certain perceptions with regard to 
intergroup categorization as well as the sense of self.  This reinforces the perception that 
in states that were previously under colonial rule, ethnic categorization has served as a 
principle of political solidarity and mobilization in situations of conflict (Ndegwa, 1997; 
Osamba, 2001; Muigai, 1995; Kagwanja, 2003; Gacheru, 2005; Brown, 2004). 
This suggests that various groups are likely to act according to the prompts of 
cultural allegiances such as ethnicity when faced with situations of intergroup 
competition and conflict. The negotiation of group relations, in this perspective, hinges 
on the creation and justification of the perimeters determining one’s perception of 
belonging, usually coiled around the notions of in-group and out-groups. In this way, 
cultural cues become the “organizing” frames of reference with regard to the perceptions 
that groups have of each other.  
From this point of view, culturally driven jokes such as the issue of circumcision 
raised by some Kikuyu radios to belittle Odinga’s as an unfit leader who has not been 
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vetted by elders to become an adult, quickly transform into sentiments of 
misrepresentation, and the appeals by the “misrepresented” group to rectify the images. 
Furthermore, the portrayal of Odinga as a radical Muslim, negotiated along the lines of 
the alleged Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Kenyan Muslims, also 
highlights the significance of cultural cues in the creation of meaning. The depiction of 
Kibaki as a corrupt and opportunist Kikuyu, playing on the stereotypes linking the 
Kikuyu with thirst for money, also points to this concern.  
Whether or not the claims are valid, such frames of reference provide mental 
maps used by different groups to locate their relationship within a shared space such as a 
territory. They influence social interactions across communities while marking 
boundaries between groups. This partly explains why the ODM party was linked to 
groups emanating from Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western provinces, while PNU was 
associated mainly with groups from Central province. PNU was no longer regarded as a 
political party but a “Kikuyu party” as Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, was the party flag-bearer.  
Equally, ODM was now associated with the Luos because Odinga, a Luo, was the 
party leader. In the processes, the Kikuyu who supported ODM were framed as traitors to 
their own community while Luos in PNU were cast as traitors within their social group. 
Other party supporters who were neither Luos nor Kikuyus were coined as in-groups or 
out-groups depending on their party affiliations.  
This indicates the fluidity in some aspects of cultural allegiances such as ethnicity 
that cannot form an all-encompassing unit of analysis explaining the 2007/08 conflicts as 
advanced in various scholarly materials. Those who were once perceived as “they” in the 
past could easily be perceived as “we” after some time and vice versa. The 1992 and 
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1997 electoral landscape and the reconstruction of group identities, support this fact. Luo 
and Kikuyu seemed to be perceived as the out-groups in Moi’s Kalenjin-dominated 
government.  
This transformed into a strong alliance between the Kikuyu and Luo communities, 
including other groups that perceived Moi’s government as favourable to the Kalenjins, 
in the period leading to the 2002 elections. Once Kibaki became president in 2002, ethnic 
alliances shifted. The Luos and Kalenjins appeared to perceive Kibaki’s government as 
alienating. As a result, Luo-Kalenjin ethnic alliances formed in the periods leading to the 
2007 general elections.    
 In essence, cultural allegiances and an individual sense of belongingness have 
weakened the perception that people hold on national identity. This has made it easier for 
groups to mingle across ethnic boundaries while redefining their identities to fit within 
the broader views of other groups, a trend that supports the studies indicating that ethnic 
boundaries are situational (Hall and Meeks, 2007; Osaghae, 1999; Cohen, 1995). This is 
why focusing on ethnicity alone may provide a skewed understanding of the underlying 
issues threatening intergroup relations. For this reason, ethnicity serves as one of the 
reference points used by people to locate the forces and conditions surrounding their 
habitat and livelihood. In this way, it is part of the larger structure explaining intergroup 
relations and conflict, as it interacts with other contextual factors that may serve as 
triggers of social conflicts such as political affiliations. 
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6.2.2. Political Affiliations 
 
Although several factors contributed to the 2007/08 conflicts, patronage politics 
and the allegations about vote rigging surrounding the highly contested presidential 
elections reinforced the perception that political affiliations are also a sore point of 
intergroup relations. Because Kenya is an ethnically diverse society (with about 42 
different groups), once clustered together by colonial authority, post-colonial governance 
seems unable to resist the forces driven by ethno-regional competition, a trend exploited 
by vernacular media to reinforce certain perceptions with regard to distribution and 
redistribution of power between ethnic groups.  
In other words, political affiliations serve as the unitary force by which 
“communal interests” or ethno-regional claims are advanced. Contrast to political 
mobilizations that led to independence in 1963 where European Settlers were collectively 
regarded as the sole “enemy” (Muigai, 1995; Nyong’o, 1997), political affiliations in 
post-colonial Kenya are shattered by ethno-regional struggles to control the state 
machinery, regarded as the means through which regional interests can be fulfilled. In the 
process, various groups perceive the state machinery as extraneous to their interests, and 
by extension, to the interests of the “under-represented” groups. Vernacular radios thus 
contributed to the cementing of ethno-political perceptions where ethnicity, language and 
geographical location became crucial elements in the association or dissociation with 
respect to political processes.  
In this light, the political implications of the 2007/08 conflicts can be understood 
from multiple perspectives. As a multiethnic state where the politics of national 
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integration have not been fully established, due to claims of ethnic self-determination and 
an ethno-territorial sense of belonging, categorical politicization of cultural cues in Kenya 
have prompted divisive, rebellious or collaborative attitudes depending on the stage at 
which the conflict manifests itself. This is partly because politically driven conflicts not 
only stem from specific circumstances, but are also socially and historically situated.  
The 2007/08 conflicts appeared to be a means through which different groups 
resort to in an attempt to balance and maintain political superstructures as well as 
intergroup boundaries. This may explain why the Luo and Kikuyu radios emphasized the 
thorny historical relationship between the Luo and Kikuyu groups, seen as “organizing 
frames” of reference to situate the relationship between the two groups. This intricate 
power relation between groups and the fight to control the state machinery is what Fukui 
and Markakis (1994) refer to as “ethnocracy59”, supposing that “ethnic/tribal identities 
are essentially political products of specific situations, socially defined and historically 
determined”(p.6).  
For some, the shaky relationship between the two groups can be explained by the 
fact that the Kikuyu and Luo groups were the most outspoken against colonial 
occupation, and that it was likely for the these groups to fight for the state powers 
amongst themselves (Ogot, 1981; Mboya, 1970; Muigai, 1995; Ross, 1975). As the 
findings indicate, the negotiation of the Kikuyu-Luo politics by the Luo and Kikuyu 
radios was often situated with the split between Kenyatta and his then-vice president, 
                                                
59 Fukui and Markakis (1994) define “ethnocracy” as the monopolization of the state machinery by some 
groups and the exclusion of others groups. That is, “the ruling groups have a proprietary attitude towards 
the state, and what they promote as the ‘national’ identity is the mirror of their own ethnic ego. 
Consequently, the process of ‘national integration’ promoted by the state verges on assimilation” (p.8). 
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Oginga Odinga, with Luo radios suggesting that some groups have turned the state into a 
“family business” run by few groups.  
Although the split between Kenyatta and Oginga Odinga was often framed by 
Luo and Kikuyu radios as the genesis of ethno-regional fragmentation and patronage 
politics in Kenya, the beneficiary of this power struggle would be the former president, 
Daniel Moi (1978-2002) who ascended to the vice presidential position before he 
succeeded Kenyatta shortly after the latter’s sudden death in 1978. The political 
landscape shifted considerably. Kenya was transformed into a strict authoritarian 
leadership where political dissent was to become unlawful. Moi’s authoritarianism can be 
understood from a number of perspectives. On the one hand, he was dealing with political 
pressures from Kenyatta’s and Odinga’s camps who saw their roles in government 
slipping away, given the constant reshuffling of the cabinet that brought the majority of 
the Kalenjin to take over the main political dockets. On the other hand, the failed attempt 
to overthrow his regime in 1982 eroded trust within the government, transforming Kenya 
into a de jure one-party state (1982-1992). This allowed him to follow state policies very 
closely while suppressing political dissent in all parts of the country, which has rendered 
intergroup conflict latent despite the violence witnessed during the 1992 and 1997 
election cycles in which Moi still emerged the winner.   
Although Moi backed Kibaki’s re-election, some of the radios broadcasting in the 
Kikuyu language inferred that the Kalenjin had their share of power when Moi ruled the 
country for over two decades. In this way, the popularity of Odinga-led Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM) in the Rift valley was portrayed as Odinga’s propaganda 
directed towards the Kalenjin ethnic block to build his support base while advancing his 
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personal presidential ambitions.  In the process, ODM as a political party became 
associated with Odinga as a person, correlating his form of leadership with dictatorship 
and inequity in resource distribution. Equally, the Luo radios portrayed Kibaki-led Party 
of National Unity (PNU) as a political party whose primary beneficiary were the Kikuyu. 
The uncertainty around political affiliations and the 2007/08 conflicts was also 
evident in the manner in which the radios framed the Majimbo debates60, especially in 
Kikuyu and Kalenjin radios. In the Kalenjin radios, the narratives about Majimbo were 
twofold: on the one hand, they point to a devolved system of governance where power 
and resources were to be decentralized at regional level. On the other hand, they alluded 
to the conflicts in the 1990s, especially in the Rift Valley. In this way, the Kikuyu radios 
articulated the Majimbo debates along the narratives of “eviction”, suggesting that the 
ODM camp planned to evict some of their members from the Kalenjin-dominated Rift 
Valley. This is consistent with the studies indicating that media narratives can have a far-
reaching influence on aggregate political attitudes and positioning when the framing is 
slanted towards regional interests (Entman, 2010; Neyazi, 2010; Matthes, 2012). 
In essence, political affiliations serve as negotiating frames with respect to power 
relations. Often, party flag bearers are regarded as indicators of a regional and/or group 
supporting base and this is linked to whether or not the candidate is likely to be entrusted 
with the group’s welfare and resource (material and immaterial) allocation. Political 
affiliations become a source of conflict if the controlling body fails to exercise fairness in 
the integration of the opposing parties in decision-making processes. This may explain 
why the narratives of vote-rigging dominated the Kalenjin and Luo radios during the 
violent conflicts. The move by the Kibaki’s government to appoint the majority (19 out 
                                                
60 See the findings in Chapter 5 
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of 22) of the members of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) prior to the 2007 
elections, without consulting the opposition, was marked with suspicion.  
The negotiations surrounding political affiliations also cause diplomatic tensions 
at different levels. For instance, competing political interests at the local level complicate 
intervention processes because disputants may feel that their respective parties are not the 
beneficiaries of the initiatives put on the table. Equally, external political pressures 
emanating from the international community may bring into question the country’s 
political sovereignty. This is what happened with the intervention of the UN-led 
mediation team, a process that led to the establishment of a power-sharing agreement 
between the two political party leaders.  
While some nationalists argued that Kenya is a sovereign country with a defined 
set of laws and therefore capable of resolving its internal affairs, the vast majority highly 
applauded the intervention of the UN-led mediation team to end the mass killings and the 
abuse of human rights. In this view, external governments/organizations may try to 
intervene to support a conflict-torn country, but the politics of intervention and control 
policies may generate another conflict between national political parties, and by 
extension, between the state and the international community. 
Apart from diplomatic tensions, the shifting perceptions that people hold with 
respect to political affiliations may reflect people’s contentment or discontent with the 
political governance in place. In this view, a government that fails to function within the 
envisioned structures is likely to generate rebellious attitudes within its frontiers. That is, 
political governance becomes a process through which parties, groups, individuals, and 
regions negotiate their respective interests. 
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Given that political governance is mostly executed at the state level, the adoption 
of political decisions touching upon the economy, territory, culture, and religion by the 
politicians representing various regions or groups likely depend on how these decisions 
and political processes are articulated. Hence, the perceived misuse of political power and 
the detention of politicians opposed to the regime can be detrimental to intergroup 
relations in situations of competition and/or conflict.  
For instance, the deployment of the police force in some regions during the 
2007/08 conflicts was regarded as excessive misuse of power by the state to suppress 
political dissent that stemmed from the alleged ODM strongholds such as Kisumu. 
Equally, the perception that the government failed to stop the alleged retaliatory attacks 
in Naivasha and Nakuru, perpetrated by the Mungiki militia group (which supposedly 
supported the PNU) illustrates that perceived misuse of political power in the managing 
of public affairs can be detrimental in ethnically heterogeneous states and is likely to 
create “ungoverned spaces” within which political scores are addressed.  
In this view, the negotiation of these perceptions by the media (in this case, 
vernacular radios) is fundamental in reinforcing rebellious or collaborative attitudes 
among party affiliates. The same goes for economic pressures and the politicization of 
ethno-regional economic disparities as demonstrated in the next two sections.  
 
6.2.3. Economic Pressures 
 
The economic dimension of the 2007/08 conflicts was mainly articulated in terms 
of unequal resource allocation and the narratives of economic marginalization. As 
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discussed in Chapter 1, administrative boundaries in Kenya are linked to ethnic 
communities where language, ancestry, and cultural allegiances primarily serve as 
defining boundaries. This is why the sentiment or perception with regard to unequal 
resource allocation in different provinces, counties, and districts easily translated into 
sentiments of disenchantment with the state, regarded as the primary guarantor of the 
resources. For instance, the claims advanced by the Luo and Kalenjin radios supposing 
that the Kikuyu were the sole beneficiaries of the Kibaki-led government suggest that the 
economic emancipation of various regions is still regarded as a sore point when 
discussing intergroup relations in Kenya. 
This is because regional loyalties are often politicized in a manner that evokes 
deep-seated emotions of disgruntlement already existing between groups and their 
perceptions of regional economic disparity. In this light, regional economic growth is 
closely linked to the control of state machinery. Whilst the validity of such claims has yet 
to be determined, historical analysis of the Kenyan situation seems to confirm, in part, 
that regional economic growth is linked to the changes in regimes. For example, 
following Kenya’s independence from the British in 1963, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, a 
Kikuyu, became the first President of the Republic of Kenya (1963-1978).  
Although Kenyatta reviewed some colonial policies to reflect the “African 
leadership” and economic redistribution, the centralized system of governance over 
which he had control, gave him the power to oversee much of the resource allocation. 
Kenyatta’s regime is mainly criticized for illegal land allocations to his own family, and 
by extension to his Kikuyu community following the fall of the British occupation 
(Okoth and Ogot, 2000; Gacheru, 2005; Throup and Hornsby, 1998; Oucho, 2002; 
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Lynch, 2007) as well as the allocation of public service positions not necessarily on merit 
but on ethnic affiliation. As a result, all major jobs appeared to be dished out to 
Kenyatta’s allies and his Kikuyu community (Gosh, Gabby and Siddique, 1999; 
Anderson and Lochery, 2008; Lonsdale, 2008). 
Following Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Daniel Arap Moi (a Kalenjin) took over the 
overall office and the focus shifted from Central Province to the Rift Valley Province. 
During Moi’s 24-year reign (1978-2002), Rift Valley became one of the Kenya’s 
economic hub where much of his effort was focused on the transformation of Eldoret 
town into a major city with a multi-million dollar international airport established in 
1995, a project that has been since regarded as a waste given that the two major airports 
in Kenya (Nairobi and Mombasa) already operate below their capacity (Gosh, Gabby and 
Siddique, 1999).  
Similarly, the public service dockets slipped away from the Kikuyu community to 
Moi’s Kalenjin during the 24-year rule, transforming the Kenyan economy and politics 
into what could be regarded as a Kalenjin dynasty (Lynch, 2008). The changes in ethno-
regional economy during Moi’s rule serve to reinforce the perceptions eminent in the 
narratives various vernacular radio suggesting that the economic emancipation of various 
groups and/or regions is likely to be dependent on whether or not the person in control of 
the state machinery is from their group.  
Following Moi’s 24-year rule and the perceived economic marginalization of the 
other regions, Kibaki (a Kikuyu) ascended to power in 2002 vowing to restore ethno-
regional balance with respect to the allocution of state resources. Whilst Kibaki’s first 
two years in office saw a 5% jump in national economic growth as many studies point out 
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(Lynch, 2008; Zuckerman, 2009), Luo and Kalenjin radios implied that the allocution of 
public service positions was gradually shifting from the Kalenjin (that dominated during 
Moi’s reign) back to the Kikuyu group (as witnessed during Kenyatta’s reign), and that 
all the major government dockets and ministerial positions were now held mainly by 
members of the Kikuyu community.  
The economic and power imbalances that were taking shape during Kibaki’s 
terms and the articulation of these views by some radios, mainly the Luo and the Kalenjin 
radios, served to cement the perception that the incumbent president failed to promote 
economic development in some parts of the country with the same kind of enthusiasm as 
others. In this view, the likelihood that adequate resources will be channelled to a given 
population is directly linked to whether or not a member of that community controls the 
state machinery, seen as a guarantor of resources. This is why the debates around 
Majimbo Constitution (devolved Constitution), already discussed, and the manner in 
which it was translated into “popular language” became highly political as various ethno-
regional political elites defined its contours in accordance with the responses and appeals 
of the groups they represented.  
Given the hypothetical categorization of the administrative territories and the 
circumstances of ethnic competition described in the previous sections, it came as no 
great surprise to find out that the Majimbo debate became highly political. On the one 
hand, the debates were articulated in terms of devolved governance, with great emphasis 
on the revision of land tenure policies in Rift Valley to observe the appeals of the 
“ancestral owners.” This rhetoric was mainly prevalent in Eldoret. On the other hand, 
Majimboism was linked to the eviction and displacement of specific identity groups and 
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the chaos that rocked the Rift Valley province in the 1990s. This was the main discourse 
observed among Nyeri residents.   
Equally, Majimboism was linked to the notion that the excessive executive powers 
held by an incumbent president were to be revised in a manner that regionally elected 
officials could have more command over regional funds and resources. This 
interpretation was mainly present among Kisumu constituents. Despite the differences in 
explanation, the rival political parties and their respective party affiliates maintained that 
their interpretations of Majimbo Consitution were the most legitimate. As a result, the ill-
defined Majimbo and the discordant nature of narratives surrounding its establishment 
served as a political tool in drumming up support from various ethno-regional territories. 
Bowing to the pressures from different “ethnic voting blocks”, a number of politicians 
disguised their favourable interpretation of Majimbo depending on the political parties 
that they represented.  
While it appeared that many people applauded the creation of a new legal 
structure (new Constitution) observing regionalism and a devolved system of governance, 
the ambiguity and/or confusion that surrounded the definition of Majimbo itself created a 
window for competitive political interests to foment. Given that Kenya has always been 
characterized by a centralized system of governance where the president oversees 
policymaking at all levels, control efforts to foster unity around a shared conception of 
Majimbo Constitution were intricately intertwined with the assumption that winning the 
2007 general elections meant controlling these changes, a factor that led to fierce political 
campaigns and subsequent violence over the alleged vote rigging.  
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6.2.4. Territorial Insecurity   
 
While land resources, particularly forests and grazing pastures, are still far from 
being the only catalysts of territorial conflicts in Kenya, this study indicates that they 
certainly played a key role in the explosion of the 2007/08 conflicts. Unclear land tenure 
claims, especially in the Rift Valley Province and some parts of the country, mainly 
forested areas, were some of the salient issues in vernacular radios in the events leading 
to the 2007/08 conflicts, supporting the agenda-setting roles of the media discussed in 
Chapter 3. That is, vernacular radios focused on the thorny land claims that have served 
to generate intergroup conflicts for decades, especially in the Rift Valley Province given 
the post-colonial resettlement schemes that encouraged the settlement of other groups in 
the Kalenjin-dominated Rift Valley.  
Given that successive governments have proved to be incapable or unwilling to 
address controversial land claims in this part of the country, Rift Valley residents have 
often resorted to violence as the only remedy to resolve these claims. When elected 
officials take the lead in such processes as the interviews in the three locations of the 
study indicated, the perceived claims often transform into personal and/or intergroup 
accounts, a trend that results in fear, violence and Internal Displacement of Persons 
(IDPs). In order to understand why territorial insecurity became salient in the narratives 
of vernacular radios serving the regions where this study was conducted, it is important to 
journey back in time a little.  
The genesis of land-related tensions in Kenya has often been associated with the 
colonial legacy, believed to have facilitated the disintegration of territories along 
language and ethnic compositions (Anderson, 2005; Anderson, and Lochery, 2008; 
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Mamdani, 1996; Muigai, 1995; Klopp, 2001; Somerville, 2009), usually for 
administrative purposes. Some scholars have suggested that the colonial legacy tactically 
employed “divide and rule” procedures to bolster ethno-territorial consciousness among 
various linguistic groups (Bienien, 1974; Okoth and Ogot, 2000; Mboya, 1970), making 
territory one of the many contentious issues in post-colonial Kenya.  
Given this territorial categorization, “African-led” political parties that struggled 
for independence also embraced territorial identity to amass support from their respective 
regions. The Kikuyus in Central Province created the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA); 
the Luos in Nyanza Province established the Young Kavirondo Association; and the 
Kalenjins in Rift Valley formed the Kalenjin Political Alliance (Mboya, 1970; Leo, 1984; 
Nyong’o, 1987; Oucho, 2002; Gacheru, 2005).  
The displacement of various communities from the fertile agricultural 
“Highlands” during colonial rule, to create room for colonial Settlers, made land tenure 
one of the most controversial issues contested by the “African-led” rebellious parties61, a 
trend that continued in post-colonial Kenya shortly after independence in 1963 that saw 
Mzee Jomo Kenyatta as the first Kenyan president. Although the British came up with a 
formula62 (at the eve of independence) to reallocate the lands that were occupied, the 
expectation was that the lands that were forcefully acquired were to be re-distributed 
freely. During Kenyatta’s regime (1963-1978) that oversaw much of the resettlement 
                                                
61 The Mau-Mau, a rebellious and politically-driven group, led to the declaration of state of emergency 
between 1952 and 1956 by the British. The group was mainly composed of the Kikuyu group that contested 
the displacement of their communities from Central Province to other parts of the country, mainly the Rift 
Valley.  
62 The formula was based on the transfer of lands ranging from major holdings to smallholdings and a loan 
to purchase the lands to ensure re-distribution across communities, a formula that was intended to 
discourage free allocation based on group alliances. However, this is exactly what happened because many 
expected the lands to be redistributed freely since the British forcefully acquired them from the local 
groups.  
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schemes in the 1960s and 1970s, land grievances fomented within the Rift Valley mainly 
between the Kalenjins and the Kikuyus.  
The Kalenjins believed that Kenyatta’s land allocation policies were alienating 
them from their own “ancestral lands” while the Kikuyus (Kenyatta’s community) and 
other groups (mainly the Embu and Meru) benefited disproportionately from the same 
policies (Leo, 1984; Gosh, Gabby and Siddique, 1999; Nyong'o, 1987; Oucho, 2002; 
Lonsdale, 2008).  
This resulted in the Kalenjins rejecting the constitutional referendum in 2005 
(under Kibaki’s government) that, in their view, would have further enabled “Kikuyu 
invasion” into the Rift Valley Province. Authors such as Lynch (2008) have written a lot 
about the contentious land ownership in the Rift Valley, often highlighting the pressure it 
exerts amongst the people of the Rift Valley. She writes,  
A strong local discourse of persecution, state bias, and popular disgruntlement 
regarding the proportion of businesses under Kikuyu ownership had become 
intertwined with this notion of ‘communal territory’ and past injustice, and 
fomented a common concern with what the Kibaki government would take next. 
In many cases, suspicions focused on the fertile land of the Rift Valley and a 
feeling that regime change and devolution was necessary for the protection and 
promotion of Kalenjin claims to the ownership and control of ethnic territory. 
Embedded in this discourse of defence also lay promises of action, as an ODM 
win was linked to a chance to ‘right’ historical injustices – one reading of which 
was that an ODM win would be a harbinger of the removal of ‘outsiders’ and 
settlement of ‘indigenes’ (Lynch, 2008: 560).  
  
This echoes the centrality of territorial insecurity in the events leading to the 2007/08 
conflicts. That is, while the proponents of Kibaki’s PNU pledged to revise land tenure 
policies along its interpretation of the Majimbo Constitution, the Kalenjin community 
appeared to be sceptical and backed ODM’s campaign vehicle that they regarded as more 
credible in addressing the much anticipated land tenure policies, a belief that was mainly 
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linked to the reallocation of Rift Valley lands to the Kalenjins. Hence, the stakes invested 
in ODM party were very high in the Rift Valley, especially among the Kalenjins who 
supported Odinga’s presidential bid. 
 As the 2007 general elections neared, concerns over territorial insecurity also 
prompted concerns over a possible eviction of the perceived PNU supporters from Rift 
Valley. Equally, the narratives of possible vote-rigging increased among ODM supporters 
claiming that they did not trust Kibaki’s government, especially with the appointment of 
the members of the Electoral Commission of Kenya. The appointments by Kibaki, then 
head of state, were seen as a plan to establish friendly structures that would foresee his 
re-election against the ODM party leader.  
 In this perspective, territorial insecurity was articulated along the lines of cultural 
allegiances, economic redistribution and political affiliations. The perceptions that people 
had on these issues, and the shifting discourses that surrounded them were, in part, 
influenced by the kinds of narratives used by vernacular radio to frame them.  
In the next section I discuss how the changes in radio discourses influenced the 
attitudes of radio listeners and how such attitudinal shifts weighed on the directions and 
patterns of the 2007/08 conflicts. This is where I discuss how media frames, identified in 
Figure 7, interact with the other broad dimensions of the 2007/08 conflict such as 
political affiliations and territorial insecurity. 
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6.3. Media and Conflict Frames: Between Differentiated and Concerted Framing 
 
The implications of vernacular radio narratives in the 2007/08 conflicts are 
associated with the manner in which they negotiated intergroup relations with respect to 
cultural allegiances, economic pressures, political affiliations and territorial insecurity. In 
other words, the changing positions that individuals, groups or political parties held on 
these issues partly hinged on how they were framed at different stages of the conflict.  
As the findings suggest, vernacular radio narratives were discordant. Prior to the 
conflicts, historical grievances with respect to cultural allegiances, economic pressures, 
territorial insecurity and political affiliations served not only as defining elements of 
contentment or discontent with the pledges of the rival parties, they also contributed to 
the escalation of the conflicts. This is because vernacular radios not only serve 
linguistically definite groups, but they are also likely to “customize” news contents to 
reflect the views (economic, cultural, political, etc.) of the groups served.  
As such, the narratives embraced by these radios speak to these “intimate 
feelings” that cannot be reached by the official-language radios that use the languages 
understood by the majority of the population. This is probably well summarized by one 
of Nelson Mandela’s famous quotes supposing: “if you talk to a man in a language he 
understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his 
heart63”. This highlights the significance of vernacular radios in negotiating intergroup 
relations. Given their language of broadcast, they are likely to evoke innate ethno-cultural 
sentiments when giving meaning to different phenomena.  
                                                
63 See Mandela, N. (1995). Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company. 
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As a consequence, striking a balance between the interests advanced by distinct 
socio-cultural groups (appeals of the targeted identity groups) and those relative to public 
interests (demands cutting across ethnic affiliations) is an uphill task for vernacular 
radios. Figure 8 shows this shifting narrative with respect to the events of the 2007/08 
conflicts. It also highlights sequential changes in attitudes prior, during and after the 
violent conflicts.  
The core argument I make is that the narratives adopted by various vernacular 
radios not only reinforced divisive and rebellious attitudes prior to and during the 
conflicts, but they also strengthened collaborative attitudes in post-conflict transformation 
stages when the country was in search of short and long-term solutions.  
 
Figure 8. Shifting radios frames and attitudinal change during the 2007/08 conflicts 
 
 
Although Figure 8 appears to suggest linearity in its sequence of frames, it should 
be understood that post-conflict transformation discourses can fall back to pre-conflict or 
active-conflict (violent) frames depending on how the perceived differences are 
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negotiated across time. This is why vernacular radio narratives are likely to contribute in 
the escalation or de-escalation of conflicts. That is, even in the de-escalation mode, if the 
narratives of compromise and reconciliation no longer reflect the appeals of the 
disputants, the conflict may regain its covert nature. 
In this view, “another” conflict may take shape from these latent forces, and 
possibly transform into an active (violent) conflict. This is what happened in the events 
leading to the 2007/08 conflicts. Prior to the conflicts, two opposing forces dominated the 
narratives of various vernacular radios. On the one hand, the presenters of these radio 
narratives appeared to be driven by the conviction that, by encouraging a diversity of 
views (through phone-in programs and music on-air), they would bolster democratic 
ideals. On the other hand, encouraging diverse positions also meant balancing the 
narratives in a manner that would discourage intergroup disfigurement, especially when 
high ratings become one of the motivating factors.  
While the former poses the question of credibility, integrity and autonomy of 
vernacular radios, the latter is mostly concerned with issues of sensationalism, objectivity 
and ethnic tolerance with respect to the perceived triggers of the conflict such as political 
affiliations, cultural allegiances, economic pressures, and territorial insecurity. The 
results point out that, in the pre-conflict phase, the discourses that surrounded the 
conflicts were negotiated in a manner that was likely to foster distrust and polarization 
along ethnic affiliations. These negotiations were articulated around economic, political, 
cultural and territorial pressures.  
Conversely, during active (violent) conflicts, the perceived divisions evolved into 
violence against the perceived “others”. The main discourse that prevailed at this point 
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was cross-victimization. Characterized by finger pointing, both parties blamed the other 
for causing the conflict. In the process, both parties scrambled for self-defence to justify 
why they resorted to violence. For instance, while ODM party affiliates blamed PNU for 
stealing their victory and using police force against them, the PNU camp blamed the 
ODM opponents for starting the violence because their leader would not concede defeat.  
The negotiations of these positions by various vernacular radios informed 
intergroup relations while refining the perimeters of violence. That is, the narratives 
adopted at this stage are likely to lead to the escalation or de-escalation of violence. 
Conflicts are likely to escalate if the narratives focus on or encourage groups’ defence 
strategies such as counter-attacks, at the expense of reconciliatory discourses. This is 
because violence is essentially a matter of social contracts if we consider Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s perceptions. He argues, “the strongest is never strong enough to be always 
the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty. Hence the 
right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant ironically, is really laid down 
as a fundamental principle64”. 
 This concurs with Fukui and Markakis’ (1994) assumption that violence is also 
one of the ways in which people “test their power” and redefine relational and power 
boundaries. This is why active conflicts may take months, years or even decades because 
each disputing party seeks to establish its strengths as rights, and no party is willing to 
see their defeat transform into compliance. Media narratives are therefore central at this 
stage, as they influence the perceptions that people hold with respect to intervention 
strategies.  
                                                
64See  http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/r/rousseau/jean_jacques/r864s/book1.html, accessed February 2012. 
	   244	  
Many studies affirm that media narratives, during an on-going conflict, are likely 
to shape the directions and levels of violence. In this light, Fisher (2007) sees the 
escalation phase of an active conflict as fourfold: discussion (dealing with firsthand 
emotions about a conflict with each party seeing a possible need for objective interest but 
being hesitant on negotiation); polarization (involving a shifting attitude towards another 
party as hostility and negativity intensify); segregation (dominated by subjective or 
individual interests thus leading to mistrust and eventually threats); and lastly, destruction 
(where one party employs all means within reach to destroy the other party for its own 
survival or to win).  
In the post-conflict transformation stage, however, vernacular radios often adopt 
narratives that cut across intergroup or party loyalties. Unlike the pre-conflict phase 
where vernacular radio rhetoric may foster divisive attitudes and the active conflicts 
where they may reinforce rebellious attitudes and polarization based on the preconceived 
nature of the relations, post-conflict transformation frames may seek to mend the broken 
ties. Post-conflict transformation narratives are therefore likely to bolster collaborative 
attitudes between disputants. This is because both parties may resort to short or long-term 
solutions through compromise or by adopting what Covey (2011) calls the principle of 
synergy65 to “transcend” the conflict, rather than just solving it.   
In this regard, vernacular radios (through programs and music on-air) reinforce a 
collective perception of nationhood, defined along the lines of citizenship or national 
self-determination rather than intergroup allegiances. Although these kinds of frames 
                                                
65 In his book, The Third Alternative: Solving World’s Most Difficult Problems, Steven Covey defines the 
principle of synergy as “what happens when one plus one equals ten or a hundred or even a thousand 
[because] it’s the mighty result when two or more respectful human beings determine together to go 
beyond their preconceived ideas to meet a great challenge. It’s all about the passion, the energy, the 
ingenuity, the excitement of creating a new reality that is far much better than the old reality.” (p. 12)  
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may not necessarily resolve the deep-seated feelings about the causes and consequences 
of the conflict, they are likely to alter the direction of conflict from its active (violent) 
nature to pave the way for peace transformation processes. In this case, the conflict may 
go back to its latent nature or “transcend” the perceived differences to bolster long-term 
solutions where both parties feel satisfied with the decisions reached.   
In essence, the shifts in vernacular radio narratives occur when new elements are 
added into the “equation” and the degree of resonance that these new elements have with 
the target populations. New frames may take different forms such as change in music 
tone, the kinds of people interviewed and their views about the conflict, and ongoing 
negotiations such as the National Accord dialogue.  
The findings of this study indicate that there are a number of elements that serve 
to categorize groups while stratifying their relationships according to the already 
withheld beliefs and perception. According to Mary Douglas, the British anthropologist, 
the media have the ability to place people where they belong. That is, media narratives 
may serve to bolster the existing beliefs or help in the contravention of the established 
order, dirt or “matter out of place” in her parlance. In other words, radios regarded as a 
“principal means to arrange culture”, have a function in categorizing people using 
withheld beliefs. This is occurs in the early stages of a conflict process, what I refer here 
as the pre-conflict phase (maybe a latent stage of a given conflict). 
There are also other sets of elements that serve to reinforce the narratives of 
victimization, especially during an active (violent) conflict process. This stage is mainly 
characterized by survival strategies, which often lead to attacks and counter-attacks of the 
perceived enemies. Vernacular radios, in this stage, mobilize narratives such as groups’ 
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plight to prevent decimation or genocide. These were the kinds of narratives adopted by 
many Kikuyu-language radios during the violent conflicts in 2007/08. Equally, the radios 
may adopt narratives of insecurity, especially territorial insecurity, which may force other 
people out of their homes for fear of attacks or retaliation. These were the kinds of 
narratives that were adopted by Luo and Kalenjin radios during the violent conflicts in 
2007/08.  
Lastly, there are elements within radio narratives that serve to re-evaluate 
conflicts processes, which focus on the pros and cons of conflicts. Depending on the 
degree of resonance with the target population, these new narratives may lead to positive 
transformation of conflicts for long-term or short-term solutions. This may take several 
forms such as negotiations, coercive force, judicial pursuits, power sharing and the 
intervention of the international community. 
These factors explain why the shifts occur. At the centre of these shifts are other 
factors such as editorial influence, domestic and international pressure, sanctions and 
censorship. In other words, the direction of conflict also hinges on the salience and the 
meanings attached to new elements by vernacular radios.  
Figure 9 shows the elasticity in radio frames during conflict processes. The 
framing is likely to reinforce divisive and rebellious attitudes if the narratives focus on 
intergroup mutilation and cross-victimization. On the other hand, violence is likely to de-
escalate if the narratives reinforce collaborative attitudes. This is why vernacular radio 
framing is also central to understanding protracted social conflicts. It indicates that the 
negotiation of intergroup relations was split between fragmented and concerted framing.  
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Figure 9. Elasticity of vernacular radio frames during conflict processes 
 
 
 
6.3.1. Differentiated Framing  
 
Differentiated framing underscores a form of narrative whereby group differences 
are negotiated in terms of competition. That is, one group is perceived as more likely to 
gain at the other’s expense. In this regard, differentiated framing may be closely 
associated with negative ethnicity as it is susceptible to generate intergroup polarization. 
This kind of framing is more likely to be prevalent in pre-conflict situations (and in the 
early stages of active – violent – conflict) when claims of ethnic essentialism and/or 
ethnic self-determination become the defining characteristics of nationhood or intergroup 
relations.  
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In this case, ethnicity is often defined in terms of blood kinship and common 
ancestry, regarded as key to the perceptions of one’s self or existence. Thus, vernacular 
radios may choose to adopt certain rhetoric (through programs and music on-air) that lean 
towards the values or views of the groups they serve for reasons not limited to 
deprivation, opportunism, historical injustices, and power relations, all of which may 
negatively impact intergroup relations.  
Differentiated framing therefore reinforces exclusivity and competitive attitudes 
among different groups, especially in multiethnic societies, leaving less room for 
constructive dialogue or compromise between ethnic groups living within an already-
established nation-state. Although differentiated framing may characterize intergroup 
tensions and subsequent intergroup conflicts, it is also worth noting that intra-group 
tensions may also stem from this kind of framing, especially when members of the same 
group are faced with fierce competition from within. 
 
6.3.2. Concerted Framing  
 
In contrast to differentiated framing, concerted framing underpins the use of 
narratives often articulated in terms of common values that cut across intergroup 
interests. In this perspective, vernacular radios may choose to embrace a rhetoric that 
underlines shared national values such as intergroup reconciliation and/or cohesion, 
public safety, national integrity, and the rule of law, rather than allegiances to group 
values. Vernacular radio frames may be concerted in the late stages of prolonged active-
conflicts and in post-conflict reconstruction phases. Their narratives may shift from 
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intergroup competitiveness to embrace commonly shared civic ideals in an attempt to 
quell intergroup conflicts and restore trust between the groups in dispute.  
At this stage, altruism seems to be the main guiding principle. Ethnicity, in this 
regard, is not articulated as a sine qua non of blood kinship or common descent; rather, it 
is negotiated in terms of citizenship and national self-determination. Thus, different 
groups are called upon to observe national values and/or interests. Concerted framing 
may therefore reinforce inclusivity and collaborative attitudes among different groups, 
thus providing an opportunity to address the perceived differences through constructive 
dialogue, compromise and synergy.  
 
Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter examined the links between fieldwork findings and documentary 
research to answer the questions that guided this study. The aim of this chapter was not to 
focus on whether or not the 2007/08 conflicts were ethnically motivated, but rather to 
emphasize the levels of interconnectedness or intersectionality between cultural 
allegiances, within which ethnicity is persuasive, and other forces such as economic 
pressures, territorial insecurity, political affiliations and media narratives, all of which 
serve as reference points with regard to the negotiation of intergroup relations during 
conflict situations.  
I argued that in order to understand the claims that were inherent in the 2007/08 
conflicts, it is necessary to cut across the existing assumptions that treat this particular 
conflict as either ethnic or political. The emphasis on ethnicity does not provide a deeper 
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understanding of the claims leading to inter-ethnic animosity, as ethnicity itself is an 
element of group categorization. Equally, considering conflict as an end product of 
political opportunism does not shed light on the conditions within which political power 
is perceived and articulated as the only means to decipher one’s suffering.  
The discussion highlighted the centrality of media framing. Apart from informal 
interactions, it is through the media that people learn about their “constructed” claims, 
often presented as collective. This explains the shifts in intergroup relations with respect 
to media framing. While differentiated framing is likely to polarize the actors involved 
given the negotiation of intergroup relations in a negative light, concerted framing is 
likely to bolster intergroup cohesion as it generates collaborative attitudes among the 
parties involved.  
The next chapter concludes the arguments of this dissertation and provides the 
directions for my future research. It also assesses the relevance of Azar’s theory of 
Protracted Social Conflict (revised) within the body of this dissertation. 
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation examined the politics of intergroup accommodation in Kenya’s 
vernacular radios during the 2007/08 conflicts. Overall, the strength of this research is 
twofold. On the one hand, the methodological orientation of this study with regard to 
media framing is different. Rather than conducting discourse analyses on radio recordings 
to offer presumptive accounts on framing of the 2007/08 conflicts by vernacular radio, I 
explored ways in which vernacular radio audiences in the three locations of research 
made sense of these conflicts. This was influenced by the fact that most “conflict labels” 
that people have are often obtained from the media. I looked into the discussions 
advanced by different radio audiences in an attempt to unpack the dominant conflict 
frames and how they shaped intergroup relations.  
Conducting fieldwork in the three ethnically diverse regions became paramount to 
understanding the conditions and motives that may have led to the explosion of violence 
along ethnic compositions. Articulation methodology proved useful in examining the 
links between the perceptions that respondents had of the conflict, following the 
information they gathered through their respective radios, and the kinds of discourses that 
were dominant as explanatory references.  
I argued that the sources of the 2007/08 conflicts stretch way beyond the notions 
of ethnic differentiation highlighted in many documents analysed. I contended that the 
2007/08 conflicts were a mixture of complex processes characterized by local, national 
and international forces that interacted recursively. Some of the general parameters of 
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such forces are explained in Figure 7: cultural allegiances, economic pressures, territorial 
insecurity, and political affiliation.  
The negotiation of these forces by different media, vernacular radios in this case, 
influenced the manner in which different groups perceived their relationship with the 
other. On the one hand, vernacular radio frames served as a communicative process in the 
sense that their narratives were geared towards a well-calculated positioning with regard 
to the groups they served, with the language of broadcast and ethno-cultural proximity 
serving as elements of persuasion about the different causes they discussed. On the other 
hand, vernacular radio frames served as mental maps by operating as reference points 
used by different radio audiences to make sense of the conflict. 
This dissertation is a modest contribution to analytical perspectives with regard to 
media framing in conflict situations, especially those emanating from multiethnic states. 
It points out the significance of media narratives in the escalation (differentiated framing) 
or de-escalation (concerted framing) of socially protracted conflicts depending on the 
levels at which the conflict manifests itself. The elasticity of frames sheds light on the 
changing perceptions with regard to intergroup accommodation, and by extension, 
explains why electoral mayhem may transform into discourses of ethnicity. In this light, 
groups may choose to act according to the prompts of ethnicity as a way of creating 
spaces for its solidarity, mobilization and perceived opportunities. Depending on the 
motives, these spaces often develop into “ungoverned spaces” associated with vicious 
violence. 
Although the findings suggest a common pattern with respect to the framing of 
the 2007/08 conflicts by vernacular radios, the applicability or transposition of this 
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research to different regions can be limited due to dissimilarity in group values and 
contextual differences. With almost 40 million people and at least 42 ethno-linguistic 
groups, the evaluation of socially protracted conflicts in Kenya cannot form an all-
encompassing unit of analysis. There are disparate conditions not limited to social, 
cultural, political and economic well-being of various groups, which are likely to change 
the course of socially protracted conflicts on multiple levels.  
Against the backdrop of this limitation, general conclusions can still be drawn 
with regard to the relevance of Azar’s PSC model (revised) in mapping out the main 
factors that contributed to the 2007/08 conflicts as well as the pressing concerns in terms 
of Kenya’s overall security in the future. As discussed, Azar’s PSC model argues for a 
four-cluster condition: communal content, deprivation of human needs, state’s role and 
governance, and international linkages. According to Azar, the four conditions serve to 
locate the contours of prolonged conflicts in developing countries, mainly multiethnic 
societies. To these clusters, I added media framing as a possible fifth cluster.   
At the heart of communal content, Azar points to the centrality of societal needs, 
such as groups’ security and identity, over which the principles of compromise are less 
plausible. This explains why the majority of the communities interviewed appeared to 
read the 2007/08 conflicts with ethnic biases. The findings suggested that past historical 
contingencies, previously presented as a threat to intergroup coexistence, not only formed 
the basis of resistance during the 2007/08 conflicts, they also prolonged negotiation 
processes that were overseen by the former UN Secretary, Dr. Kofi Annan. While 
Odinga’s side claimed to recapture its “stolen victory”, Kibaki’s side dismissed their calls 
as power-hungry claims spearheaded by individual ambitions.  
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The common denominator during the negotiation deadlock is that both parties 
seemed to use ethno-political struggles that have characterized the Luo-Kikuyu relations 
since colonial occupation as reference points. The question of accountability and mistrust 
between groups thus intensified, with both Odinga and Kibaki bearing the greatest 
responsibility in terms of ethnic alignments. This was mainly due to their ethnic 
backgrounds as individuals.  
With respect to the deprivation of human needs, the 2007/08 conflicts seemed to 
have opened a new window to address the latent social, political and economic 
disturbances that have characterized intergroup relations in Kenya. This is supported by 
the change of Constitution that was overwhelmingly voted for during the 2010 
constitutional referendum and subsequent promulgation of the new Constitution in 
August 2010.  
Although the new legal framework is supportive of a devolved system of 
governance, decentralizing power to regional levels, its relevance to Kenya’s context is 
yet to be determined. Contentious land ownership, regarded by many groups as a central 
source of economic emancipation, is still not very clear in the minds of many 
communities. The “No Campaign” (opposing the adoption of the new Constitution) led 
by some leaders such as the former Agriculture and then Education Minister, William 
Ruto, indicates the validity of this concern.  
Consistent with the state’s role and governance, this study points out the 
paramount role of state as a guarantor and protector of all groups, irrespective of their 
values, claims and well-being. If the 2007/08 conflicts were framed along the lines of 
ethnicity, it points out that intergroup accommodation in situations of competition is 
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porous. Many groups still feel disenfranchised from accessing the state’s resources on the 
basis of cultural allegiances.  
The unsuccessful bids by Kibaki’s government to defer International Criminal 
Court (ICC) proceedings against the six suspects (now four) who supposedly bore the 
greatest responsibility during the 2007/08 conflicts, and the contestations it drew from the 
civil society, further illustrates the significance of the state’s role and governance as an 
indicator of intergroup cohesion. Furthermore, the confirmation of charges against Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto, both presidential aspirants in the next general elections, has 
created new forms of ethno-political pacts ahead of the next general elections66. In 
situations like this, characterized by intergroup fragmentation, the steering ability of the 
state is often weakened, thus prompting more security concerns. 
Equally challenging is the timing of international interventions with respect to 
regional stability and/or humanitarian endeavours. Since the 2007/08 conflicts and 
subsequent ICC charges against four of the six alleged architects of the conflicts in 
question, tensions and diplomatic deadlocks between Kenya and the Western countries, 
especially Britain, continue to rise. Local nationalists and presidential aspirants such as 
Uhuru Kenyatta facing charges at the ICC have vowed to contend for the “top seat” 
                                                
66During the 2007 general elections, it seems that the Kalenjin (spearheaded by William Ruto) and Luo (led 
by Odinga) communities were part of the majority groups represented in the Odinga-led opposition party – 
Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The Kikuyu group seemed to be the out-group then, as they 
seemed to be the main majority in Kibaki-led Party of National Unity (PNU) that was for Kibaki’s 
reelection bid. The current trends scenario paints a different picture. Both the Kalenjin and Kikuyu 
communities appear to be swayed by Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) and William Ruto (a Kalenjin) not to vote 
for Odinga (a Luo) in the forth-coming general elections. The shifting trends appear to indicate that the 
former “in-groups” in the period leading to the 2007 elections are now regarded as an “out-groups”. 
Equally, the former “out-groups” are now perceived as “in-groups.” Recent political campaigns and the 
discourses around GEMA and KAMATUSA are particularly exemplary in this regard. These mutations 
point to the growing challenges facing future intergroup relations in Kenya. 
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arguing that the international community is threatening Kenya’s hard-earned freedom and 
meddling in its internal affairs.  
During the launch of his political party on May 20, 2012, Uhuru lamented 
Kenya’s freedom has to be safeguarded against external influence: 
Our sovereignty is core to our beliefs and safeguarding it will be paramount if we 
are to gain respect and influence. Freedom is never given on a silver platter. It is 
fought for and earned. Every year, as we honour the men and women who loved 
this country so much to have laid down their lives for it, we must task the 
government of the day with the duty of safeguarding this freedom67.  
 
Whether this claim is valid or not, it supports Azar’s assumption that international 
linkages are one source of protracted social conflicts. This is because they put both the 
weak and strong states on the same levels of international economic systems 
characterized by synchronized patterns of international relations, which are often shaky. 
This may explain why African states are venturing into “South-South” linkages in an 
attempt to overcome the enduring Western policies. Against the backdrop of this concern, 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a key trade partner and donor to the 
continent. These new linkages are shifting the trends of foreign aid and the patterns of 
interdependency between the Western and African states.  
With regard to media framing, this study shows that peace transformation also 
hinges on the kinds of narratives adopted by the media such as vernacular radio frames. 
Since the late 1990s, the media landscape in Africa changed drastically, invoking new 
challenges of intergroup accommodation. Various conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa such as 
those witnessed in Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo, and Kenya have been partly 
                                                
67 See Daily Nation newspaper online, accessed May 20, 2012 
http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Pomp+and+colour+at+Uhuru+party+launch+/-/1064/1410060/-
/7rh3enz/-/index.html    
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exacerbated through differentiated framing, where intergroup relations are negotiated in 
terms of competition likely to generate intergroup polarization.  
While vernacular broadcasting is strongly viewed by many groups as a means 
through which cultural heritage is sustained across generations, the media narratives are a 
key aspect when seeking to understand socially protracted conflicts in ethnically 
heterogeneous nation-states. The move by the ICC to indict Kenya’s Kass FM radio host, 
Joshua Arap Sang as a suspect in the orchestration of the 2007/08 conflicts not only 
highlights the paramount role vernacular radios can play in conflict situations, but also 
sends a strong signal with regard to the significance of peace-journalism in multiethnic 
societies.   
Overall, the core arguments of this dissertation are as follows: a) vernacular radio 
narratives are often torn between differentiated and concerted framing, especially in 
situations of stiff competition between groups or in conflict processes; b) the shifts in 
vernacular radio frames occur when new elements (narratives) are added into the 
equation and the degree of resonance with the target population (or the kinds of meanings 
attached to them by editorial staff); c) ethnicity os neither the cause nor the effect of 
conflict processes, rather, conflicts do fall along ethnic lines, and in this case, vernacular 
radios may serve as enablers of conflict along ethnic affinity; lastly d) media framing, 
both as an interpretive and persuasive discourse, does inform conflict intractability, a gap 
in Azar’s PSC model.  
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Directions for Future Research  
 
While the ICC course of action is likely to ascertain the direction of political 
accountability in Kenya, misperceptions surrounding ICC proceedings continue to 
generate and intensify intergroup tensions, especially in the next general elections where 
some groups perceive the timing of the proceedings as a direct attack on their 
communities and a means to block some of their leaders from the presidential race. In this 
way, the coverage and framing of the proceedings are becoming more political, creating 
suspicions of foul play by the international community to influence the results of the next 
general elections. The politicization of the ICC processes as a selective justice is such that 
regional leaders are considering pulling out of the Rome Statute, which is now 
discredited as serving Western ideals rather reinforcing common justice.  
Recently the government of Kenya, in conjunction with the East African 
Legislative Assembly (EALA) once again pushed for the trials of the four suspects at the 
East African Court of Justice (EACJ), describing “ICC as a neo-colonial court that should 
not be entrusted to serve justice to the four Kenyans accused of crimes against humanity 
during post-election violence68.”  
Future research should examine the implications of Kenya’s ICC cases on the 
politics of democratization and good governance within the war-ridden Great Lakes 
Region and how they affect Africa’s regional stability. This may be done by looking at 
the local reception of the ICC processes in the countries States Parties to the Rome 
Statute with ongoing cases at the court. This may help unpack why many African 
                                                
68 See The Standard newspaper, online edition, accessed May 22, 2012. 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?2000057134=2000057134&4=4&articleID=2000057134  
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countries increasingly perceive the ICC processes as a direct attack on the sovereignty of 
many African states and their leaders, rather than simply perceiving them as legal 
decisions to redress impunity that many state officials have enjoyed for years.  
Equally important is the negotiation of foreign aid in Africa and the role of China 
as a key player in Africa’s development, including peace and security. Since its launch in 
2000, the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) has been the pillar of this 
economic relationship, commonly referred to as “South-South” cooperation. Rather than 
promoting private sector growth, as has been the case of Western economic policies in 
developing nations, the Chinese government is particularly advocating for state-to-state 
bilateral agreements.  
This has been supported by their conclusion that underdevelopment is the primary 
cause of conflicts in Africa. The critics of this approach often question the accountability 
of some African governments in overseeing such development endeavours as well as 
addressing insecurity concerns, characterizing many African states, which obstruct 
economic developments on which China’s aid to Africa is poised. 
Despite the criticisms, the Sino-Africa relationship in the areas of peace and 
security is growing. This is often linked to China’s principle of non-meddling in the 
matters of a sovereign state. The underlying assumption is that the principle of good 
governance cannot be imposed from outside (international community), and that internal 
conflicts call for domestic solutions.  
This has been the position of China on African affairs. The Chinese believe that 
the international community’s intervention in matters within the frontiers of a sovereign 
state begins by respecting the country’s sovereignty. However, the non-interference 
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policy advocated by China is often criticized, given China’s military support (weaponry 
supply) to fragile states already ravaged by civil wars such as DR Congo, Zimbabwe, and 
Sudan. The argument raised is that the ruling elite often becomes the primary beneficiary 
of such policies. 
Nonetheless, the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament 
(CPAPD), founded in 1985, is gradually shifting the perceptions held toward China 
(mostly by Western countries) as being indifferent to the pressing conflicts and human 
suffering in the continent. CPAPD seem to be at the forefront of China’s policies on 
peace and security. For instance, CPAPD organized, in Liaoning Province, a series of 
peace activities between the 21st and 24th of September 2011 to observe the International 
Day of Peace in China69. Similarly, CPAPD has been vocally active in condemning the 
insurgence of piracy off the coast of Somalia.  
Despite the contradictions surrounding China’s relations with Africa, the trends 
seem to cast the People’s Republic of China as a key and strategic ally of the African 
states, including the observation of peace and security (given that it is also a permanent 
member of the United Nations’ Security Council). It would be interesting to examine how 
the African media is covering China’s increasing role in administering economic and 
peace missions in Africa, especially in the greater Horn of Africa (Uganda, Sudan, 
Rwanda, Burundi, Djibouti, Eretria, Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia) and the Great Lakes 
Region (Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia Djibouti and Uganda) that are prone to socially 
protracted conflicts.   
It would be interesting to assess or to conduct a comparative analysis on how 
various media outlets in sub-Saharan Africa are paiting Sino-Africa relationships and 
                                                
69 See http://www.cpapd.org.cn/web/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId=320, accessed May 22, 2012.  
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how the media constructs around this subject is embraced locally. This may help 
understand why, despite the sharp critisms attached to China’s aid in Africa, many 
African leaders are opening up trade paertenerships with China while assigning most of 
their infrastructural development projects to the chinease companies.  
This dissertation is intended to broaden the theoretical and analytical framework 
of protracted conflicts in multiethnic societies, particularly sub-Saharan Africa 
overridden by conflicts that are partly contingent upon media’s representation of the 
“ethnic other”. It can be useful to various groups such as governments, non-governmental 
organizations, media groups, human rights and advocacy groups and learning institutions 
involved in peace-building on multiple broad levels. 
That is, this study may not only help identify key uses of vernacular radio, but 
also the dominant radios in different communities so as to design targeted programs to 
bolster inter-group peace processes, which should also take into account the formats used 
by these radio. Given the shifts in radio narratives with the introduction of new elements, 
groups involved in peace-building may also use the findings of this study to identity and 
determine stages of conflict maturity for intervention purposes, whether during 
categorization stage, victimization stage or re-evaluation stage.  
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APPENDICES  
 
 
ORAL CONSENT:   
[Read the protocol verbatim before conducting any interview] 
 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW TEMPLATES: 
 
Title of the research: Exploring the Politics of Intergroup Accommodation in Kenya’s 
Vernacular Radios During the 2007/08 Conflicts 
Principle investigator: Philip Onguny, Université de Montreal, Communications 
Department 
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Micheline Frenette, Université de Montreal, Communications 
Department 
 
I am currently a Ph.D. candidate in Communications at the University of Montreal, 
Canada. My concentration is in International Comunication and Development. I am 
conducting a research on the links between vernacular radio narratives and the 
accommodation of intergroup relations in the events leading to the 2007/08 conflicts.  
 
As such, I would like to interview you to seek your views on the ways in which 
vernacular radios played a role in shaping the perceptions of different groups with respect 
to this conflict. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and you can skip the questions 
that make you feel uncomfortable. You may also terminate the interview at any time.  
 
Taking part in this study also confirms that you are at least 18 years old, and a member of 
the study’s target groups: Luo, Kikuyu or Kalenjin70. Your identity and the information 
you provide will be treated with confidentiality, unless you wish to be quoted alongside 
the comments you make. I anticipate that this interview will take no longer than one hour, 
and will be conducted exclusively in English. 
 
Any questions regarding this inquiry can be addressed directly to me at <<<<<<<<<<<<. 
You can also contact the Ombudsman of the University of Montreal at 
ombudsman@umontreal.ca or call 1-(514) 343-2100 for more information about your 
rights as a participant. 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, please let me know by saying YES. [IF YES] 
Thank you. This interview will be tape-recorded to ensure that I accurately capture all the 
information you provide. The recordings will strictly be used for the purpose of this 
research. [If NO] May I ask you the reason why you prefer not to be tape-recorded?  
 
[Indicate the date and location of the interview:..............................................................] 
                                                
70 Omit the whole sentence if interviewing key respondents  
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TEMPLATE 1: RESPONDENTS IN KISUMU, ELDORET AND NYERI 
 
SECTION A: INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS  
 
To begin, I would like to get to know you a little bit more [take note of respondent’s 
gender discretely – Male/Female].  
1. So, how long have you been living in Kisumu/Eldoret/Nyeri? [select depending 
on the location of inquiry] 
2. Did you grow up here? 
3. Could you talk to me briefly about what you do for a living?  
a. Would you consider this a blue-collar or white-collar job? [if both or don’t 
know, ask the respondent to explain] 
4. How do you normally follow news in general? [probe to get an extensive list of 
media consulted – if radio is not mentioned, ask if the respondent listens to radios 
in general] 
 
 
SECTION B: VERNACULAR RADIO LISTENERSHIP 
 
1. You just mentioned listening to radios as one of the ways in which you keep 
yourself informed with the current affairs.  
a. Do you own this radio device, or how do you normally have access to the 
radio? 
2. Which vernacular radio stations do you listen to? [wait for the respondent to list 
the radio stations, and ask why] 
a. So I presume that you are a Kikuyu/Luo/Kalenjin [choose depending on 
the location], is this correct? [if not corresponding to location’s ethnic 
majority, ensure that the respondent is a member of the study’s target 
groups] 
3. Among the radios you just mentioned, which one do you listen to the most? 
[probe to find out why the respondent finds this station more appealing than 
others] 
a. Have you ever taken part in any of the radio debates on-air (e.g. email, 
SMS, call-in, etc)? [if yes, ask in what capacity and how frequently] 
5. How useful are vernacular radios to you as a Kenyan? [probe to find out the type 
of content the respondent likes to listen to, including specific programs if any, and 
why]  
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a. How frequently do you listen to these radios, would you say [everyday] 
[every other day] [once or twice a week] or [other]? [ask the respondent to 
explain if “other”]  
b. Do you consult any other media even while listening to vernacular radio 
broadcast?  
[if no, ask why] [If yes, ask if they the same media mentioned previously] 
 
SECTION C: VERNACULAR RADIOS AND THE 2007/08 CONFLICTS: 
 
Now, let us turn to the 2007 presidential elections and the conflicts that followed shortly 
after the announcement of the official results. I would like you to reflect on how 
vernacular radios which you mentioned covered the events leading to this particular 
crisis. 
1. According to many reports, the 2007/08 conflicts are, so far, the worst conflicts 
Kenya has ever witnessed since independence. Do you believe that vernacular 
radios are partly or entirely to be blamed for this conflict? [probe to find out why] 
a. What struck you the most in how the news was presented in the period 
leading to the crisis? [probe for more information if necessary] 
2. What were the main issues covered by these radios prior to the conflict? 
a. Among the issues you just mentioned, could you tell me which ones 
dominated the airwaves the most? 
b. How were the issues covered? (i.e. interview with political leaders, phone-
in…) [probe to get specific answers with regard to the content and 
formats used]  
3. How about during the violent conflicts, what were the main issues discussed on-
air? 
a. Did you notice any differences/similarities in terms of news coverage? 
[probe to get specific answers with regard to the content and formats 
used] 
4. Was the coverage different or similar after the violent conflicts stopped? [probe to 
get specific answers with regard to the content and formats used] 
5. Many believe that the manner in which the elections were coverage sparked 
hatred between different groups, and thus led to the conflicts. Do you think 
vernacular radio hosts were tolerant toward other ethnic groups? [probe to get 
specific answers with regard to the three stages of the conflict] 
6. Given the information you just provided, do you think vernacular radios directly 
instigated the 2007/08 conflicts because they serve ethnic interests? [probe to find 
out why] 
7. How do you see the future of vernacular radios in Kenya? 
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[Before we terminate the interview, I will ask you only two more questions and that’s 
it]  
i. Which among the following best describes your highest level of 
education? [Primary] [Secondary] [Post-secondary - vocational training 
institutions] [University degree or higher] 
ii. What is your age group among the following age-brackets: [18-23] [24-
29] [30-35] [36-41] [42-47] [48-53] [54-59] [60-65].  
CONCLUSION: 
 
Thank you for taking time to do this interview. As mentioned earlier, everything you said 
shall be treated with confidentiality. However, if you want to be quoted alongside the 
information you provided, I will only use your first name [pause and wait for the 
respondent to decide]. Thank you for your time. 
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TEMPLATE 2: KEY RESPONDENTS  
[Read the oral consent verbatim before the interview] 
 
SECTION A: INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS: 
 
To begin, I would like to get to know you a little bit more [take note of respondent’s 
gender discretely – Male/Female].  
1. Could you talk to me briefly about your profession?  
a. Would you say your profession involves peace-building? [probe to get 
specific responses e.g. researcher, advocate…] 
2. How do you normally follow news in general? [probe to get an extensive list of 
media consulted] 
 
SECTION B: VERNACULAR RADIO LISTENERSHIP 
 
You just mentioned listening to radios as one of the ways in which you keep yourself 
informed with the current affairs.  
1. How do you find radio broadcasting in Kenya, compared to other media such as 
newspaper readership? 
2. Do you listen to vernacular radios? [if no, ask why, then proceed to section C; if 
yes, probe to find out which stations the respondent listens to] 
a. Which ones in particular? [probe to find out which stations the respondent 
listens to the most and why] 
3. Have you contributed to any of the debates on-air (e.g. email, SMS, call-in, etc)? 
[if yes, ask in what capacity and how frequently] 
4. How frequently do you listen to these radios? Would you say (everyday) (every 
other day) (once or twice a week) or (other – please specify) 
5. What would be the main difference, apart from the language of broadcast, 
between vernacular radios and official-language radios? 
 
SECTION C: VERNACULAR RADIOS AND THE 2007/08 CONFLICTS: 
 
Now, let us turn to the 2007 presidential elections and the conflicts that followed shortly 
after the announcement of the official results. You must have come across several reports 
indicating that vernacular radios may have facilitated the spread of hate speech between 
different groups. 
1. Do you really think vernacular radios were responsible for this conflict? [probe to 
find out why the respondent feels that way]  
a. What struck you the most in how the vernacular radio news were 
presented to the audiences?  
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2. What were the main issues covered by these radios prior to the conflict? 
a. Among the issues you just mentioned, could you tell me which ones 
dominated the airwaves the most? 
b. How were the issues covered? (e.g. interview with political leaders, 
phone-in…) [probe to get specific answers with regard to content and 
formats used] 
3. And during the violent conflicts, what were the main issues discussed on-air? 
[probe to get specific answers with regard to content and formats used] 
4. Was the news coverage any different after the violent conflicts stopped? [probe to 
get specific answers with regard to content and formats used] 
5. Many believe that the manner in which the elections were coverage sparked 
intergroup hatred, which led to the conflicts. Do you think vernacular radio hosts 
were tolerant toward other ethnic groups? [probe to get specific answers relating 
to the three stages of the conflict] 
a. Do you think vernacular radios are ethnically divisive compared to the 
official-language radios? [probe to find out why] 
 
[I only have four more questions and we’ll be done] 
6. If you were a policymaker, which you actually are in many respects, what policy 
guidelines would you suggest to ensure ethnic tolerance is observed in vernacular 
radio broadcasts? [probe to find out what the respondent thought about the 
temporary ban on live media imposed by the government during the violent 
conflicts in 2007/08] 
7. How do you see the future of vernacular radios in Kenya, especially with the 
newly adopted Constitution? 
8. Apart from ethno-political interests, what do you think explains the violence that 
many African countries seem to have during election cycles? 
9. What did you make of the intervention of the international community in bridging 
the differences between the ODM and PNU party leaders? 
CONCLUSION: 
 
Thank you for taking time to do this interview. As mentioned earlier, everything you said 
shall be treated with confidentiality. However, if you want to be quoted alongside the 
information you provided, I can do that as well [pause and wait for the respondent to 
decide]. Thank you for your time. 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
AKFED  Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development  
AU African Union 
CCK Communication Commission of Kenya 
CDF Constituency Development Fund 
CPAPD Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament 
DR Congo Democratic Republic of Congo 
EAC East African Community 
ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya 
FORAC Forum on China-Africa Co-operation 
GEMA Gikuyu Embu Meru Association 
IDP Internally Displaced Person 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union 
KANU Kenya African National Union 
KAMATUSA Kalenjin Maasai Turkana and Samburu 
KBC Kenya Broadcasting Corporation 
KNA Kenya National Archives 
KNHRC Kenya National Human Rights Commission 
KPU Kenya People’s Union 
KTN Kenya Television Network 
KUJ Kenya Union of Journalists 
LSK Law Society of Kenya 
MCK Media Commission of Kenya 
MOA Media Owners Association 
MoU Memorandum of Understanding 
NARC National Rainbow Coalition 
NCCK National Council of Churches of Kenya 
NMG Nation Media Group 
NTV Nation Television 
ODM Orange Democratic Movement 
PNU Party of National Unity 
PSC Protracted Social Conflict 
RTLM Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
SG Standard Group 
UN United Nations 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USIU United States International University  
 
 
 
 
 
